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Winter 1988–89

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James L. Sundquist — The New Era of Coalition Government in the United States

David M. Barrett — The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson and The Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN explores why American security policy in the Middle East exhibits little sensitivity to indigenous political forces and focuses instead on the Soviet threat. He studies how cognitive and bureaucratic factors affect the response of American decision makers to radical political change in the region.

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST describes a new era of divided—or coalition—government in the United States. He argues for a new theory to replace the long-established doctrine that the political party unites the government under presidential leadership and thus makes the separation of powers work.

DAVID M. BARRETT surveys the anti-escalation advice offered by six men to Lyndon Johnson before he moved the United States into a major commitment of ground troops in Vietnam. He concludes that Johnson, contrary to popular mythology, sought and heard widely divergent views before escalating the war.

JEFFREY HERBST examines the prospects for the overthrow of the white regime in South Africa. He finds that analogies to other recent popular revolutions that overthrew dictators are misleading and that the black majority will not be able to gain power for the foreseeable future.

VERNON COLEMAN analyzes the politics of the postwar labor movement. He argues that labor politics is best understood in terms of the extent to which union leaders expand their power in national government by advancing policies to benefit unorganized, low-wage workers.

MARIE ANCHORDOGUY analyzes how Japan used a public corporation—The Japan Electronic Computer Company (JECC)—to target the development of a domestic computer industry.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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American Globalism in the Middle East: The Roots of Regional Security Policy

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN

Students of American involvement in different Third World regions frequently share a common criticism of U.S. security policy: the United States tends to misunderstand indigenous political change and often mistakes nationalism and neutralism for Soviet ideology and influence. America frequently finds itself fighting against the inevitable forces of political change that have accompanied decolonization and modernization in the Third World. As a result, the argument continues, the United States undermines its own objectives in the periphery by exacerbating anti-western sentiment, transforming intrastate or regional disputes into confrontations of East versus West, and even pushing states toward alignment with the Soviet Union. Currently, this line of reasoning is often advanced with respect to American policy toward Central America; in previous years it has been applied to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.[1]

[1] On Asia see George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York: John Wiley, 1979); and Selig Harrison, *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1978). On Latin America see Cole Blaiser, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Doubleday, 1981). On Africa see Thomas Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985); and Henry Bienen, "The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa" in John Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is assistant professor of politics at Princeton University. He has recently published the book, *The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security.*

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This article will evaluate this argument and examine the roots of U.S. regional security policy more generally by focusing exclusively on the Middle East. Two specific questions will be addressed. First, has the United States tended to react inappropriately to political change in the Middle East and to focus on the Soviet threat to the exclusion of intraregional concerns? Second, if there is such a bias in U.S. regional security policy, what are its sources?

Section one examines two specific periods (1957–1958 and 1979–1980) that correspond both to significant political upheaval in the Middle East and to substantive change in U.S. security policy toward the region.[2] There are striking similarities between these two periods, both in terms of regional political developments and in terms of the U.S. reaction. After a brief review of the case studies, I will examine recurring weaknesses in the U.S. response to political change. The analysis reveals that U.S. security policy has in fact been skewed by a basic misunderstanding of regional developments and that the United States has tended to lose sight of the intraregional context in favor of broader East-West considerations. This tendency will be referred to as American "globalism."

The second and third sections of the article attempt to expose the roots of American globalism. The analysis is based on a simple conceptualization that breaks the policy formulation process into three chronological and analytic stages: identification of the problem (input) → discussion of the problem and potential responses (decision process) → policy initiative (output). Both the chronological and analytic components of this conceptualization are crucial. As will become evident shortly, U.S. globalism is rooted in the sequential nature of the policy formulation process as well as in the conceptual framework within which decision makers operate. Within the context of this conceptualization there are two broad explanations of the global bias in U.S. regional security policy (the output). The first focuses on the input stage. It suggests that U.S. policy has been shaped mainly by such stimuli as perceptions of the Soviet Union, the dispositions of successive administrations, or alliance politics, and that decision makers have ignored the political and strategic realities of the Middle East. In other words, the attention of U.S. decision makers may be directed toward external variables, causing them to overlook or pay insufficient attention to the regional situation. The second explanation focuses on the decision stage. It suggests that decision makers implement inappropriate policies because they do not know how to cope with regional political change, not because they overlook it or are distracted by other stimuli. The United States accurately perceives the nature of political change, but is unable to respond appropriately. The input itself is correct; it is the decision-making process that skews the output.

[2] I am concerned in this article with "radical" political change: events which undermine the position of preexisting elites and lead to a change in the political order that constitutes a clear break with traditional patterns of authority and legitimacy. Such events may, but need not, alter a state's foreign policy or domestic economic structure.

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Section two shows that U.S. globalism has not been the result of improper identification of the problem. The United States has in fact detected and reacted promptly to ideological and political realignment in the Middle East; changes in U.S. strategy since 1945 have been initially stimulated by shifts in the political orientation of regional states. Moreover, during the early stages of political upheaval, U.S. decision makers recognized accurately the indigenous nature of radical change. Misperceptions developed only later in the decision process, when elites came under pressure to formulate a concrete policy response.

Section three examines the dynamics behind and the substance of U.S. responses to political change during the policy formulation stage. It shows that American globalism is deeply rooted within the decision-making process. The article traces the inadequacy of U.S. responses to political change to two key variables: cognitive and bureaucratic distortion of the decision-making process. First, radical change in the Middle East, because of the uncertainty and stress it produces in Washington, causes decision makers to distort their perceptions of events in the region and to blur the distinction between indigenous and Soviet-sponsored threats to U.S. interests. Cognitive biases, produced by the need both to simplify complex events and to shape incoming information to preexisting conceptual frameworks, drives elites to interpret political upheaval within the context of containment. Second, this perceptual distortion is exacerbated by the tendency of the top echelon of decision makers to exclude regional experts from the policy formulation process. This minimizes the influence on policy of those most able to understand the sources and implications of regional political change. The formulation of policy is left to generalists at the top of the hierarchy—individuals with little or no regional expertise who are predisposed to view events within an East-West framework. Cognitive distortions and the constriction of the decision-making process that is responsible for excluding regional specialists are most pronounced when crisis situations intensify. This explains why the United States appears to recognize accurately the indigenous nature of political change in the initial stages of upheaval, yet later responds inappropriately in a manner that suggests considerable misperception of regional realities. It is the synergistic effect of interrelated cognitive and bureaucratic biases that has persistently produced globalism in U.S. regional security policy.

The Inadequacy of U.S. Responses to Political Change

Case Studies

U.S. interests in the Middle East have remained fairly constant since the early postwar years: maintaining access to oil, containing direct and indirect Soviet advances, and protecting Israeli security. Important to the attainment of all three objectives has been the enhancement of U.S. leverage in the region and the maintenance of stable and friendly relationships with powerful actors in the Arab world. Managing these relationships within the context of the extremely volatile political

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environment that has accompanied decolonization and modernization has been one of the key challenges facing U.S. policy.

As periods of considerable upheaval in the Middle East, the years from 1957–1958 and 1979–1980 offer rich historical material for the study of how U.S. security policy has adapted to changes in the political and strategic environment. During the former period, Nasserism and pan-Arab nationalism spread throughout much of the eastern Mediterranean littoral. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rising popularity and influence after the Suez crisis in 1956 led to political instability in Jordan and Syria, to the formation of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) in February 1958, and later that year contributed to a coup in Iraq and a civil war in Lebanon. These changes were associated with a weakening of the West's strategic and political position in the Middle East. Nasser denied the British access to bases in Egypt; in Iraq, the pro-western Nuri al Said was killed and replaced by General Abdul Karim Qassim, who promptly closed British airfields in the country and withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact;[3] in Lebanon the pro-American President Camille Chamoun fell to the neutralist opposition. In short, there appeared to be a widespread political movement that threatened to undermine the West's predominant position in the Middle East that had taken root during the era of European colonialism.

The Eisenhower administration took a series of steps to impair the spread of both Arab nationalism and what it saw as Soviet communism. Unveiled in January 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine made clear a U.S. commitment to use force to defend allies in the region against "any nation controlled by International Communism."[4] During the course of the year, further steps were taken to isolate Nasser and preserve the regional status quo. These efforts culminated in July 1958 with the landing of U.S. forces in Lebanon to prevent the impending fall of President Chamoun.

In 1979–1980, the Iranian revolution constituted an even more direct challenge to U.S. policy and to America's strategic position in the Middle East. The shah and his large and advanced military had been America's chief surrogate in Southwest Asia and assumed the role of regional policeman. The revolution not only ended Iran's close relationship with the United States, but Iran was transformed from a status quo power into a state intent on bringing radical political change to the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 heightened American sensitivity to the strategic vulnerability of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf area. Whatever the motivations behind the invasion, the Soviets enhanced their ability to project power to the Gulf and exhibited the willingness to move

[3] The Pact—a defensive alliance—was formed in 1955 with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Britain as members. After Iraq's withdrawal, it became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the headquarters were moved from Baghdad to Ankara.

[4] U.S. Department of State, *United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957*, State Department Publication no. 6505 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1957), 20.

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their armies outside the eastern bloc.[5] The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 further complicated the regional situation and posed a direct threat to the flow of oil from the Gulf.

The Carter administration responded to this triad of crises with its own doctrinal innovation. "Any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such assaults will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[6] The Carter administration established the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), enhancing America's ability to intervene in the region. While it did not involve the deployment of active combat units to Southwest Asia, the Carter Doctrine did mark a permanent shift in U.S. strategy. The RDF, the search for access to bases in the theater, the procurement of new lift assets and new light divisions, the efforts to construct a new regional security framework based on the Gulf Cooperation Council—these were all components of a thorough reassessment of U.S. Gulf strategy.[7]

U.S. Misperceptions: The Role of the Superpowers in Regional Security

The United States responded to each of these crises in a similar fashion. Both the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Carter Doctrine were to convey a credible threat of U.S. intervention in the Middle East, thereby erecting a deterrent posture against the Soviet Union and regional adversaries. Yet in both cases, U.S. strategy fell prey to two key shortcomings: the United States exaggerated the Soviet threat and became preoccupied with it to the exclusion of regional problems; the United States overestimated the degree to which local states shared America's strategic perspective and the degree to which they would turn to U.S. military power to meet their security concerns. As a result, the United States jeopardized its own objectives by alienating regional states and intensifying the cold war in the Middle East.

Exaggerating the Soviet Threat. From the Suez crisis in July 1956 to the landing of Marines in Lebanon two years later, the Eisenhower administration grew increasingly concerned with the spread of Soviet communism. While President Dwight D. Eisenhower argued against a military reaction to Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal Company, by January 1957 he was prepared to take measures to isolate Nasser politically and to declare openly a U.S. commitment to fight with military force "International Communism" in the Middle East. As Nasserism spread during the following year, so did U.S. concern about growing Communist influence. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles saw the growth of pro-Nasser sentiment in Syria

[5] See Thomas McNaugher, *Arms and Oil* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 23–46.

[6] Cited from 1980 State of the Union address in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 426.

[7] For details of these efforts, see Charles Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), chaps. 4–6

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in mid-1957 as part of a pattern in which the "end result sought is that the country will fall under the control of International Communism and become a Soviet Satellite."[8] The establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 provided further evidence of the "apparently inexorable drift of Syria toward the Communist orbit."[9] The Iraqi coup and the chaos in Lebanon were viewed in similar terms. Referring to events in Lebanon, Eisenhower believed that "the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble."[10] The intervention in Lebanon, though its immediate goal was to prevent the fall of Chamoun, had the much broader goals of stemming the continuing spread of Nasserism and communism and preventing the entire region from sliding into the Soviet camp.[11]

Was the Eisenhower administration justified in calibrating its policy to respond to the Soviet challenge and in associating events in the Middle East with the rampant spread of communism? While the Soviet Union may indeed have benefited from the loss of western influence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, there is little evidence that suggests that the Soviets were involved in orchestrating events in these states or that the new regimes were either Communist or overtly pro-Soviet in orientation. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the "radical" regimes that emerged during this period were by no means drawn to communism, and they reluctantly aligned with the Soviet Union in part because of Eisenhower's insistence that they choose between East and West.

Nasser himself moved closer to the Soviets and increasingly relied on them for arms and financial assistance only after the Baghdad Pact had frustrated his bid for leadership in the Arab world and after he was affronted by U.S. unwillingness to fund the Aswan Dam project and angered by the Eisenhower Doctrine.[12] The UAR was anything but the product of a Communist conspiracy; the Syrian leadership pressured a reluctant Nasser to assist it in suppressing growing Communist influence in Syria.[13] The coup in Iraq was similarly devoid of pro-Communist sentiment and Soviet meddling. It was the result of long-term splits within the military, and Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact reflected Qassim's desire to pursue a policy of neutralism, not to ally with the Soviet Union.[14] The civil war in Lebanon was also the result of internal political rifts – stemming from the Na-

[8] Department of State Memorandum for the President, 20 August 1957, cited in Steven Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 86.

[9] Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 263.

[10] Ibid., 266.

[11] William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970" in Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, eds., *Force Without War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 232–248.

[12] Gail Meyer, *Egypt and the United States* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 184–187. See also Robert Stookey, *America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter* (New York: John Wiley, 1975), 147–149; and Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* 66–71.

[13] Richard Nolte, "The United States Policy in the Middle East" in The American Assembly, *The United States in the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), 168.

[14] Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985). On the coup see 116–125; on the orientation of the new regime see 153–155.

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tional Pact of 1943 between the Christians and Moslems—that were stimulated neither by Communist sympathizers nor external meddling. While the opposition did receive supplies from the UAR, a UN commission found almost no evidence to support President Chamoun's claim that the UAR had undertaken "massive intervention" in Lebanon.[15]

In short, the Eisenhower administration's suspicions that international communism was sweeping the Middle East were simply unfounded. The spread of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism indeed made alignment with the United States a less popular proposition (and in some cases a dangerous one). Washington was understandably concerned about its eroding influence. And the decline of western leverage in the Middle East after 1956 was a development upon which the Soviets might be able to capitalize. But this was not a movement orchestrated by the Soviets nor one which professed any particular affinity for Soviet communism. To base policy on these assumptions was misguided and led to the formulation of inappropriate and, at times, counterproductive initiatives.

During the 1979–1980 crisis in the Persian Gulf, the United States demonstrated a similar preoccupation with the Soviet Union, though it manifested itself in a different way. The political upheaval within Iran was not perceived in Washington as the result of Soviet infiltration. In fact, as will be discussed below, U.S. recognition of the fact that this was a deep-rooted social and religious movement created confusion and hesitancy during initial efforts to craft a coherent response. The policy that was eventually formulated to deal with the crisis, however, was calibrated to meet the Soviet threat and showed little sensitivity to the regional political implications of the Iranian revolution.

Late in 1978, top-level officials in Washington began to consider how to respond to the growing chaos in Iran and how to compensate for the potential loss of Iran as America's principal strategic ally in the region. While there was little consensus about how to react to the social unrest, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown did instruct the Pentagon to begin contingency planning to replace the guardian role filled by the shah. This planning focused on a wide range of intraregional missions.[16] In February 1979, Brown also spelled out the U.S. commitment—which was later to become the core of the Carter Doctrine—"to defend its vital interests (in the Middle East) with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary."[17] Contrary to popular wisdom, the strategic foundation of the Carter Doctrine, supposedly formulated to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was incorporated into U.S. policy over ten months before the Soviet move as a response to the revolution in Iran.

The common perception of the link between the RDF and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is in part a product of a curious shift within U.S. policy that took

[15] Nolte, "The United States Policy in the Middle East," 169.
[16] See Kupchan, *Persian Gulf*, 83–98.
[17] Harold Brown on CBS News, *Face the Nation*, 25 February 1979.

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place during the course of 1979. During the second half of the year, planning came to focus not on coping with a revolutionary Iran or U.S. involvement in an intraregional conflict, but on a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Iran.[18] This shift occurred because of U.S. concern that the chaos in Iran might invite Soviet intervention and for bureaucratic reasons to be discussed below. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confirmed this bias within the planning process; from late 1979, the Pentagon focused exclusively on responding to a Soviet move toward the Persian Gulf. Given the deterioration of Iran's military capability and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, American efforts to undertake military planning for a potential confrontation with the Soviets in Southwest Asia were indeed justified. Yet as subsequent events have shown, fear of a Soviet thrust toward the oilfields should not have subsumed concern about dealing with radical political change in Iran and its impact on intraregional alignments and tensions—issues that had far greater strategic implications for the United States than did the invasion of Afghanistan. Furthermore, the mired Soviet position in Afghanistan only decreased the likelihood and feasibility of a simultaneous invasion of Iran. Nevertheless, the Pentagon concentrated on a Soviet contingency, basing its focus on the specious assumption that planning for the worst case scenario would also prepare the United States for lesser contingencies.

This analysis is by no means meant to suggest that the United States should *not* have taken steps to respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Whatever the motivations behind the Soviet move, the event signified a willingness and ability to project power into Southwest Asia and warranted a strengthening of America's deterrent posture. The problem is that the United States exaggerated the significance of the Soviet move and its strategic implications for the Gulf, focused on the Soviets to the exclusion of events in Iran, and therefore developed a security policy for the area that submerged regional political realities within an East-West context.[19]

Misreading the U.S. Role in Regional Security. The changing political environments in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon in the mid-1950s all shared at least one common component: alignment with the United States was rapidly becoming a less attractive option for regional leaders. Beginning in 1956, the political costs of close and visible ties to the United States—at both the domestic and intraregional level—rose sharply. A central goal of Nasserism was to end foreign control of Egypt and the Middle East. In Nasser's own words, "we aim at eradication of past evils which brought about our domination, and the vestiges of the past which took place despite ourselves and which were caused by imperialism through treachery and deceit."[20] This objective clearly appealed to other leaders in the

[18] Author's correspondence with Robert Komer, 29 July 1985.

[19] For an elaboration of the ways in which the United States exaggerated the Soviet threat in Southwest Asia see Robert Johnson, "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts," *International Security* 10 (Winter 1985-86): 58-63.

[20] Speech by President Nasser, 26 July 1956, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *The Suez Canal Problem,* Department of State Publication 6392 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956), 27.

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Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine was received coldly throughout the region and viewed by many as proof that U.S. imperialism was replacing European colonialism.[21] Chamoun was the only leader in the Arab world to endorse enthusiastically U.S. policy.[22] Yet Chamoun was to find that his relationship with the West undermined his legitimacy and intensified the domestic political chaos.[23] The situation in Iraq was little different. Nuri al Said's participation in the Baghdad Pact and strong ties to the West played a key role in his demise.[24]

During the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration seemed to read these messages accurately. Dulles presented the following argument against intervention: "Let us remember that while *we* think first of the danger that stems from international communism, many of *them* think first of possible encroachments from the West, for that is the rule they have actually known at first hand."[25] Furthermore, the administration saw little evidence that Nasser's behavior either before or during the Suez crisis was the product of sympathy for or manipulation by the Soviets.[26]

By 1957, however, this sensitivity to regional dynamics and anticolonial sentiment had withered and the administration had focused its attention on the Soviet threat. Despite and *because of* strengthening anti-American currents, the United States reacted to the spread of Nasserism by seeking to solidify its strategic ties with regional states and to increase its visible military presence. The Eisenhower Doctrine sought to reaffirm America's willingness to intervene in the region. Eisenhower asserted that regional states would "welcome closer cooperation with the United States" to realize "independence, economic well-being, spiritual growth."[27] The President went on to say that "the best insurance against this dangerous contingency [the spread of communism] is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East. . . ."[28] Nasser could hardly have hoped for a more timely contribution to fuel Arab nationalism. The administration also made an attempt to distance itself from Israel, assuming that this would enable Arab states to cooperate more fully with the United States.[29] At the same time, Washington emphasized the imminence of the Soviet threat

[21] Nolte, "The United States Policy in the Middle East," 166.

[22] Quandt, "Lebanon," 226.

[23] Chamoun later admitted that a less public display of U.S. support may have been wiser. See Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Archives, Interview with Camille Chamoun, 28 August 1964, 47–48.

[24] Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq,* 118–123.

[25] Dulles cited in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 179.

[26] See Richard Moss, "The Limits of Policy: An Investigation of the Spiral Model, the Deterrence Model, and Miscalculations in U.S.-Third World Relations," unpublished diss. manuscript, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1987, chap. 3.

[27] President Eisenhower, "Radio and Television Address to the American People," reprinted in *The Situation in the Middle East,* Department of State Publication 6461, Near and Mideast Series 23 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), 18–19.

[28] Ibid., 21.

[29] Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* 63.

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to regional states. The President suggested that Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt be publicized throughout the Middle East so that "every weak country understands what can be in store for it once it falls under the domination of the Soviets."[30]

By the middle of 1957, the administration acted on this rhetoric. Eisenhower sent vessels of the Sixth Fleet to show the flag along the Mediterranean shore in response both to an alleged Communist coup attempt in Jordan and, a few months later, to the strengthening of pro-Nasser forces in Syria. The landing in Lebanon followed the next year, confirming the administration's belief in the need to demonstrate U.S. willingness to use force. The United States may have achieved its short-term goals of stopping the civil war; there was a peaceful transition of power. In the long-term, however, America's more aggressive military posture did little to solve Lebanon's complex political divisions and certainly did not succeed in arresting the spread of Arab nationalism or anti-Americanism. On the contrary, U.S. policy in 1957–1958 exacerbated anti-American sentiment and hastened the political polarization of the region.

The situation in 1979–1980 was remarkably similar. The Iranian revolution itself, and the virulent anti-Americanism that accompanied it, broadcast in dramatic terms the potential for close cooperation with the United States to turn into violent hostility towards America. In as much as the shah's modernization program was made possible by and supported by the United States, Washington was implicated in the revolution. Even if the more conservative states such as Saudi Arabia did not fear the domestic repercussions of visible ties to the United States (which they did), they were justifiably concerned about changes in the region's political environment. The shah's Iran had strengthened the moderate coalition in the Arab world; coupled with Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League following the Camp David Treaty, the revolution initially contributed to the erosion of a moderate bloc within Arab politics, making the United States a far less attractive partner for strategic cooperation.[31]

The U.S. response to these changes paralleled that of 1957–1958. The Carter administration initially felt that an overt U.S. military presence or the use of force would only worsen the situation in Iran. Early in the crisis, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance seemed well aware of the need for a politically sensitive response; he perceived "no sense of panic among the moderate states about either Soviet intentions or the disappearance of the Shah. Our friends wanted continued discreet political and military support, but no splashy deployment of American military power which could exacerbate their internal political difficulties."[32] The United States also attempted to foster good relations with the interim governments that followed the shah's departure.

[30] Robert Ferrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 334.

[31] See Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 352–386.

[32] Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 347.

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Again, this sensitivity to the regional situation eroded quickly. Despite the warning signals that emerged from the Iranian revolution, the United States by the middle of 1979 had begun efforts to secure access to military bases throughout the Persian Gulf/northern Indian Ocean area. Planning for the RDF was based upon the assumption of gaining reliable access to facilities in the region. The Americans proposed establishing a forward base in Saudi Arabia but were quickly rebuffed by the Saudis.[33] The United States did succeed in securing access to bases in Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and Egypt—states in which a visible American military presence was less dangerous, but also ones that were much farther from the likely area of conflict in the northern Gulf. Furthermore, the reliability of these arrangements has already been called into question. Oman has come under pressure, particularly from Kuwait, to loosen its military ties with Washington; bilateral political disputes have jeopardized U.S. access to facilities in Egypt. While the United States was "seeking . . . to obtain a degree of cooperation which will give us the capacity to support our friends in the area," those friends were far less certain about the benefits of such cooperation.[34]

Central to the U.S. approach was the belief that there was little difference between how America and how regional powers saw the strategic landscape. The Reagan administration attempted to forge a "strategic consensus" throughout the region based upon the supposition that the Soviet Union presented the chief threat to the stability of the area. In the same way that the Eisenhower administration hoped to use the Soviet invasion of Hungary to convince Gulf leaders of the Kremlin's intentions, the Carter and Reagan administrations publicized the imminent threat posed by the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Again mirroring the 1957–1958 crisis, the United States after 1979 attempted to distance itself from Israel. Despite these efforts, the notion of a strategic consensus based upon the Soviet threat was quickly shot down by Arab leaders. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited the Middle East in March 1981 to garner support for the new strategic consensus. One Jordanian official asserted that "it is solving rather than sidestepping the Palestinian issue which will defuse the possible radicalization of the Arab states—and it is this which is providing the Soviets with their best opening in the region."[35] The United States grew increasingly frustrated with its allies in the Gulf, while regional states grew increasingly skeptical of the motivations behind U.S. policy.[36]

By overestimating its welcome in the region and focusing on the Soviet threat, the United States, while it did not push regional states toward the Soviets as during

[33] Anthony Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 253.

[34] David Newsom, cited in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *U.S. Security Interests and Policies in Southwest Asia* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), 85.

[35] "Haig Visit to Middle East Clarifies U.S. Priorities," *London Times*, 6 April 1981.

[36] See Abdul Mansur, "The American Threat to Saudi Arabia," *Armed Forces Journal* 118 (September 1980).

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the earlier period, did strain its already tenuous relations with Gulf states. Washington undermined its own goals of enhancing U.S. leverage in the Gulf. Chaos in the northern tier and the erosion of the moderate bloc drew the United States into the region. Yet it was these same factors that made America's strategic entry into the Gulf all the more unacceptable to local powers. In 1979–1980, as in 1957–1958, the United States seemingly misread the political environment in the Middle East, subsuming regional concerns within an exaggerated perception of the Soviet threat.

U.S. Regional Security Policy: The Motivations for Change

This search for the sources of American globalism in the Middle East begins with the input stage of the decision process. What variables or stimuli have been most important in shaping U.S. policy? Policy changes may correspond to changes in administrations and the ideological dispositions they bring to office. Alternately, U.S. decision makers may be consistently concerned only with the Soviet threat and simply pay little attention to regional developments. If U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions in the Middle East have been the primary determinant behind U.S. policy, then we have an answer to the puzzle. We would not expect initiatives crafted in response to an external threat to be particularly sensitive to intraregional considerations. The problem may be one of overlooking regional political change, not misreading it. The goal of this section is to refute the above argument and to show that in the initial stages of political upheaval, decision makers have accurately perceived the indigenous nature of radical change. Shifts in the political orientation and alignment of states in the Middle East have in fact been the primary variable stimulating reassessment of U.S. security policy.

The Causes of Change in U.S. Policy

Given the succession of Arab-Israeli wars, the intensity and permanence of inter-Arab and Arab-Persian animosity, the frequency of intrastate instability and violence, and the sporadic growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East, U.S. security policy toward the region has exhibited a remarkable degree of continuity. As a rule, the United States has avoided explicit military intervention and has pursued its regional strategic objectives primarily through appointing and arming local surrogates. There were only two exceptions to this rule: during 1957–1958 and 1979–1980 the United States strengthened its military posture in the region and made clear, through both rhetoric and action, its willingness to use force. The naval escort of Kuwaiti tankers that began in 1987 constitutes a third period during which the United States has demonstrated its willingness to intervene militarily. While it is too early to study the motivations behind and the results of this operation, it does correspond with and provide further evidence in favor of the analysis that follows.

What was it about the events of 1957–1958 and 1979–1980 that led to a major shift in U.S. strategy and that distinguishes these two crises from the many others

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that have occurred in the Middle East? Under what conditions did the United States see its interests sufficiently jeopardized to warrant either intervention or a significant alteration of its military posture in the region?

We can begin by examining a number of crises in the Middle East that did *not* produce a change in U.S. strategy. This allows us to discount several popular beliefs about the determinants of U.S. policy. First, shifts in policy have not been the product of changes in U.S. administrations and the ideological dispositions they bring to office. The changes in strategy during 1957–1958 and 1979–1980 occurred while a single administration was in office. There has been striking continuity between administrations. This suggests that domestic politics have not been an important determinant of policy. Second, an Arab-Israeli war has proved to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for change in strategy. In 1957–1958 and 1979–1980, there was no war but a shift in strategy; in 1956, 1967, and 1973, there was an Arab-Israeli war but no change in strategy. Finally, a direct threat to the West's oil supply is clearly not a sufficient condition for change, as demonstrated by events in 1973–1974 and 1984–1987. From 1984 to 1986 repeated attacks on tankers in the Gulf did not elicit U.S. intervention. Furthermore, the U.S. escort of Kuwaiti tankers was not motivated by growing concern about the flow of oil. No new threat appeared in 1987 nor was there a dimunition of the flow from the Gulf or a shortage of oil in the international market. The U.S. operation appears to have been a reaction to the Soviet offer to escort Kuwaiti tankers and to the attack on the USS *Stark*. A threat to the flow of oil also does not appear to be a necessary condition. In 1957–1958, despite Nasser's closing of the Suez, the United States had sufficient reserves to divert supplies to the Europeans, averting any threat of oil shortages. Furthermore, the initiatives taken by the United States during this period had little to do with protecting the flow of oil from the region; their principal objective was to contain the spread of Nasserism and communism.

Four readily identifiable conditions may have contributed to the observed change in U.S. security policy. First, powerful regional states were experiencing internal political changes that undermined their previously pro-West orientation, jeopardizing western access to bases and business interests (1957–1958: Egypt and Iraq; 1979–1980: Iran). Second, these new regimes posed a political and military threat to their more conservative neighbors by seeking to perpetuate political change throughout the region (1957–1958: Pan-Arab nationalism; 1979–1980: Islamic fundamentalism). Third, there was a shifting of responsibilities within the NATO alliance vis-à-vis Middle East security (1957–1958: aftermath of Suez; 1979–1980: "out-of-area" debate about extending NATO's scope to include Southwest Asia). Fourth, the United States was reassessing the willingness and ability of the Soviets to project military power (1957–1958: the invasion of Hungary; 1979–1980: the invasion of Afghanistan).

Is it possible to determine which of these four conditions were most important in shaping U.S. strategy? Was it the changing distribution of responsibility among NATO partners, U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union, or regional events that led to a reassessment of U.S. security policy? A closer look at the historical evidence

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allows us to discount the importance of both NATO politics and U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union and to link shifts in U.S. policy to concern with regional political developments.

To begin, we can establish that intraalliance disputes over the Middle East had only peripheral impact on U.S. military strategy in both 1957–1958 and 1979–1980. As a result of the Suez crisis, the United States, by default as much as by design, indeed assumed greater responsibility for regional security arrangements. In Eisenhower's own words, "[t]he existing vacuum in the Middle East must by filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia."[37] Yet while the British and French withdrawal elicited greater U.S. involvement in the Middle East, it was events within the region that led to a significant change in the nature of that involvement. The loss of European influence was in itself insufficient to elicit the Eisenhower Doctrine. As shown above, the publicity and rising popularity associated with Nasser's victory in the Suez crisis fueled U.S. fears of the spread of Arab nationalism, anti-American sentiment, and communism. It was when these fears were confirmed by events in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon that the United States decided in favor of military intervention.

In the 1979–1980 crisis, the link between NATO politics and U.S. strategy is even more tenuous. In this episode, the United States established the RDF and implemented its initiatives toward Southwest Asia without even consulting the Europeans. Further, when the United States requested European assistance after the fact, Washington pressured its allies to compensate *in Europe* for the diversion of U.S. troops to the Middle East.[38] The Europeans were uncooperative, but this had little impact on the evolution of a new U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf.

It is also clear that U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions have played a secondary role in initiating change in U.S. strategy. During the period from 1967–1973, although the Soviets made clear political and strategic gains in the Middle East, there was no strengthening of U.S. military posture in the region.[39] On the contrary, the Nixon Doctrine and its corollary in the Middle East — the Twin Pillar Policy — devolved responsibility for maintaining regional security to Iran and, to a lesser extent, to Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, in neither of the two cases in which there was a significant shift in U.S. strategy was there substantial concern in Washington about changing Soviet intentions or capability *prior to* the designation of new policy. Between the

[37] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,* 178.

[38] See Charles Kupchan,"NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," *International Organization* 42 (Spring 1988); and Charles Kupchan, "The Out-of-Area Problem for NATO" in Stephen Flanagan and Fen Hampson, eds., *Securing Europe's Future* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 286–293.

[39] They broke relations with Israel and supported the PLO, enhancing their leverage with "radical" Arab states; they increased their naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1,900 ship-days/year in 1968 to 9,000 in 1973; they threatened to send airborne troops to Egypt during the 1973 war. Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions" in Alvin Rubenstein, ed., *The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 56.

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Suez crisis and the Marine landing in Lebanon, the Soviet Union continued to sell arms to Egypt and Syria but undertook no new initiatives in the Middle East. Eisenhower's presentation before Congress of his new policy for the region contained no reference to changing Soviet behavior, but only to the fact that "Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East."[40] The Soviets did use force to suppress the Hungarian revolution in October 1956, but this said little about their willingness to project power to Southwest Asia. Eisenhower only suggested that "because Soviet promises have sunk to a new low" after the invasion of Hungary, "International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable success."[41] Furthermore, the principal policy initiative of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to give economic and military aid to pro-western states (Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon) to enable them to resist the efforts of pro-Nasser forces to destabilize their regimes. There was little concern about dealing with a direct Soviet invasion. In May 1958, Secretary Dulles admitted that "an armed attack from a country which we would consider under the control of international Communism" was very unlikely.[42] During the operation in Lebanon, the United States did activate fighter wings in Turkey and move a Marine contingent from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. Yet these measures had intraregional objectives; they were intended to deter the Iraqis from attacking Kuwait.[43] In short, the Eisenhower administration's policy initiatives in 1957–1958 were not reacting to Soviet behavior per se, but to the potential for the Soviets to benefit from changing political orientations and regional alignments of power. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a response to the growing appeal of Nasserism and Arab nationalism, not to Soviet adventurism.

In 1979–1980, the chronology of events reveals a similar relationship between Soviet behavior and changes in U.S. strategy. As noted above, the original decision to establish the RDF and bolster America's ability to project force to Southwest Asia was made well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although initial planning to improve America's rapid deployment capability had begun in 1977 on the recommendation of Presidential Directive 18, it was the Iranian revolution that focused attention on Southwest Asia and ensured that the Pentagon began efforts to construct the RDF. It is also important to note that initial contingency planning for the force focused on intraregional missions, not on a U.S.–Soviet confrontation. Again, the United States was concerned that the Soviets might take advantage of the chaos in Iran to improve their position in the northern tier or deepen their political penetration of the Gulf region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indeed provided further impetus to the construction of the RDF. But it was the Iranian revolution itself—and its strategic and political implications for the Gulf region—that stimulated the formulation of a new U.S. strategy for South-

[40] U.S. Library of Congress, *A Select Chronology* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1969), 145.
[41] Ibid., 146.
[42] U.S. Department of State, "For the Press," No. 280, News Conference of 20 May 1958, 6.
[43] William Quandt, "Lebanon," 238.

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west Asia. Secretary of State Vance could not have been clearer on this point: "These steps [to bolster military capability in the Gulf] stemmed not from the invasion of Afghanistan, as some have suggested, but rather from the turmoil in Iran. The hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan simply accelerated measures already under way."[44]

The above analysis shows that shifts in U.S. security policy toward the Middle East have been initiated by changes in political alignment and orientation at the regional level. In both 1957–1958 and 1979–1980, the initial shift in U.S. policy was brought about by the fall of pro-western regimes and the fear that new political forces in the Middle East could change the orientation of the region as a whole either through ideological/religious persuasion or military coercion. This finding shows that U.S. decision makers have not simply overlooked changes in the regional political environment, and it dispells the notion that U.S. policy has been shaped primarily by domestic and alliance politics or changing assessments of Soviet intentions and capability.

This conclusion sharpens our original question: If Washington has in fact exhibited responsiveness to regional developments, to what can we attribute the identified shortcomings in U.S. strategy? Given that the input to the policy process is accurate, why has the United States tended to adopt policies that reveal misperception of political change? Because the diagnosis is correct, but the prescribed cures inappropriate, we must assume that such misperception develops during the formulation of policy.

The Cognitive and Bureaucratic Roots of American Globalism

The Cognitive Component

At the outset, it is important to recognize the inherent difficulty in both understanding indigenous political change and in appropriately responding to it. In Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran, the changing political order was shaped by deep-rooted social, ideological, and religious forces that are perplexing to those participating first-hand, no less to an external power attempting to understand from afar. Gary Sick, Iran specialist in the National Security Council (NSC) during the Carter administration, described the confusion within Iran: "Iranians of all persuasions were astonished at the rapidity of the collapse of central authority, and they almost universally misjudged the nature of the outcome and its effects on their own lives and interests."[45] Deciphering the motives behind Soviet behavior may be no easier, but understanding the implications of Soviet aggression and identifying the need for and the potential forms of response are far less complex tasks. Despite recognition of what appears to be a clear link between modernization and political instability, understanding the sources of and coping with intrastate strife and revo-

[44] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 370–371.

[45] See Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Random House, 1985), 156.

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lution in the Third World remain extremely difficult.[46] In reflecting on the fall of the shah, Henry Kissinger concisely identified the predicament:

> Assuming we had understood the peril [of revolution in Iran], what should the United States have advised? Do we possess a political theory for the transformation of developing countries? Do we know where to strike the balance between authority and freedom, between liberty and anarchy in feudal, religious societies? . . . The fact is that we lack a coherent idea of how to channel the elemental forces let loose by the process of development.[47]

It is clear that U.S. officials confronted such confusion in dealing with the Middle East crises of both 1957–1958 and 1979–1980. Throughout the mid-1950s, the Eisenhower administration was never certain whether it should support Nasser or seek to isolate him. This uncertainty was less the product of Nasser's erratic behavior than of widely disparate views within Washington about the nature of Arab nationalism and how best to respond to it.[48] Not only were there clear splits among the agencies involved in making policy, but key individuals were themselves confused about the best course of action. Admiral Arleigh Burke described an exchange of messages with his on-station commander that took place during the Suez crisis after he ordered the U.S. fleet to prepare for engagement: "Captain Brown sent back, 'Who's the enemy?' And I sent back, 'Don't take any guff from anybody.' I didn't know who the damned enemy was. . . ."[49] Eisenhower himself was uncertain about the the real causes of radicalism in the Middle East. Indeed, he remained unconvinced about even Nasser's true colors: "If he was not a Communist, he certainly succeeded in making us very suspicious of him."[50] The causes of instability in Syria in 1957–1958 were equally ambiguous to Eisenhower: "If the government comprised only radical Arab nationalists and pro-Nasserites, that was one thing; if they were to go completely Communist, that could call for action."[51] General Qassim, who led the coup in Iraq that triggered the Lebanon landing, was also "something of a mystery figure whose basic purposes were never made plain."[52] In fact, though Eisenhower constantly spoke of Communist penetration of the Middle East, he seemed to recognize that his assessment was based on belief, not on fact. In justifying the Lebanon landing, he could not go beyond stating a "deep-seated conviction" that the chaos had been caused by Communists.[53]

[46] See, for example, Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[47] Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 672–673.

[48] Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* 61–91; and Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950–1957," *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Spring 1982).

[49] John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Archives, interview with Admiral Arleigh Burke, 11 June 1966, 15.

[50] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,* 265.

[51] Ibid., 197.

[52] Ibid., 288.

[53] Ibid., 266.

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The Iranian revolution was accompanied by similar confusion and frustration in Washington. President Jimmy Carter initially stood firmly behind the shah: "The key to stability was the monarch himself, supported by the military."[54] The State Department, on the other hand, urged that the shah step down, thereby providing the United States a better chance of cultivating favorable relations with a new leadership.[55] As during the Eisenhower administration, personal descriptions of the crisis revealed a pervasive sense of uncertainty. Despite his confidence in the shah, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security adviser, perceived "a strange sense of ambiguity about him." Brzezinski also saw the crisis as presenting an "acute moral and political dilemma" for the United States. Secretary of State Vance sent a telegram to his ambassador in Teheran in December 1978 stressing that "it is essential repeat essential to terminate the continued uncertainty."[56] Vance also commented that "we are operating with too limited an understanding of Iranian political realities."[57] The most dramatic evidence that the administration did not know how to react or whom to support was that high level officials simply avoided dealing with the crisis. The first high level meeting on Iran occurred some ten months after the initiation of civil disturbances—less than three months before the shah's departure in January 1979.[58] Brzezinski admitted that "until the crisis became very grave, the attention of the top decision makers, myself included, was riveted on other issues."[59] While this delay in part resulted from the administration's preoccupation with China, SALT II, and Camp David, Gary Sick pointed to another explanation:

> At least equally important for the relative lack of attention paid to Iran during this critical period was the underlying realization that there were no attractive options available to Washington. Civil rebellion poses painful dilemmas. . . . [S]ince there were very few realistic policy options available, and since any substantial change in policy involved actions that were certain to be politically distasteful or worse, people were inclined to keep their thoughts to themselves. The combined effect was to stifle communication, to breed suspicion and to encourage procrastination in the hope that the situation would resolve itself somehow.[60]

Both the Eisenhower and Carter administrations were thus faced with situations that bred intellectual and political frustration and uncertainty: intellectual, in the sense that the changes occurring in the region were extremely complex and that there appeared to be no attractive options; political, in the sense that both Presidents came under increasing personal and domestic pressure to demonstrate resolve and offer some form of response. Eisenhower was adamant that nonac-

[54] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith, Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 440.
[55] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 368.
[56] Ibid., 361, 371, 375.
[57] Vance, *Hard Choices*, 328.
[58] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 64.
[59] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 358.
[60] Sick, *All Fall Down*, 66–67.

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tion was the worst alternative: "In Lebanon the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World) and in doing so to risk general war with the Soviet Union or to do something worse—which was to do nothing."[61] Similarly, in 1979 Brzezinski admitted that it was "painfully clear that all the choices facing the President were grim."[62] With presidential elections on the horizon in 1980, however, Carter realized that "[t]he public was . . . becoming more restive with each passing week because of our seeming impotence in dealing with international crises."[63] Ambassador William Sullivan captured the atmosphere of confusion and frustration in Washington in late 1979 with the title of his study of what Iran after the shah might look like: "Thinking the Unthinkable."[64]

As many studies of decision making have shown, individuals in this predicament are prone to two types of cognitive distortion. First, decision makers facing complex situations seek to minimize uncertainty by altering their perceptions of the crisis at hand until it appears to be more manageable within the context of a fixed repertoire of options and beliefs.[65] John Steinbruner asserts that

> [t]he cognitive processing mechanisms of the mind provide a number of ways in which beliefs become established, independent of the weight of objective evidence. . . . As a general matter, cognitive theory makes the assumptions that structure will be imposed on certain situations, and uncertainty thereby resolved, not by probabilistic judgments, but by categorical inferences.[66]

This cognitive tendency, according to Robert Jervis, causes people "to fit incoming information into preexisting beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there."[67] Second, individuals facing decisional stress and frustration experience a psychological reaction called defensive avoidance. In order to deal with difficult decisions and the accompanying stress, they pay selective attention to the external environment, distort incoming information, and fail to consider fully available options.[68]

[61] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace,* 274.

[62] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle,* 397.

[63] Carter, *Keeping Faith,* 489.

[64] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle,* 367.

[65] John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 47–87. See also Jack Snyder, "Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence," *World Politics* 30 (April 1978).

[66] Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory,* 110.

[67] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 143. This type of distortion is frequently called an unmotivated bias and is associated with "cold" cognitive failure. It is produced by normal cognitive mechanisms and is not induced by stress.

[68] See Irving Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 45–80. This type of distortion is called a motivated bias. An individual sees what he wants or needs to see because of cognitive failure associated with decisional stress. For futher discussion of defensive avoidance and the distinction between motivated and unmotivated biases see Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 101–119; Jervis, *Perception and Mis-*

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The timing and substance of the U.S. response to political change in the Middle East seems to correspond closely with this more abstract description of cognitive processes. In both of the cases examined above, decision makers initially recognized the problem at hand accurately and showed little concern about the Soviet threat. The impetus behind a shift in policy was provided by the changing political environment in the region. It was during the process of formulating a response that misperception of the crises grew pronounced. If such misperceptions were in fact the product of cognitive failure, what type of U.S. behavior would we expect to see? Given that the Eisenhower and Carter administrations found themselves facing a very difficult situation that bred a high degree of uncertainty and frustration, what cognitive biases might have influenced their decisions? What policy repertoire and preexisting beliefs would American decision makers turn to under these circumstances?

Thinking about regional security since 1950 has been dominated by the notion of containment. Although there have been wide debates about what form of containment to implement—strongpoint or perimeter, assymmetric or symmetric—the chief objective of policy has been to restrict the expansion of the Soviet Union. The United States has cast its conception of national security—and based its doctrine, force structure, and contingency planning—around this objective. The applicability of containment to the periphery, however, assumes two preconditions. First, the United States must be confronting either Soviet ideology or Soviet forces. Second, the threat to U.S. interests must take the form of a deterrable event—one that can be avoided by the threat to use or the use of military force.

At this point, the argument should be self-evident. Officials in the Eisenhower and Carter administrations, stymied and frustrated by political change in the Middle East, altered their perceptions of the respective crises and transformed them into events which were more familiar and with which they were better able to cope. This explains why the United States initially reacted to regional developments themselves, but soon associated these developments with exaggerated Soviet manipulation or penetration. The Eisenhower administration saw no need to respond to the Suez crisis; there was consequently no cognitive impulse to perceive Soviet involvement in the episode. By the unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine a few months later, however, official perceptions of the nature of the crisis had changed markedly. The need for a definitive policy response created the need to perceive a Soviet threat.

In 1979 the actors were different, but the major themes the same. The Carter administration reacted sluggishly and with little coherence to the Iranian revolution. Initial reactions showed sensitivity to the volatility of revolutionary sentiment and the need for a low American profile in the region. When forced to formulate a substantive response, however, decision makers focused on the Soviet threat and the need for bold reassurances of American willingness to intervene

perception, 356-406; and Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957).

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in the region. In contrast to the sluggish U.S. response to events in Iran, the reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was speedy and resolute, further corroborating the importance of cognitive frameworks in shaping policy. Washington responded with alacrity because it was precisely this type of contingency that the national security apparatus has been calibrated to meet. A coherent policy for Southwest Asia crystallized only with increasing concern about the Soviet threat. Though more difficult to respond to in purely military terms, the prospect of a U.S.–Soviet confrontation was a definable and familiar threat, one that fit neatly into the policy repertoire that has emerged to implement containment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan justifiably heightened U.S. concern about the Kremlin's intentions. But it also meant the further subordination of intraregional concerns to East-West considerations. Brzezinski hinted at the perceptual shift that precipitated the crystallization of policy: "The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan meant that henceforth any action taken by us toward Iran had to be guided, to a much larger extent than heretofore, by its likely consequences for regional containment of Soviet ambitions."[69]

The uncertainty associated with radical change and the primacy of containment in American thinking about regional security led decision makers to focus on the Soviet threat and to view events within the predominant conceptual framework: East versus West. The political chaos in Southwest Asia and the frustration and fear it produced in Washington caused officials to pay selective attention to incoming information and to misread the concerns and priorities of regional states. Both types of cognitive biases led to similar and mutually reinforcing misperceptions.

This conceptualization of the problem explains why the United States understood the political chaos in 1957–1958 and 1979–1980 in terms of deterrable events and insisted on making public commitments to use force in the region when the changes that were occurring during these periods could hardly have been prevented by the introduction of U.S. troops. Because both the Eisenhower and Carter Doctrines were formulated within the framework of containment and deterrence, the effectiveness of U.S. strategy—at least in the minds of those implementing it—depended upon the credibility of America's threat to use force. If the problem is one of dealing with interstate aggression or a Soviet invasion of the region, then defining credibility in these terms makes sense. But if the problem is the spread of Arab nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism or civil rebellion, then American credibility is not strengthened by effective threats of intervention. To assume so is to define credibility narrowly and self-referentially. Nevertheless, it is clear that one of Eisenhower's chief motivations for the Lebanon landing was to deter Nasser and restore American credibility in the region: "The Suez incident . . . had led him [Nasser] into the egregious error of doubting America's firmness in carrying out her pledges." But after the Lebanon mission, Nasser "certainly had his com-

[69] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle,* 485.

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placency as to America's helplessness completely shattered."[70] It was as if the Marine landing had assuaged Eisenhower's own perception of America's helplessness, not that of Nasser. The Carter administration was equally concerned about asserting U.S. military power in order to restore its image of resolve and challenge claims of impotence.[71] The problem is that for regional powers in which rising anti-western sentiment ties domestic legitimacy to nonalignment, American credibility rests with U.S. reassurances of distant watchfulness and restraint, not with threats of U.S. intervention, notions of strategic consensus, or the establishment of U.S. bases. Attempts to deter nondeterrable events may not only be ineffective, but they may precipitate the very developments the United States is seeking to avoid.

This argument corresponds well with the broader pattern of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. American concern about the Soviet threat and building U.S. regional military capability was highest during the two periods of radical change in the Middle East. During the 1960s and early 1970s, despite growing Soviet power and leverage in the Middle East, two Arab-Israeli wars, and the oil crisis, U.S. concern about the Soviet threat remained fairly low and U.S. sensitivity to intraregional dynamics fairly high. Not surprisingly, this period was one of relative political stability in the Arab world. This provides further evidence linking American globalism to an inability to cope with radical political change.

Finally, it is important to realize that underlying these cognitive biases and the distorted notion of credibility related to them is a deep-rooted ideological hostility toward radical change in the Third World. Scholars have traced this disposition to the continuity and orderliness that have characterized American political development. As Robert Packenham concluded in his study of the ideological roots of U.S. aid policy toward the Third World, "[t]hese experiences and beliefs have made it difficult for Americans to perceive, understand, and appreciate the positive role that radicalism and revolution . . . may play under certain circumstances in other countries."[72] Americans also have difficulty accepting that other nations *qua* nations may be hostile to the United States and the values it represents. This contributes to the tendency to see anti-American movements as the product of Soviet or Communist manipulation. As a result of these deep-seated beliefs, the United States tends automatically to view radical change as inimical to its interest—even if it is not—and to assume that it must respond to maintain the status quo. But precisely because decision makers are forced to react to events that are difficult to understand and difficult to respond to, they misperceive the sources and implications of political change, tend to exaggerate the Soviet threat, and formulate security policies based upon these misperceptions. These cognitive biases lie at the root of America's globalism.

[70] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 290.

[71] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 363, 386, 437.

[72] Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), 138.

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The Bureaucratic Component

Thus far, the argument has proceeded in very general terms. We have identified certain cognitive factors that seem to explain the global orientation of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. By looking at the bureaucratic dynamics behind the U.S. approach to regional security, we can now specify in more detail how and why cognitive processes and ideas are translated into policy.

We must begin by asking why the many regional specialists within the U.S. foreign policy community have been unable to moderate the global orientation of U.S. policy. Given the number of specialists whose sole task is to monitor and interpret developments in the Middle East, why have policy initiatives reflected a misperception of political change? To maintain consistency with the argument just presented, should not regional experts be immune to at least some of the cognitive distortions described above because of their better understanding of regional issues? The answer to this puzzle lies in the relationship between these specialists—almost all of whom are career bureaucrats—and the generalists who comprise the top echelon of decision makers.

During the crises of 1957–1958 and 1979–1980, two tendencies within the decision-making community restricted the influence of regional specialists on policy. First, there was significant disagreement between top officials in the White House and Cabinet and the Department of State (DOS) bureaucracy over Middle East policy. Second, as the crises developed, the locus of decision making shifted toward the White House, favoring the opinions of the generalists in the NSC and Cabinet and neglecting those of the career regional specialists in the State Department. In both cases, the rift between the top echelon of decision makers and the DOS focused upon the issue of how to react to the changing political environment. Eisenhower and Dulles were concerned primarily with the Soviet threat and halting the spread of communism. Regional experts in the DOS and CIA favored accommodating the rise of Arab nationalism and attempting to develop good relationships with newly emerging regimes.[73] The substance of the debate in 1979 was no different. The NSC, driven largely by the fervor of Brzezinski, firmly supported the shah, viewed Southwest Asia as an "arc of crisis," and argued for the establishment of the RDF and the construction of a new security framework in the Gulf based upon strategic cooperation between regional states and the United States. The State Department urged that Iran move toward coalition government, feared the intraregional ramifications of the RDF, arguing that it would only jeopardize U.S. relations with conservative Arab states, and warned against exaggerating the significance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[74]

This struggle between the generalists and regionalists initially stymied the formulation of a coherent policy during both administrations. Furthermore, Brzezinski

[73] Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 60–61.

[74] For more detail on the respective positions of the DOS and NSC see Kupchan, *Persian Gulf*, chap. 4; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 355–390; and Vance, *Hard Choices*, 328–338.

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notes that "disagreement within the U.S. government widened as the situation in Iran deteriorated."[75] As pressure for some type of response mounted, the White House therefore reacted by constricting the normal channels of policy formulation and by-passing the DOS bureaucracy.[76] Officials in the State Department consequently complained of their exclusion from the policy process. During the 1957–1958 crisis, Emmet John Hughes commented that the DOS staff "felt totally out of touch with the Secretary of State, that the communications were erratic or nonexistent. Policy discussions were issued as fiats and often without proper consultation."[77] In 1979, the NSC similarly dominated the policy process, in part because of its physical proximity to the President. Carter tellingly noted that, "I hardly know the desk officers and others in State, but work very closely with NSC people."[78] The complete details of the new security framework for the Gulf were even withheld from the DOS to avoid what was sure to be stiff opposition.[79] Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Newsom, complained that the State Department had been ignored in the formulation of U.S. strategy for the Gulf and that there had been no "detailed study of the implications of the policy or its alternatives."[80] President Carter came close to firing a number of officials in the DOS because of their "reluctance . . . to carry out my directives fully and with enthusiasm."[81] Given that area experts had, for the most part, been excluded from the decision-making process, it is not puzzling that the policies that emerged lacked sensitivity to regional realities.

One final aspect of bureaucratic dynamics contributes to our understanding of the global orientation of U.S. strategy. The military services have historically resisted undertaking missions in the periphery, preferring to prepare for and devote resources to a central conflict with the Soviet Union. Beginning with George Kennan in 1947, successive administrations have sought to establish regional strike

[75] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle,* 371.

[76] The tendency for the decision-making arena to narrow during times of crisis is the result of three dynamics. First, the top-echelon tends to exclude those who present recommendations contrary to their own; they prefer not to hear evidence or interpretation that contradicts their predispositions. This is a form of defensive avoidance on a collective basis and is related to what Janis and Mann call "groupthink." See *Decision Making,* 129–133. See also Lebow, *Between Peace and War,* 153. Second, top elites streamline the decision-making arena to save time, enhance efficiency, and reduce bureaucratic squabbling. Third, the more salient an issue becomes, the more control the top echelon attempts to exercise over policy decisions. As Lebow comments, "[e]fforts by political leaders to oversee in detail the implementation of their policies are almost certain to generate conflict with the bureaucracies . . . [because] leaders bypass or ignore the channels and routines that govern bureaucratic behavior." *Between Peace and War,* 285. See also Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision—Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 144–184.

[77] John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Archives, interview with Emmet John Hughes, 22 April 1965, 24. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict,* 60.

[78] Carter, *Keeping Faith,* 450.

[79] Interview with William Odom, former military assistant to Brzezinski in the NSC, on 6 August 1985.

[80] David Newsom, "America Engulfed," *Foreign Policy* 43 (Summer 1981): 17.

[81] Carter, *Keeping Faith,* 449.

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forces for rapid deployment to the periphery. With the exception of the short-lived Strike Command established in 1962, the Pentagon has resisted efforts to create a unit specifically for missions in the Third World.

This Eurocentric bias had a significant impact on policy in 1979. When the administration instructed the Pentagon to commence planning for the RDF early in the year, the chiefs and the individual services reacted with little enthusiasm. Not only were each of the services reluctant to be saddled with the Persian Gulf mission, but the traditional division of responsibility for Middle East operations between the Atlantic and Pacific Commands presented an obstacle to forming an independent regional strike force. Because of this lethargic reaction, the focus of contingency planning for the RDF was deliberately switched from intraregional missions to the task of responding to a Soviet invasion in the hope of stimulating bureaucratic momentum.[82] Confronted with a more familiar mission and one that required a sizeable expansion of the defense budget, the services no longer avoided involvement in planning for the Gulf but began to compete for participation in the RDF. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan added further impetus to the planning and procurement process. Yet it was clear that instructions to prepare for potential intraregional missions in the Gulf were insufficient to elicit a substantive response from the Pentagon. It took the prospect of a confrontation with the Soviets to drive the bureaucratic machinery.

In essence, the global bias within U.S. security policy has been the product of complementary cognitive and bureaucratic components. American inability to respond to political change and preoccupation with containment have skewed U.S. policy toward the Middle East and shaped the Soviet-centric nature of the bureaucracy. The structure and process of decision making have also shaped American thinking and ensured that regional concerns are often subsumed by global ones and that the system as a whole is calibrated to react to the Soviet threat, not to regional realities.

Conclusions

This article has confirmed that, at least in the Middle East, the United States has tended to react inappropriately to regional political change and has adopted security policies that exaggerate the Soviet threat and that are insensitive to the realities of local politics. U.S. initiatives have exacerbated intrastate conflicts in the Middle East, fueled anti-American currents, and ensured that regional disputes have taken on an East-West component. At least to some extent, the American search for the Soviet threat in the Middle East has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This is by no means meant to suggest that the Soviet threat to the Middle East is insignificant. On the contrary, the United States has vital interests in the Persian Gulf that it must be prepared to protect. The Soviets have client states in the Middle

[82] Author's correspondence with Robert Komer, 29 July 1985.

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East and, though a Soviet invasion of Iran is very unlikely, it is not inconceivable given the Gulf's proximity to the Soviet Union. The RDF serves as a needed deterrent.

There will continue, however, to be radical political change in the Middle East—and other Third World regions—that has little or nothing to do with Soviet expansionism. The United States must rethink its approach to these types of events. The above analysis suggests that there are two key components to the problem: a cognitive one stemming from the uncertainty and stress produced by radical political change and the consequent tendency to interpret events within a fixed conceptual framework provided by containment; a bureaucratic one stemming from the dynamics and Soviet-centric structure of the decision process. It is the synergistic effect of these two variables on the decision process that is primarily responsible for American globalism in the Middle East.[83]

Efforts to ameliorate American globalism must begin with the recognition that the problem is deeply rooted in cognitive biases. Without recasting the conceptual framework and changing the mind-set in which decision makers operate, attempts to refine policy or to integrate area specialists more fully into the decision-making process will be inadequate. As Brzezinski admitted in reflecting on the events of 1979, the crisis in Iran involved "a failure of political intelligence in the widest meaning of the word 'intelligence'."[84] Furthermore, the input of area specialists is most needed during periods of crisis. Yet it is precisely during episodes of intense upheaval that generalists are most likely to constrict the decision-making arena and to misperceive regional developments.

In short, globalism can be overcome only if analysts and scholars address the difficult question of how to understand and to cope with radical political change. Containment alone is insufficient to guide policy; it must be complemented by a notion of regional security that is more sensitive to local political change and to events that cannot be deterred by the use of U.S. military power. What are the sources of radicalism and how does it affect America's long-term interests in the Third World? In order to limit the adverse effects of political upheaval, should

[83] It appears that the explanatory power of these variables is by no means unique to the Middle East. Exaggeration of the Communist threat in Latin America and Africa corresponded with periods of radical political change in those regions. Similarly, the evidence suggests that the bureaucratic sources of globalism extend well beyond the scope of the two case studies examined herein. In his discussion of decision making during the Vietnam war, Richard Pfeiffer commented, "[a]s issues became hot or more sensitive—the higher it rises in the bureaucracy—the more completely the experts are excluded while the harassed senior generalists take over." See Richard Pfeiffer, *No More Vietnams?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 44. In his analysis of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Irving Janis observed that "[w]hen the Bay of Pigs invasion was being planned, at least two groups of experts in the United States government were not consulted—those in the intelligence branch of the CIA and on the Cuban desk in the State Department." See Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 32. The more recent Iran-contra arms scandal was clearly orchestrated by an NSC staff acting without the approval or the knowledge of the State Department.

[84] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 397.

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the United States threaten, accommodate, or simply ignore revolutionary regimes? Does unchecked radicalism spread or do the exigencies of power politics lead neighboring states to balance against rather than bandwagon with emerging regional hegemons?[85] Coping with political upheaval must begin with a fundamental reassessment of the causes and implications of change in the Third World. Only by addressing how decision makers *think* about regional security can the United States come to terms with the deep-rooted cognitive and bureaucratic roots of American globalism.*

[85] Some insightful studies challenging domino theory and the tendency of radical ideology to spread include Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Jerome Slater, "Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Do They Matter?" *International Security* 12 (Fall 1987).

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Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST

On 8 November 1988, when the American voters decreed that Republican George Bush would succeed Ronald Reagan in the White House but the opposition Democratic Party would control both houses of the Congress, it was the sixth time in the last nine presidential elections that the electorate chose to split the government between the parties. As in 1988, so in the earlier elections of 1956, 1968, 1972, 1980, and 1984, the people placed their faith in Republican presidential leadership but voted to retain Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and in the first three of those elections (as well as in 1988), Democratic majorities in the Senate also.

This is something new in American politics. When Dwight D. Eisenhower took his second oath of office in 1957, he was the first chief executive in seventy-two years—since Grover Cleveland in 1885—to confront on Inauguration Day a Congress of which even one house was controlled by the opposition party. Sometimes the opposition would win majorities in the House or the Senate, or both, at the midterm election, but even such occasions were relatively rare. In the fifty-eight years from 1897 through 1954, the country experienced divided government during only eight years—all in the last half of a presidential term—or 14 percent of the time. Yet in the thirty-six years from 1955 through 1990, the government will have

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been divided between the parties for twenty-four years—exactly two-thirds of that period.

A generation ago, then, the country passed from a long era of party government, when either the Republican or the Democratic Party controlled both the presidency and the Congress almost all of the time, to an era when the government was divided between the parties most of the time. Under these circumstances, the United States has its own unique version of coalition government—not a coalition voluntarily entered into by the parties but one forced upon them by the accidents of the electoral process.

It is the argument of this article that the advent of the new era has rendered obsolete much of the theory developed by political scientists, from the day of Woodrow Wilson to the 1950s, to explain how the United States government can and should work. That theory identified the political party as the indispensable instrument that brought cohesion and unity, and hence effectiveness, to the government as a whole by linking the executive and legislative branches in a bond of common interest. And, as a corollary, the party made it possible for the president to succeed in his indispensable role as leader and energizer of the governmental process; it accomplished that end because the congressional majorities, while they would not accept the president's leadership by virtue of his constitutional position as chief executive—institutional rivalry would bar that—would accept it in his alternate capacity as head of the political party to which the majorities adhered.

The generations of political scientists who expounded this theory paid little attention to how the government would and should function when the president and the Senate and House majorities were not all of the same party. They could in good conscience disregard that question because intervals of divided government in their experience had been infrequent and short-lived. Whenever the midterm election brought a division of the government, anyone concerned about that could take a deep breath and wait confidently for the next presidential election to put the system back into its proper alignment. As late as 1952 it had always done so in the memory of everybody writing on the subject. But since 1956, that has no longer been a certainty. It has not even been the probability. And that represents a momentous change in the American governmental system, for institutional processes and relationships are profoundly altered when the unifying bond of party disappears.

This article briefly reviews the antiparty doctrine that the Framers wrote into the Constitution but promptly abandoned. Then it presents the theory of party government and presidential leadership as it was explicated by authoritative and influential political scientists in the era that ended in the mid-1950s, and finally discusses the implications of the obsolescence of that theory since the transformation of the governmental system during the past three decades.

The Antiparty Theory and its Abandonment

Party government was, of course, not the intent of the Framers who met in Philadelphia in 1787. Quite the opposite. Their views—which are well known and need

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not be set forth at length here—were, in a word, antiparty. The word "party" appears only rarely in James Madison's account of the proceedings of the 1787 convention. The preferred terms were "faction" and "cabal," and they were used only for purposes of condemnation. No more powerful diatribe against political parties has ever been penned than *The Federalist*, particularly Madison's No. 10, in which he denounced "the violence of faction" as "this dangerous vice" that introduces "the instability, injustice, and confusion" that have "been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished." If a majority party can win the whole of governmental power, Madison reasoned, what is to prevent it from oppressing the minority? As Madison saw it, the natural party division would be between "those who hold and those who are without property," between "those who are creditors, and those who are debtors." He feared that a majority party made up of the propertyless would exhibit "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property."

In *The Federalist*, particularly in No. 10 but also in Nos. 47, 48 and 62, Madison saw the whole constitutional design as a defense against the danger that any "interested and overbearing majority" or "sinister combinations" could gain control of the entire government. Raising decisions to the national level would place them in the hands of men who had risen above the factionalism of the states, and factions would be more difficult to organize on a national scale. The separation of powers among the branches—and within the legislature between two bodies—would further guard against the threat that majority rule might lead to "tyranny" and "oppression." And so would the method devised for selecting the president. Rejecting the two obvious ways of making that choice—either election by the people directly or election by the Congress—the Framers conceived that peculiar institution, the electoral college, as a nonpartisan, antiparty apparatus, a kind of search committee, not unlike those that corporations and universities and city councils set up nowadays to select a new executive. The college would be made up of men mostly unknown to each other, who would not meet as a body, who would not even be in communication across state lines. As Madison put it at the Convention, "there would be little opportunity for cabal, or corruption.[1]

George Washington, who presided over both the convention and the newly-formed government, tried to lead in the nonpartisan manner that the Constitution contemplated. But before the end of his first term, he witnessed the rise of factionalism not only in the Congress but also within his own cabinet. Washington expressed his dismay in his celebrated farewell address in which—echoing *Federalist* No. 10—he warned his countrymen "in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally." That spirit, the "worst enemy" of democratic governments everywhere, said Washington, serves to "distract the public councils . . . enfeeble the public administration . . . agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms . . . foments occasional riots and in-

[1] Max Farrands, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 2, 29, proceedings of July 17, notes of James Madison.

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surrection . . . opens the door to foreign influence and corruption," can lead to "frightful despotism," and all the rest.[2] And Washington's successor, John Adams, concurred in his inaugural address that the "spirit of party" is one of the "natural enemies" of the Constitution.[3]

But by the end of his term, the spirit of party was flourishing. In the election of 1800, a fledgling two-party system—reflecting to a degree the cleavages between the propertied and the landless, between creditors and debtors, which Madison had identified as fundamental—was in operation, with two slates of candidates running nationally. The electoral college was hardly formed when it ceased to be the intended body of nonpartisan statesmen with complete discretion and independent judgment and became what it has since remained—a body of faceless partisans that merely registers the choice of the voters between or among national party candidates. "The election of a President of the United States is no longer that process which the Constitution contemplated," one of the Framers, Rufus King, told the Senate in 1816.[4] In his retirement years, James Madison himself acknowledged that parties are "a natural offspring of Freedom."[5] By that time of course, Madison had been elected and reelected president as a party nominee.

The Theory of Party Government and Presidential Leadership

Madison did not expound a new theory to supplant the one that he had been so instrumental in embedding in the Constitution. But without benefit of much explicit doctrine, the nation's political leaders developed in practice the system of party government—as distinct from nonpartisan government—that settled into place in the Jacksonian era and prevailed throughout the next century and a quarter. In each presidential election two national parties sought exactly what the Madisonian theory written into the Constitution was supposed to forestall: the capture of all three of the policy-making elements of the government—the presidency, Senate and House—by the same faction or party, so that the party could carry out its program.

No major party has ever said, "We want only the presidency," or only the Senate or the House. They have always said, "give us *total* responsibility." Since early in the nineteenth century, they have presented their programs formally in official party platforms. Asking for total power in the two elected branches, they have been eager to accept the total responsibility and accountability that would accompany it.

[2] James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), vol. I, 210–11.

[3] Ibid., 221.

[4] *Annals of Congress*, 14 Cong. 1 sess., 216, reprinted in Farrand, *Records*, III, 422. King was a delegate from Massachusetts to the Constitutional Convention, but moved to New York during the following year.

[5] Note to his speech at the 1787 Convention on the right of suffrage, apparently written about 1821, when he was preparing his record of Convention proceedings for publication. Ibid., 452.

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That was the theory of party government; and not only the politicians, but the people accepted it. The parties lined up naturally on opposite sides of whatever were the great issues of the day—creating a national bank, opening the West with turnpikes and railroads and canals financed by the national government, prohibiting slavery in the western territories, raising or lowering tariffs, mobilizing the national government to help the victims of the Great Depression, and so on. The people listened to the arguments of the two parties and made their choices. And when they did, the party they elected had a full opportunity to carry out its mandate, because when the voters chose a president each four years they normally entrusted control of the Congress to the president's party, thus making it fully responsible. From Andrew Jackson's time until the second election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, only four presidents—Zachary Taylor elected in 1848, Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, James A. Garfield in 1880, and Grover Cleveland in 1884—had to confront immediately upon inauguration either a House of Representatives or a Senate organized by the opposition. In the nineteenth century these results may have been largely an artifact of the election process itself. The parties printed separate ballots listing their slates, and the voter selected the ballot of the party he preferred, marked it, and dropped it in the box. Yet after the government-printed, secret ballot came into universal use early in this century, straight-ticket voting and the resultant single-party control of the government continued to prevail. The voters gave the Republican Party responsibility for the entire government in the 1900s, again in the 1920s, and finally in 1952; and they chose the Democratic Party in the 1910s, 1930s, and 1940s. No president in the first half of this century ever had to suffer divided government upon taking office, and few had the problem even after the normal setback to the president's party in the midterm election.

As soon as political science emerged as a scholarly discipline, its adherents began to pronounce and elaborate the theoretical foundation of the system of party government that was in being. Parties were not only natural, since people were bound to organize to advance their differing notions as to the goals and programs of government, but the scholars concluded that they were useful and necessary too. Among their uses was the one that is the concern of this paper: their utility in unifying a government of dispersed powers and thereby making it effective.

In his review of the literature on political parties in the late nineteenth century, Austin Ranney found that Woodrow Wilson "was perhaps the first American scholar in his period to attack the principle and deplore the effects of separation of powers, and to consider methods for by-passing it."[6] The primary method was to accept the political party as the unifier of the separate powers. "The organization of parties," wrote Wilson, "is, in a sense, indistinguishable from the legislature and executive themselves. The several active parts of the government are closely united in organization for a common purpose, because they are under a common

[6] Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1954), 36, fn. 39.

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direction and themselves constitute the machinery of party control."[7] And they had to be united because, wrote Wilson, "our government is a living, organic thing, and must . . . work out a close synthesis of active parts which can exist only when leadership is lodged in some one man or group of men. You cannot compound a successful government out of antagonisms."[8]

Ranney traces the evolution of these concepts through other members of what he calls the "party-government school": A. Lawrence Lowell, who believed that the "almost unworkable" American governmental system "requires the services of the parties if it is to work at all" and Henry Jones Ford and Frank J. Goodnow, who agreed in their analysis of "the fallacious principle and harmful effects of the separation of powers" and joined "in arguing that parties are the only agency available in America for inducing some kind of coordination and harmony between the legislative and executive branches."[9]

At the time these men were writing early in the twentieth century, party organizations had reached the nadir of corruption and bossism. Reformers sought to weaken them—and succeeded—through the introduction of direct primaries, nonpartisan local elections, and other innovative measures. Yet the doctrine that political parties were indispensable at the national level lived on in political science literature and by the 1940s had clearly become the dominant theory. "[F]or the government to function," wrote V. O. Key, Jr., in the first edition of his influential textbook on political parties, "the obstructions of the governmental structure must be overcome, and it is the party, through extra-constitutional expedients, that accomplishes this end."[10] James MacGregor Burns took up the theme in his *Congress on Trial*: "If there is no way to harmonize the separated organs of government, sustained and effective action may be impossible. It is that vital function of integration that the majority party should fulfill. Operating through both branches of Congress and through the committees as well, having as its chief the occupant of the White House . . . the majority party should be the perfect instrument for carrying out a popular mandate."[11]

By the time the Committee on Political parties of the American Political Science

[7] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911), 211–12, quoted by Ranney, *Doctrine*, 36.

[8] Ibid., 60, quoted by Ranney, *Doctrine*, 35.

[9] Ranney, *Doctrine*. The quotations are from Ranney's summations of their views, 62 and 97. Ranney also devotes chapters to two writers who distrusted parties as the "enemy of democracy"—M.I. Ostrogorski and Herbert Croly.

[10] V.O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1942), 495. By the third edition, published in 1952, Key had rephrased the sentence in the more eloquent form in which it remained in subsequent editions: "Yet, for government to function, the obstructions of the constitutional mechanism must be overcome, and it is the party that casts a web, at times weak, at times strong, over the dispersed organs of government and gives them a semblance of unity," 693.

[11] James MacGregor Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949, republished by Gordian Press, 1966), 45.

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Association made its landmark report in 1950, it could simply assert, without feeling obliged to argue the case, that political parties are "indispensable instruments of government," necessary "to furnish a general kind of direction over the government as a whole" and for "integration of all of the far-flung activities of modern government." It then offered a series of reforms that would make the parties better organized, more tightly disciplined, and hence "more responsible."[12]

The report stirred up a storm of criticism in political science journals and textbooks that continued into the next decade and even longer, culminating in the recantation and devastating critique by one of its members, Evron M. Kirkpatrick. He found the report guilty of "lack of clarification, justification, or analysis of the norms," of "both normative slovenliness and empirical inaccuracy."[13] But his and the earlier criticisms were directed not at the concept of the party government as such but at the realism and the desirability of the committee's proposed reforms, which sought to enable parties to impose a greater measure of discipline on their elected officials in the government. The debate was joined on whether party government should and could be made *more* responsible, not whether it should exist at all. Nobody argued that the parties as they existed in 1950 were too tightly disciplined, and that the need was that they be made *less* responsible. Nobody argued that the ideal system was the one that was to be ushered in a few years later: coalition government in which *no* party is or can be held responsible.[14]

Indeed, the concepts expressed by Wilson and his colleagues at the turn of the century and by Key and Burns in the 1940s maintained their hold long after the era of party government had, scarcely noticed, come to its end.[15] These are excerpts from authoritative textbooks:

> *Howard Penniman, 1952*—But far more important is their [the parties'] service in neutralizing the effect of the check-and-balance system. . . . [S]ince the constitution provides no means of combining the dispersed and disconnected organs of government, the parties, in seeking to control them all and bind them to a common purpose, discharge an essential function. . . . A party, once put it command of the various agencies of the

[12] Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsive Two-Party System*, supplement to the *American Political Science Review* 44 (September 1950), also published by Rinehart & Co., 1950. Quotation from Rinehart ed., 15, 16.

[13] Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science," *American Political Science Review* 65 (December 1971): 965–90.

[14] Thus a theme of one of the earliest critical responses to the Report was that the Committee "underestimated present party responsibility," that parties do in fact present clear alternatives to the voter, and that "most of the majority program is carried into effect." Julius Turner, "Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor," *American Political Science Review* 45 (March 1951): 143–52.

[15] The remarkable failure of political scientists to recognize the significance of the transition from the era of party government to a new era of coalition government is evident, for example, in a book entitled *The New American Political System*, Anthony King, ed., (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), which in ten chapters by eminent writers does not even mention divided government as an element of the new system.

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government, will make them respond to a common impulse and work in harmony. Such power carries with it responsibility; and the voters can in some measure enforce that responsibility by transferring power to the rival party.[16]

Clinton Rossiter, 1960—It has not been an easy constitution with which to make policy quickly and to govern efficiently, which is exactly the kind of constitution the framers intended it to be. The gaps that separate the executive from the legislature . . . have often been as discouraging to men of good will as to men of corrupt intent. . . . For this reason we need more, and more easily traveled, bridges across the gaps, and our major parties provide two that we could hardly afford to be without.[17]

Frank J. Sorauf, 1968— . . . the American parties contribute to the functioning of the American political system by providing a unifying focus in a system of dispersed political authority . . . To the fragmentation of the nation and the fifty states multiplied by the three-fold separation of powers in each, the two great national political parties bring a unifying force . . . which helps to hold the disparate fragments together.[18]

David B. Truman, 1971—It is as appropriate to observe today as it was at the turn of the century . . . when Henry Jones Ford was producing his studies of American politics, that the national political party is the "sole efficient means" of producing "union between the executive and legislative branches of the government."[19]

Gerald Pomper, 1980—The Constitution has served us well, but only because we have not adhered to its provisions rigorously . . . . Amendment of the Constitution, in practice rather than in law, has enabled the parties to bridge its gaps thorough such integrative institutions as the national nominating conventions, the joint meetings of the president and congressional party leadership, the House and Senate party caucuses. . . .[20]

Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and David Wise, 1985—Because political parties are involved in the governmental process, they serve to link different parts of the government: the president communicates with party leaders in Congress; the two houses of Congress communicate in part through party leaders . . . . In sum, political parties perform vital functions in the American political system. They . . . [as one function] link various branches and levels of government.[21]

Like the Committee on Political Parties, the later writers who saw political parties as the unifying instrument in the governmental system generally agreed that they often failed to perform that function satisfactorily. Decentralized and federal in their organization, without authoritative central institutions, and made up of diverse ideological and cultural elements, the parties lacked discipline. Yet even

[16] Howard Penniman, *American Parties and Elections*, 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), 164–65. (Penniman was a member of the Committee on Political Parties.)

[17] Clinton Rossiter, *Parties and Politics in America* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), 62–63.

[18] Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 18.

[19] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 531–32.

[20] Gerald Pomper, "The Contribution of Poltical Parties to American Democracy" in Pomper, ed., *Party Renewal in America: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 7.

[21] Milton C. Cummings and David Wise, *Democracy Under Pressure: An Introduction to the American Political System*, 5th ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovoch, 1985), 248.

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without the reforms recommended by the committee, the political party was seen as nonetheless succeeding to some degree in bridging the gaps between the separated branches of the government.

Thus, Rossiter credits "the simple fact" that the president and roughly half of the Congress "are all brothers in the same political lodge" helping to close and bridge the "gaps" between the branches. The parties, he wrote, continue "to keep all our independent centers of power in touch with one another."[22] And Sorauf, while noting that party cohesion in the Congress and in state legislatures is "irregular, sporadic, and imperfect" on substantive issues, "in the aggregate an important measure of party discipline does exists." He continues:

> Neither the American parties nor the voters can meet the demands which the classic model of party responsibility imposes on them. But binding the various sectors of the party together—despite all that divides them—is an inarticulate ideology, a commitment to a set of issue positions which sets the activists, candidates, and voters of one party apart from those of the other. In a loose, often distressingly imprecise sense, the two parties are distinct groups of "like-minded" men. Out of that tentative and limited agreement on issues comes enough cohesion to produce a modest, if variable, degree of responsibility. The American approximation of party government does indeed fall far short of the model of party responsibility and the hopes of the reformers, but the role of the political party in organizing government and the debate on public issues cannot be ignored.[23]

And how is that degree of party discipline and responsibility achieved? In the national government, political scientists proclaim with virtual unanimity that it is through presidential leadership. When the party serves its unifying function, it is because the members of the president's party in the Congress recognize the president as not merely the head of the executive branch but as the leader of the band of " brothers in the same political lodge." In enacting as well as in administering the laws, the government cannot move dynamically and prudently without a recognized and accepted prime mover, a leader. And that leader is logically and necessarily the man chosen by the whole national party to carry its standard, and who has done so successfully in the most recent presidential election. Besides, the president has the resources of the entire executive branch to help him to develop coordinated programs. "The President proposes and the Congress disposes" long ago became the catch phrase to describe the legislative process.

Austin Ranney notes that, of the "various devices by which American presidents and other politicians have tried to join together, for purposes of getting the government to work, what the Constitution so successfully put asunder," most "fall under the general heading of 'presidential leadership of Congress.'" He summarizes:

> The ideas underlying all of them are that America, like every other country, must some-

[22] Rossiter, *Parties and Politics*, 63.
[23] Sorauf, *Party Politics*, 14, 393–94.

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> times take swift, coherent, and purposeful action . . . that Congress . . . cannot by itself initiate such action; the president . . . is the only official who can take the lead; and that the basic problem of American government is finding and perfecting institutions that will enable the president to lead Congress with maximum effectiveness.[24]

Political scientists played no small role in creating those devices of presidential leadership. They refined and embellished, if they did not originate, the concepts of the executive budget that were enacted in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. They dominated the task forces of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, whose report in 1937 laid the basis for expanding the executive office of the president and giving the chief executive the mechanisms for serving effectively as the general manager of the government. And they heartily acclaimed the assertion by the president of leadership in the legislative process. The identification of the president as chief legislator has been traced back to Howard Lee McBain's *The Living Constitution*, published in 1927. By the 1940s, no textbook on American government failed to highlight the president's legislative role, usually in a section carrying the phrase "chief legislator" in the title.

"The president is usually considered both chief administrator and chief legislator," wrote Pendleton Herring in 1940. "The public expects the president to lead Congress; Congress is unable to produce coherence of direction to rival his." And "to meet the demands of the hour," Herring continued, "Presidential leadership is the answer."[25]

These sentiments were echoed and reechoed in the political science literature of the next several decades, as these samples illustrate:

> *V. O. Key, Jr., 1942*—The only common point about which leadership and direction of the party may be established for the conduct of the Government is the Presidency. It is the President who determines the major issues on which Congress acts; and it is the President who attempts, with or without success, to bring the party members in the House and Senate to the support of his policy.[26]

> *Charles S. Hyneman, 1950*—It is imperative, as I see it, that the President take a lead in suggesting and formulating proposals which, when found acceptable by a majority in each house of Congress, will provide the legislative base for these programs of government . . . . There is every reason to believe that we will get effective legislative solutions for our toughest problems only if the President supplies vigorous leadership in legislation.[27]

> *Clinton Rossiter, 1956*— . . . we may therefore consider [the President] to be the Chief Legislator. . . . [w]e may . . . consider him as *leader of Congress*. . . . [t]he complexity of the problems it is asked to solve . . . has made external leadership a requisite of effective operation.

[24] Ranney, "The President and His Party" in Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 131–32.

[25] Pendleton Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940), 12, 145–46.

[26] Key, *Politics, Parties*, 504–05.

[27] Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), 565.

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> The President alone is in a political, constitutional, and practical position to provide such leadership, and he is therefore expected, within the limits of propriety . . . to guide Congress in much of its lawmaking activity. Indeed, since Congress is no longer minded or organized to guide itself, the refusal or inability of the President to serve as leader results in weak and disorganized government.[28]
>
> *Richard E. Neustadt, 1960*—an expert search for presidential influence contributes to the energy of government and to the viability of public policy. . . . In a relative but real sense one can say of a President what Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense once said of General Motors: what is good for the country is good for the President and *vice versa*.[29]
>
> *Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, and Walter F. Murphy, 1963*—A modern democracy must try to devise and carry into effect positive policies for the solution of its social problems. It is an inescapable fact of American politics that the President alone can supply the kind of intelligent and aggressive leadership that is essential if this is to be done in the United States. . . . The nature of the times in which we live makes it absolutely essential for the President to lead Congress.[30]
>
> *Charles E. Lindblom, 1968*—Because leadership in Congress is fragmented through the committee system and because congressmen know that someone or some small group has to take responsibility for organizing a legislative program, congressmen have informally conferred on the President both the authority and the positive responsibility, to the near exclusion of any similar role for themselves, to propose major legislation. Clearly, presidential authority for legislative leadership is now well established.[31]

In his analysis of what he termed "the textbook presidency" of the 1950s and 1960s, Thomas E. Cronin found that the texts "[w]ith rare exceptions . . . not only devised and approved but openly celebrated an expansive theory of presidential power." Among the more vivid of the many quotations he assembled were those terming the presidency "the great engine of democracy," "the American people's one authentic trumpet," "the central instrument of democracy," and "a kind of magnificent lion who can roam widely and do great deeds. . . ." Cronin wrote at a time of reaction against the "imperial presidency" revealed by Vietnam and Watergate, and his purpose was to define a more realistic and accountable presidency. Yet he himself stopped well short of rejecting the doctrine of presidential leadership that had evolved in the earlier decades: "The promise of the American presidency may have been oversold, overstated, and stretched beyond reality, but denying the importance and the need for effective presidential leadership would be to overstate the case, as well as misleading."[32]

Somewhat startling in retrospect is the absence in all pre-1970s literature of any noticeable fear that presidential leadership might be transmuted into presidential

[28] Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1956), 14, 46.

[29] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 183–85.

[30] Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, and Walter F. Murphy, *American Democracy in Theory and Practice*, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 372, 374.

[31] Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-making Process* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 72.

[32] Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 25–29.

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imperialism and party cohesion into party docility and congressional subservience. A century and a half of experience had evidently convinced political scientists that the "frightful despotism" foreseen by Washington and the political "oppression" that haunted Madison were figments of an eighteenth-entury imagination fevered by the struggle against George III. The preeminent instance in all that time of usurpation of power by a president—that of Abraham Lincoln at the outset of the Civil War—had turned out, after all, to be a necessary assertion of leadership in the noblest of causes. So too, it seemed, were the unilateral interventions of Franklin Roosevelt on the side of the Allies in the months before Pearl Harbor. In 1947, Louis Brownlow, of Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management, could exult that "during the whole history of the thirty-two presidents, not one has been recreant to his high trust—not one has used his power to aggrandize himself at the expense of our settled institutions."[33] The Committee on Political Parties even turned the argument around; it had the foresight to acknowledge the possibility of presidential excess but contended that disciplined parties would restrain an ambitious president by forcing major decisions into the context of a party's collective leadership. Neustadt's dictum that what is good for the president is good for the country would prevail until Vietnam and Watergate—and later Irangate—aroused scholars to an awareness that presidential power might be abused. Yet even after Vietnam and Watergate, Cronin appeared to speak for most political scientists in holding that "the importance and the need for presidential leadership" had not been invalidated by events. In the year of the Nixon resignation, a textbook writer could still reiterate the established doctrine:

> . . . the President has become the primary source of initiative in the American political system. Domestic programs will lack consistent direction if he does not supply it. . . . His need for a steady sense of direction is even greater where international and military affairs are concerned, because these decisions are generally made in the innermost circle . . . and he is *the* indispensable member of any innovating group.[34]

By the 1960s, political science had developed a dominating theory as to how the American constitutional system should—and at its best, did—work. The political party was the institution that unified the separated branches of the government and brought coherence to the policymaking process. And because the president was the leader of his party, he was the chief policy maker of the entire government, presiding directly over the executive branch and indirectly working through and with his party's congressional leadership over the legislative branch as well.

[33] Louis Brownlow, *The President and the Presidency* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1949), a compilation of lectures given in 1947.

[34] Dorothy Buckton James, *The Contemporary President*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1974), 307–8.

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The Old Theory in a New Era

This established theory presupposed one essential condition: there would in fact be a majority party in control of both branches of government. Rereading the literature of the midcentury, one is struck with how easily this condition was taken for granted. The writers could well do so, for in the twentieth century until 1955, the government had been divided between the parties only for four periods of two years each, and in each case in the last half of a presidential term—those of Taft, Wilson, Hoover, and Truman. A scholar who happened to be writing during or immediately after one of these intervals (or who was commenting on state governmental systems) might observe in parenthetical style that divided government could sometimes obscure responsibility, impede leadership, and thus thwart the fulfillment of the party government ideal. But the aberration was passed over quickly, without interrupting the flow of the basic argument. In the normal state of affairs, one party would have control of the policy-making branches of government; the other would be in opposition.

Thus, in the passage quoted earlier from the 1942 book by V. O. Key, Jr., such phrases as "the party in power," "the President's majority in Congress," and "when it [the party] takes control of the Government" appear repeatedly. In the 1952 edition of the same book, Key inserted a paragraph on how the Republican majorities in the Congress behaved in the 1947–1948 period of divided government. But the earlier phrases—"the party in control of the government," "the party in power," "the President and his congressional majority"—survived in their original unqualified form.[35] Hyneman, in his 1950 book, distinguished between "the party that has control of the government" and "the party out of power" and declared: "it is in the nature of things that [the president] will call upon the Congress that goes into power with him to lay a base in law and appropriations for the program that he has sponsored." Hyneman recognized the possibility of divided government, but saw it as the outcome only of midterm elections and accordingly found the remedy in a revision of terms of office so that presidential and congressional elections will coincide.[36] The report of the Committee on Political Parties confined its recognition of divided government to one subordinate clause of eight words; elsewhere it referred with casual ease to "the party in power," "the majority party," or "the dominant party," and to "the opposition party" or "minority party."[37] In contrast, Sorauf, writing in 1968, put considerable emphasis on divided government as an impediment to effective party government. Referring particularly to state governments, he termed the division of government between parties as "by far the most important institutional barrier to the coordination of legislative and executive decisionmaking under the aegis of a unifying political party. . . ."[38]

[35] Key, *Politics, Parties*, 3d ed., 702–03, 692, 711.

[36] Hyneman, *Bureaucracy*, 566, 573.

[37] Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, 8, 1, 18, 34, 35, 41, 51.

[38] Sorauf, *Party Politics*, 361.

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Divided government invalidates the entire theory of party government and presidential leadership, both elements of it. Divided government requires that the United States "construct a successful government out of antagonisms," which Wilson warned could not be done, and renders impossible the "close synthesis of active parts" that he found necessary. How can a party cast its web over the dispersed organs of government to bring a semblance of unity, in Key's phrase, if it controls but one of the branches? How can the majority party fulfill Burns's "vital function of integration," or rally the government's elements behind Penniman's "common purpose," or provide Rossiter's "bridges across the gaps," or Sorauf's "unifying force" if there is no majority party? How can the president lead the Congress if either or both houses are controlled by the party that fought to defeat him in the last election and has vowed to vanquish him, or his successor as his party's candidate, in the next one? But if the president cannot lead, Rossiter has told us, "weak and disorganized government" must follow. Our "toughest problems," Hyneman has admonished, will in that circumstance remain unsolved.[39]

The question at once arises: In our twenty-two years thus far of forced coalition government, have those gloomy forecasts been fulfilled? Eleven Congresses during the administrations of four presidents would appear to have given ample time for putting the established theory to the test. Unfortunately, however, the test results are bound to be uncertain and would still be so if another two score years of experience were added. There will not be agreement on whether, and to what extent,

[39] Fortunately for believers in party government, the problem of intra-party cohesion and discipline that so preoccupied the writers of the midcentury has to a large extent been solved by the events. The realignment of the party system since they wrote has produced Democratic and Republican parties that are more homogeneous than at any time within the memory of anyone now living; the minority wings that were once strong enough to disrupt the internal unity of both parties have withered. First to fade were the liberal Republicans, who until a couple of decades ago were potent enough to seriously contest for the presidential nomination; they are now ineffectual remnants that did not even put forward a candidate in 1988. Their mirror-image counterparts, the conservative Democrats, have been vanishing as well, although more slowly. Since the New Deal era, their wing of the party has been virtually confined to the South, and for thirty years its base there has been steadily eroding as conservatives find their political home in the burgeoning Republican Party. New Democratic senators from the South are no longer the Byrds, Robertsons, Eastlands, Russells, Thurmonds, and Hollands, who automatically voted with the Republicans on major issues and made life miserable for Democratic presidents, Senate majority leaders, and House speakers; for the most part they are people who fit quite comfortably into the moderate-to-liberal national party, such as Terry Sanford, Bob Graham, and Wyche Fowler. (Strom Thurmond himself became a Republican long ago, and the son of Democratic Senator A. Willis Robertson made his race for the presidency in the Republican, not the Democratic, caucuses and primaries.) The same transformation has taken place in the House.

So the Republicans have become a solidly right-of-center party, very much in Ronald Reagan's image. If Republicans ever were to capture the Congress, they would have a little trouble attaining the unity necessary for true party government. And the Democrats, if and when they elect a president, will demonstrate a cohesion that will astound those who recall the schismatic party of thirty or even twenty years ago. Moreover, the reforms of congressional organization and procedures, which have strengthened the position of party leaders, party policy committees, and party caucuses, make it far more likely now that the cohesive Democratic majorities in the Congress would be able to overcome any obstruction that the truncated conservative wing might still attempt.

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and during what periods the government has in fact been "weak and disorganized," or even on whether those characteristics are wholly undesirable. "That government is best which governs least" is still an aphorism of wide appeal, and the weaker and more disorganized the government the less governance it can inflict. Moreover, to rest a theoretical proposition on concrete examples from history is to invite debate on the merits of each example and to call forth counterexamples. And when the instances are so recent that they involve current personalities or groups—Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals—the debate is distorted by the emotional attachments of the debaters. Moreover, almost any failure or success can be ruled out of consideration as attributable to accidents of personality or to circumstances beyond the control of the institutions however organized. So, in the absence of proven and acceptable methodology for evaluating the performance and success of governments, any judgement about institutional structures will necessarily embody the biases and the values of whomever is the judge. But if that is the best that can be done, so be it. If there is any worth at all to the contention that a government cannot function without the unifying web of party, as Key held, the judgment must be made on whatever is the soundest basis that can be contrived.

My own conclusion is that the predictions of the sages of the earlier generation have been borne out in this modern era of divided or coalition government. True, in the administrations of the four Republican presidents who had to make their peace with House Democratic majorities—and usually Democratic Senate majorities as well—there were significant accomplishments. President Dwight D. Eisenhower achieved a successful bipartisan foreign policy, and President Ronald Reagan managed to carry enough Democrats with him to enact for better or worse the essentials of his economic program in 1981. In subsequent Reagan years, the Congress and the administration collaborated across party lines to enact measures to bring illegal immigration under control, rescue social security, and reform the tax code. But Eisenhower and the Democratic Congress were stalemated on domestic measures throughout his six years of coalition government; the Nixon-Ford period was one of almost unbroken conflict and deadlock on both domestic and foreign issues; and the last seven years of Reagan found the government immobilized on some of the central issues of the day, unwilling to follow the leadership of the President or anyone else and deferring those issues in hope that somehow the 1988 election would resolve matters and render the government functional again.

By common consent, the most conspicuous among the urgent but unresolved problems has been, of course, the federal budget deficit, which has been running at between $150 billion and $200 billion a year since the great tax cut of 1981 took effect. The national debt now stands at well over $2 trillion, more than doubled in seven years of divided government. The United States has suffered the shock of falling from the status of a great creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation, living on borrowing from abroad. The huge trade deficit, the shortfall in investment, and high interest rates are all blamed on the inability of the government to get the budget deficit under control. For all these reasons, virtually all

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of the country's responsible leaders—the president, the congressional leaders, and members of both parties in both houses—have for nearly over half a dozen years been proclaiming loudly and in unison that the nation simply cannot go on this way. The experts from outside—in the academic world, the Federal Reserve System, on Wall Street, in foreign countries—likewise agree that these deficits are economically perilous, whether or not they can be termed morally outrageous as well.

But during all that time that the country has seen a virtual consensus on the urgency of this problem, its governmental institutions have floundered in trying to cope with it. President Reagan sent the Congress his program, but the Congress flatly rejected it. The legislators in their turn floated suggestions, but the President killed them by promising a veto if they were passed. The congressional leaders and others pleaded for a summit meeting between the executive and legislative branches to hammer out a common policy. Finally, in November 1986, the meeting took place. But it is a measure of the national predicament that it took a half-trillion-dollar collapse in the stock market—a five-hundred-billion-dollar panic—before the two branches of the U.S. government would even sit down together. It was easier for Mikhail Gorbachev to get a summit meeting with the President of the United States than it was for the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. And even the domestic summit that was finally held essentially papered over the problem rather than solved it.

Or we can draw examples of the failure of coalition government from international affairs. The country lost a war for the first time in history—in Vietnam—after another period of floundering in search of a policy, with the president pulling in one direction and the Congress in another. And the situation in Nicaragua was throughout the Reagan years almost a replica of Vietnam. The government could adopt no clear and effective policy at all; it could neither take measures strong enough to force the Sandinista government out of power, as the President and his administration wished to do, nor accept that government and make peace with it, as many in the Senate and the House would like. Then there is the Iran-contra debacle. President Reagan in his own summation of that episode spoke of the "failure" of his policy, of "a policy that went astray," of "the damage that's been done," and he blamed it all on mistrust between the executive and legislative branches.[40]

But, some will argue, even if these or other instances can indeed be considered governmental failures attributable to mistrust between the unwilling partners of a forced coalition, the performance of recent unified government has been no better. The Kennedy and Carter years cannot claim overwhelming success, they will maintain, and while Lyndon Johnson proved to be a spectacular presidential leader of the Congress in the enactment of his Great Society measures in 1964 and 1965, he also led the country into the quagmire of Vietnam that in turn launched a

[40] Address to the nation, 12 August 1987, as reported in *New York Times*, 13 August 1987.

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devastating spiral of inflation. That is the difficulty of arguing from cases, as I suggested earlier.

Nor is it any more profitable to look abroad for answers to the effectiveness of unified compared to coalition government. It is easy to demonstrate that Britain's unified governments have not always been successful, and that in continental countries coalition governments (which, it is important to note, are quite different from ours) have not always failed. For better or worse, the discussion of the relative merits of unified over divided government has to be pursued in abstract terms, as it was for the most part in the political science literature cited earlier.

The essence of the theoretical argument in favor of the unified government has been and is: For coherent and timely policies to be adopted and carried out—in short, for government to work effectively, as the established theory held—the president, the Senate, and the House must come into agreement. When the same party controls all three of these power centers, the incentive to reach such agreement is powerful despite the inevitable institutional rivalries and jealousies. The party *does* serve as the bridge or the web, in the metaphors of political science. But in divided government, it is not merely the separated institutions of government that must overcome their built-in rivalries but the opposing parties themselves. And that is bound to be a difficult, arduous process, characterized by conflict, delay, and indecision, and leading frequently to deadlock, inadequate and ineffective policies, or no policies at all.

Competition is the very essence of democratic politics. It gives democracy its meaning, and its vitality. The parties are the instruments of that competition. They are and should be organized for combat, not for collaboration and compromise. They live to win elections in order to advance their philosophies and programs. Therefore, each party strives and must strive to defeat the opposing party. But in a divided government, this healthy competition is translated into an unhealthy, debilitating conflict between the institutions of government themselves. Then, the president and Congress are motivated to try to discredit and defeat each other. Yet these are the institutions that, for anything constructive to happen, simply have to get together.

The average citizen reacts by simply condemning all politicians as a class. "Why don't those people in Washington stop playing politics and just get together and do what's right?" But that is not in the nature of things. Political parties, as the textbooks have always told us, are organized because people have genuine, deep disagreements about the goals and the programs of their societies. If a coalition government is to work, the leaders of committed groups have to be willing to submerge or abandon the very philosophies that caused them to organize their parties in the first place. They have to set aside the principles that are their reason for seeking governmental power. And they will do that only under compulsion of clear and grave necessity—usually, in other words, after deadlock has deteriorated into crisis.

In the American form of coalition government, if the president sends a pro-

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posal to Capitol Hill or takes a foreign policy stand, the opposition-controlled House or houses of Congress—unless they are overwhelmed by the president's popularity and standing in the country—simply *must* reject it. Otherwise they are saying the president is a wise and prudent leader. That would only strengthen him and his party for the next election, and how can the men and women of the congressional majority do that, when their whole object is to defeat him when that time arrives? By the same token, if the opposition party in control of Congress initiates a measure, the president has to veto it—or he is saying of his opponents that they are sound and statesmanlike, and so is building them up for the next election.

So when President Reagan sent his budgets to the Congress, the Democrats who controlled both houses had to pronounce them "dead on arrival,"as they did. And when they came up with their alternatives, the President had to condemn them and hurl them back. Eventually, when the stream of recrimination and vetoes ran dry each year, some kind of budget was necessarily adopted; but it did not reflect the views of either party, and in terms of the consensus objective of deficit reduction it was a pale and ineffective compromise. Neither party would take responsibility, neither could be held accountable, each could point the finger at the other when the things went wrong.

In such circumstances, the people in their one solemn, sovereign act of voting cannot render a clear verdict and thus set the course of government. Elections lose their purpose and their meaning. The President, all through 1988, was saying, "Don't blame me for the budget deficit. It's those Democrats in Congress." And the Democrats were replying, "Don't blame us. Blame that man in the White House for not giving us the proper leadership." In November, the voters were not able to hold anybody clearly responsible, because, in fact nobody had been.

Our struggles with coalition government have demonstrated also the truth of the established wisdom concerning presidential leadership: in the American system there is simply no substitute for it. The Congress has 535 voting members, organized in two houses and in innumerable committees and subcommittees; every member is in principle the equal of every other other member, and nobody can give directions to anybody else and make them stick. Such a body is simply not well designed for making coherent, decisive, coordinated policy. As the old theory told us, the system works best when the president proposes and the Congress disposes, when the president sets the agenda and leads, as everyone expects him to.

But how can leaders lead if followers don't follow? In divided government, presidential leadership becomes all but impossible. The president is not the leader of the congressional majority. He is precisely the opposite—the leader of their opposition, the man they are most dedicated to discredit and defeat. With great fanfare and immense hope, the people elect a president each four years. But then, most of the time these days, they give him a Congress a majority of whose members tried their best to beat him in the last election and will do so again in the next. To lead in those circumstances would be beyond the capability of any mortal. No

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one should blame presidents when they fail in a time of coalition government. It is the system that is at fault.

Nobody planned it this way. The country in no way made a conscious decision thirty years ago to abandon the responsible-party system that had served it well for almost the whole life of the nation. It was simply an accident of the electoral system. Almost unique in the world, the United States has an electoral process that permits people to split their tickets—to vote one way for president and the other way for Congress, if they so choose. And that is what enough of them have done to produce a divided outcome most of the time of late.

Re-reconciling Theory and Practice

Today there is a disjunction between theory and practice, between the long-accepted and not-yet-abandoned ideas about how the government of the United States should work and the way in which it is now compelled to try to work. How can theory and practice once again be synchronized?

First, can the practice be altered to fit the therapy? In other words, is there any way to restore party government as the normal, rather than abnormal, state of affairs? Theoretically, there is. But only by altering the electoral system that lets ticket-splitting determine the composition of the government. That would mean fundamental change in the Constitution, and it only takes a split second of reflection to convince anyone that politically and practically it cannot be done. It would take the utter collapse of government to make such change possible.

The constitutional amendment might take any of several forms, the simplest of which would be a revision of the ballot to make ticket splitting impossible in national elections. That would in effect return the country to the nineteenth-century mode, when straight-ticket ballots were printed and handed out by the parties—except that the ballots would now be government-printed and the secrecy of the vote protected. The voters would select one from among two or more party slates or "team tickets" that included each party's candidates for president, vice president, Senate, and House. This is not a totally outlandish idea, because voters now choose between team tickets for president and vice president. If that principle were extended to Senate and House candidates as well, it would be almost a certainty that every incoming president would have a Congress of his own party to work with and to lead. A subtle variant of this scheme would be to require a party's candidates for Congress to be its candidates for the electoral college also, so that a voter could cast a ballot for president only by casting it for the congressional candidate as the elector. A different approach would be to create bonus seats in the House and Senate, to be awarded to the president's party in sufficient number to give it control of the Congress.

But any of those ideas would be anathema to the members of Congress, who under normal constitutional amendment procedures would have to initiate the change. Because the amendment process requires extraordinary majorities—two-

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thirds of the House and Senate and three-fourths of the state legislatures—it demands in effect bipartisan agreement. Therefore, both parties would have to see benefit in the change. But since redistribution of power is a zero-sum game that creates both winners and losers, one party is bound to lose. In the current case it would be the Democrats, for any of these proposals would have given the Republicans control of the Congress during much or all of the time that they have held the presidency. The Democrats in the Congress would never take a second look at any team ticket scheme that would make them stand or fall with a George McGovern or a Walter Mondale, and that would convert their majorities into minorities every time their candidate for president was beaten. And the Republicans would not perceive the advantage for their party, however obvious that advantage may have been throughout the past twenty years. Faced with a team ticket proposal, they would remember how many seats they would have lost with Barry Goldwater back in 1964 and play it safe.

If practice cannot be changed to fit the established theory of party government, then what are the prospects for the development of new theory? If coalition government is what the United States must live with most of the time, can political leadership and political science produce an alternative theory that tells us how that kind of government can be made to work?

On this question, today's political scientists, who would appear to have the primary obligation to make suggestions, fall into three groups. The first consists of those who are happy with the way the government works now. They simply reject the party-government and presidential-leadership theories of the preceding generation. They find divided government acceptable enough, and maybe even better than party government, for it more certainly safeguards individual liberties and assures that rash and impulsive actions can be forestalled—in domestic affairs, at least. This is the position of traditional conservatives who still echo the fears of government that dominated the eighteenth century, and is a wholly arguable and defensive position. But ironically, these conservatives are joined now by their exact opposites—the typical liberal Democrats, whose gut reaction is, "Thank God for divided government under President Reagan. It saved us from Judge Robert Bork, and war in Nicaragua, and all kinds of other follies." These liberals were *for* party government and presidential leadership when their man—FDR or John Kennedy or another Democrat—was in the White House, but they were against it when the President was Ronald Reagan.

The second group is made up of the intellectual heirs of the dominant school of the midcentury, still true believers in party government and presidential leadership. It includes such survivors of that school as James MacGregor Burns, who was a leader in the formation of two current reform organizations, the Committee on the Constitutional System and the Committee for Party Renewal, both of which attempt to bridge the separate worlds of academic science and practical politics. The Democrats in this group had to swallow hard in the Reagan era, but forced their reason to overcome their emotions so that they could say, "We're willing to let the Republicans have their day—even under Reagan—because they will be held

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accountable, they will discredit themselves, and then we will have our day." The Democrats are now joined, too, by some of their exact opposites—the new breed of conservative activists who have found that divided government can frustrate them too, when the public mood swings their way. Those in this group in both parties believe that in the long run a government that is able to act, even if it makes mistakes, is less dangerous than one that is rendered impotent by deadlock and division. A government with the capability to act will also have the capability to correct its errors (or its successor can) but there is no recourse when a government is inert, lethargic, paralyzed. Accordingly, scholars in this group believe that reform measures are in order, but they are apt to put the question aside because of the hopelessness of advocating changes in the Constitution.

The third bloc of political scientists and apparently the largest, even among specialists in American national government, is made up of those who have not found it necessary to take a stand at all. This group can be charged with evading what is surely one of the most crucial intellectual questions facing students of American government—one that the previous generation of political scientists explicitly asked and answered.

There are many reasons that scholars of government might prefer to evade the question. One was mentioned earlier—methodology. How is the general performance of a government to be evaluated, anyway? How can the effects of divided government be separated from the effects of all the other factors that influence outcomes—the temperaments and capabilities of individual leaders, the economic and social circumstances of a given time, and the actions of the other peoples and nations that share the globe—so that one can render a quasi-scientific judgment as to whether unified or divided government is the superior model for America? These are daunting questions, but no one needs precise quantitative answers. Informed judgments are needed based on the best methods of analysis that are available, as rough as those may be.

Some of the other reasons for evading the issue are less respectable. It is not satisfactory to argue that an intellectual effort is unnecessary because the new era will shortly end and the country will return to party government of its own accord. A third of a century has already elapsed since 1955, and the tendency of the voters to elect Republican presidents and Democratic Senates most of the time, and Democratic Houses all of the time, appears to be as firmly fixed as anything in national politics, reinforced rather than weakened from election to election. Those who would rely on this argument should provide a convincing explanation for predicting an automatic restoration of the previous order.

Nor is it satisfactory to contend, as many do, that a basic principle of democracy forbids questioning the desirability of coalition government: that of majority rule. A majority of the people evidently want divided government, runs this argument, and therefore they are entitled to have it, whether it is good for them or not. After all, the people rule. But this argument assumes that divided government is the people's intent, more or less conscious, rather than the essentially chance outcome of the electoral system that was not designed by those who use it. Clearly

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the latter is the case: divided government is a historical and procedural accident. The era of coalition government was not ushered in three decades ago by the sudden appearance of an overwhelming popular demand for that form of government as such. In 1956, the first presidential election year of the new era, a majority of voters liked Eisenhower and a majority wanted to retain their incumbent Democratic congressmen; but those were not the same majorities. In that year and in every one of the divided-government elections since, a large majority of the voters in fact voted a straight ballot, either Republican or Democratic, for national offices. It was the ticket-splitting *minority*, often a small minority, that gave the country its divided government. There is no evidence from electoral behavior that the public at large has deliberately rejected the long-accepted doctrine of party government; reliable public opinion polling data on the abstract question do not exist.

In short, fence straddling on this issue is not intellectually defensible. Either the dominant pre-1954 view of the desirability of party government and presidential leadership as the model and the ideal was right or it was wrong. That two systems so diametrically opposite as party government and coalition could serve the country equally well is a virtual mathematical impossibility, and that they could come close to equality is highly improbable. One or the other necessarily has to be the superior model for America, and political scientists have a responsibility to determine which it is and inform the country of their judgment.

Not that the discipline would ever speak with a single voice, of course, or even reach the level of agreement that prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s. But political scientists have the responsibility to grapple with the question individually, and by pooling their wisdom and debating opposing views to see whether a broad area of agreement might emerge.

Those who think that the model of party government and presidential leadership was wrong, and who would advance the post-1955 structure of coalition government as the new ideal, have an obligation to provide a new body of theory that will tell us what is the substitute for presidential leadership and congressional followership, how the partners in the American coalition government should relate to one another for that type of government to function well, and how those relationships can be brought about. What is the role of parties in such a system, and will strengthening them simply intensify the confrontation between the branches and render deadlocks more implacable? Should the agitation within the discipline for stronger parties be reversed and should weaker parties be made the goal? How would the weakening of congressional parties affect the efficiency of the Congress and its status vis-à-vis the presidency? Does the answer—or part of it, at least—lie in bipartisan mechanisms such as the one that resolved the social security issue and the National Economic Commission that was created in 1988 to grapple with the budget deficit? Can these be multiplied and regularized to anticipate and forestall crises rather than simply cope with them when they reach the desperation stage? If we are to accept coalition government as ideal, or even as satisfactory, we need a body of theory as fully developed as the one it superseded,

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followed by institutional innovation based on the new theory. No such body of theory has even begun to emerge.

By the same token, those who still cherish the idea of party government have an obligation of equal gravity. They must come to grips with the question of how our election system, or the composition and powers of the branches of government, should be altered to restore unified government as the normal state of affairs. And if that means—as it surely does—that the Constitution itself should be changed, how can that be brought about? That question obviously is not one for the faint-hearted. But for any serious student of American government to contend that all of the issues raised by coalition government can simply be set aside, because whatever is is best, is not an answer. The times demand a more responsible political science than that.*

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The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War

DAVID M. BARRETT

There is an almost undisputed consensus in the present era that the decision of President Lyndon Johnson to commit hundreds of thousands of American combat troops to fight in South Vietnam was a mistake of gigantic proportions. This large escalation of the American role in Vietnam in 1965 was an early and crucial chapter in a subsequent decade of failure and tragedy in Southeast Asia. In search of how such a misguided venture as the American participation in the Vietnam war could have happened, historians and political scientists have written much about the personality of Johnson and the advisory process surrounding the President. These two elements are often regarded as possible causes of the American miscalculation in entering the war on a massive scale.

This article will suggest that a mythology has been prevalent for some years regarding Lyndon Johnson, his willingness to listen to varied advice on handling the Vietnam situation in 1965, and the scope of the advice he in fact received before deciding on escalation. The most important myth is that Johnson was a "victim of groupthink," that is, that he did not receive wide ranging opinions from significant advisers about whether or not to intensify America's military role in Vietnam. This myth suggests that with one principle exception no important advisers urged

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Johnson to keep combat troops out of Vietnam. A secondary and related myth claims that Johnson's personality and ego were such that he would not countenance the expression of conflicting advice that might raise the possibility that the United States would be wrong to increase its military presence in Vietnam.

By drawing on documentation declassified in recent years and by considering diverse secondary sources, some of which have been available for many years, this article demonstrates that Johnson was not a victim of groupthink and that he received and listened to significant advice warning him against sending troops to Vietnam. It is important to note what this article does *not* claim: it does not assert that most of Johnson's advisers in 1965 urged him against escalating the American role in Vietnam. On the contrary, it is certainly true that the distinct majority of Johnson's advisers told him that the United States had no choice but to send in the troops in order to save South Vietnam. However, the myths that a pathological advisory process or a tremendously egotistical personality prevented Johnson from considering alternatives to (and the drawbacks of) escalation in Vietnam should be laid to rest. In retrospect, it is clear that Lyndon Johnson made a tragically bad decision when he committed ground troops to a land war in Southeast Asia. But unlike the picture drawn in many accounts, the President certainly heard and seems to have agonized over the different options facing him before making the decision.

Not only does the historical record need to be set straight, but a good deal of the scholarly literature based on this distorted view of Lyndon Johnson, his advisers, and the 1965 decision to enter the Vietnam war needs revision. Further, while the influence of presidents' "expert" advisers is an area for fruitful research, it will be suggested that models of presidential decision making used or developed by political scientists need to reflect the often important, albeit informal, advisory role of presidents' political and personal intimates.

Contemporary Interpretations of Johnson's Decision

In reading various histories and scholarly articles about the Vietnam war, it is not unusual to encounter claims that Lyndon Johnson received very few warnings from significant advisers that disaster lay ahead if he went to war in Vietnam. Irving Janis's *Groupthink* was published in a revised edition in 1983. Using the Vietnam war as a case study with the most "relevance," it proceeds to examine the dangers of poor advice emanating from cohesive groups of advisers. In exploring whether or not Lyndon Johnson was a victim of groupthink, the study concludes that the President probably was, since his advisers failed "to canvas the full range of alternative courses of action."[1]

John G. Stoessinger's *Why Nations Go To War*, analyzes a number of instances when nations have gone to war. In its study of how the United States and North Vietnam reached such a state, Stoessinger paints a picture of Lyndon Johnson

[1] Irving Janis, *Groupthink*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), 130, 98.

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as a man of "ego, stubborness, and pride" who did not even understand in making his July 1965 decision that he "had crossed the Rubicon and unleased a major American land war in Asia." Furthermore, at the time that Johnson faced the decision of whether or not to enlarge the American role in Vietnam, "Only one man in Johnson's inner circle openly voiced his doubts about Vietnam: George Ball." Calling the Vietnam war a "national catastrophe," Stoessinger blames a President guided by his "enormous ego and *machismo*" and stresses the importance of how Ball was "alone in his resistance" to escalation.[2]

Stoessinger's book is typical in naming Under Secretary of State George Ball as the only important Johnson adviser to urge the President against escalation. Another is Paul Kattenburg's *The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945–1975.* In writing of what he claims was the nearly unanimous advice Johnson received in favor of troop increases, Kattenburg says, "The one exception was Undersecretary of State George Ball, who not only opposed the policy of escalation, but determinedly and vigorously dissented with our policy of deep engagement in Indochina."[3]

Larry Berman's *Planning a Tragedy* links the Vietnam decision of 1965 to the domestic political agenda of Johnson, chiefly the desire to move Great Society and civil rights legislation through Congress. Berman's account moves away from the mythology that only George Ball warned Johnson against escalation. However, this article will consider in more depth than did Berman's book the advice Johnson heard from significant figures opposing escalation. Included here are the views of persons not mentioned in the Berman account. Furthermore, the weight of evidence presented here calls into question Berman's thesis that Johnson "heard but ignored" such advice, and that the President was simply "using" advisers in order to "legitimize" his escalation decision.[4]

Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts produced an account of the American experience in Southeast Asia that does not rely on the groupthink thesis to explain escalation in Vietnam. In *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* the authors contend that successive presidents up through Richard Nixon took measures strong enough to "hurt the enemy but not destroy him" in order to avoid the political consequences of the "loss" of Vietnam to communism. Unlike Berman, Gelb and Betts do not find particular fault with the advisory process of the Johnson administration. Instead, they suggest that Johnson followed the same flawed but fervently held principles that other presidents had both promulgated and followed. Nonetheless, when Gelb and Betts describe the 1965 time frame preceding Johnson's decision "to drastically raise the ante . . . in July" they substantially understate both the number of anti-escalation figures with direct access to Johnson and the substance of the advice that those men gave Johnson. This article will demonstrate that the authors'

[2] John Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 99, 102.

[3] Paul Kattenburg, *The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1948–1975* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 130.

[4] Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 121, 152.

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description of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield as the only congressional leader opposing escalation is just one example of such understatement.[5]

I will point out how such interpretations of American entry into the Vietnam war have filtered down into and distorted certain scholarly literature. But first, let us consider some of the political figures who warned Johnson against getting caught in a quagmire in Southeast Asia.

The Six Advisers

There is sufficient documentation to verify that there were at least six anti-escalation figures who in 1965 were significant among those advising President Johnson on his dilemma in Vietnam. Of course, the designation of advisers as "significant" cannot be entirely objective. This article will treat those men who had both a close personal relationship with Lyndon Johnson and/or who held a high ranking political position within Johnson administration circles. Thus, while such figures as Senator Wayne Morse, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and Walter Lippmann were among those privately warning against escalation in Vietnam, their advice will not be considered in this article, since they were either not sufficiently close to Johnson personally or sufficiently powerful to merit such consideration.

I will consider the advice given to Johnson in 1965 by six men—George Ball, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell, Clark Clifford, William Fulbright, and Mike Mansfield—and explore what they said, their relationships with Johnson, and how he responded to their advice.

George Ball

Ball is the figure whose advice needs the least attention, since as undersecretary of state his opposition to escalation in Vietnam has been documented and even celebrated for many years. Throughout 1964 and the first half of 1965, Ball gave spirited and prophetic warnings that the United States would be no more successful with its military intervention in Indochina than France had been over a decade earlier. In an 18 June 1965 memo to the President, Ball suggested, "A review of the French experience more than a decade ago may be helpful. The French fought a war in Vietnam, and were finally defeated—after seven years of bloody struggle and when they still had 250,000 combat-hardened veterans in the field, supported by an army of 205,000 South Vietnamese."[6]

Because Ball's position has been so thoroughly documented elsewhere[7], I will

[5] Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), 128, 2, 125.

[6] George Ball, Memo to the President, 18 June, 1965, National Security File, Deployment of Major U.S. Forces, Box 42, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas, 4.

[7] See, for instance, George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982); and David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972).

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address the following questions: Did Ball have access to the President? Did he get a serious hearing from the President? Or was he merely what Irving Janis and others called a "domesticated dissenter," who alone advised Johnson to avoid a major war in Vietnam?[8]

A good starting place for answering these questions is an oral history interview with Ball made by the Lyndon Johnson Library.[9] Ball, who was allowed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to have unprecedented freedom in communicating directly with the President, says that after the President received the undersecretary's first comprehensive memo on Vietnam:

> the President read it not once, but twice, so he told me, and he was very impressed, or shaken, by it. So he insisted that we sit down and start arguments. Well, that was the beginning of a process I then employed, because then I wrote the President every few weeks setting forth, in effect, what I thought were quite serious reasoned memoranda which were difficult to do because, as I say, I had to do them all myself. But each one was addressed at some particular proposal for escalation, challenging the proposal and arguing that we were losing the war, that it was an unwinnable war, that we could commit any number of—500,000 I think the figure I used at one point in a memorandum—and that we still would not win. . . . The President always read these things. And the reason I know he read them is because he always insisted on having a meeting then, and he would call on me to present my views, which I would do. The reason I know he read them was that he would sit there without looking at them and he'd say, "Now, George, you say on page nine so-and-so."
>
> Interviewer: He didn't block you out because he knew you were going to be unsympathetic?
>
> Ball: No. Let me say if I had found myself excluded from meetings . . . then I would probably have quit. But, on the contrary, I was always involved.[10]

On another occasion, after the United States had begun bombing North Vietnam on a regular basis, but before the major increase of troop levels in July 1965, Ball prepared a paper

> that I wrote to President Johnson describing the escalatory steps which would follow one another until we got into deep trouble—a war with China and a war with the Soviet Union and so on—because I wanted to take him through this . . . I sent this to the President and he called me and said come over. I went over with [special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] Mac Bundy. I think this was on a Saturday. We sat down and I went through it step-by-step and explained the logic of each step.[11]

Though Ball and Lyndon Johnson[12] claim that such advice had its "day in court" and was "listened to,"[13] others suggested that the undersecretary was merely a

[8] Janis, *Groupthink*, 120. James C. Thomson, Jr. coined the term "domesticated dissent" in "How Could Vietnam Happen?" *The Atlantic*, April 1968, 49.

[9] Oral interview with George Ball, conducted for the LBJ Library, 8 July 1971.

[10] Ball oral interview, I-18, 20. On Rusk and Ball, see Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 384.

[11] Ball oral interview, I-18, 20.

[12] Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 147.

[13] Ball oral interview, I-31.

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"domesticated dissenter." Larry Berman, for instance, cites with emphasis a remark by William Bundy, undersecretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs in 1965, that one meeting in which Ball vigorously challenged escalation plans was "a bit of a set piece . . . you felt it had been scripted to a degree."[14] A reader might infer from such a quotation that Bundy thought the meeting in question was held purely for show. However, a reading of the full oral interview transcript shows Bundy quickly pointing out that the meeting in question was *not* like many National Security Council (NSC) meetings, where views put forth "were really simply recitals, quite frankly. I think that's an important thing to say." Instead, this meeting "was all the senior advisers; it was a major meeting . . . a real meat and potatoes meeting . . . a nitty-gritty meeting. . . ." Bundy's "set piece" comment was intended to reflect not on the seriousness with which Ball's views were considered, but rather Bundy's feeling "that the President had already started to formulate [a decision]." Bundy describes Ball's advice as "real strategic dissent" and attacked the notion that there was a "a sort of 'kept voice' of dissent." He continues:

> In our system where there is only one fellow who is going to make the decision, all your advocacy is keyed to that; but I would venture, and I think the papers will support, certainly my own recollection is very clear, that the quality of men that President Johnson had around him and the way that he dealt with them on the whole created an atmosphere in which you did level.[15]

As all histories of the Vietnam war indicate, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy all disagreed with Ball's advice. However, it is equally clear that Lyndon Johnson heard emphatic advice from his undersecretary of state that he should avoid a massive military commitment to South Vietnam.

In order to demonstrate that President Johnson was not a victim of groupthink during the first half of 1965, it is important to show that Ball was not the only significant person giving Johnson such advice. Therefore, I now turn to what five other men had to say to the President. In considering these men, their relationships with Johnson, and what they advised him to do, we will also get a sense of whether or not the President really wrestled with the different courses open to him in dealing with the Vietnam problem.

J. William Fulbright

As is true of a number of men whose advice is presented here, the relationship of Fulbright with Lyndon Johnson and the advice he gave the President in the first half of 1965 have been obscured by what happened before and after that cru-

[14] William Bundy, oral interview, LBJ Library, 42; also quoted in Berman, *Planning a Tragedy*, 106.
[15] W. Bundy, oral interview, LBJ Library, 42, 28, 32, 29.

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cial year. Fulbright is well known as the man who sponsored Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin resolution in the Senate in 1964 and as the man who became a bitter critic of the subsequent American war fighting under the leadership of Lyndon Johnson. What has received less attention are the closeness of Johnson's relationship with Fulbright up until mid-1965 and the quiet but firm advice which the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee had for the President.

Lyndon Johnson and William Fulbright were both southern senators who succeeded in rising above regional concerns to become national figures. Despite their different personalities, they became close friends while serving in the Senate. One of Fulbright's biographers, Tristram Coffin, wrote in 1966 of the Johnson-Fulbright relationship, "Theirs was a friendship out of the ordinary, a psychic attraction of the opposites . . . Johnson seemed to see in Fulbright a shoot of his own life, an intellectual one that had never had a chance to grow."[16] Haynes Johnson and Bernard Gwertzman, in the 1972 volume, *Fulbright, the Dissenter* wrote that in their Senate days, Fulbright "admired no one more than the Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson. [In 1960] Fulbright was solidly behind the Texan for the presidency." In the first year of his presidency, Johnson brought Fulbright into his "closest confidences."[17] That friendship extended to the wives of both men. In 1964, Lady Bird Johnson said of William and Betty Fulbright, "They are our best friends. We see them more than anyone else."[18]

After the escalation in Vietnam, of course, Fulbright became a critic, and the friendship died a painful, bitter death, with each man feeling betrayed by the other. In the first half of 1965, however, William Fulbright tried earnestly to convince the President that becoming committed to defending South Vietnam with combat troops would be a mistake. The essence of the senator's beliefs was that the United States could not "save" South Vietnam. The best and most realistic solution to the Vietnam problem from the American vantage point would be the emergence of a "Titoist" style, independent, Communist Vietnam. Such a nation, like Yugoslavia under Joseph Broz Tito, would do the bidding of neither the Soviet Union nor China, but rather would steer an independent course between the two as events and conditions demanded.[19]

It is difficult to determine the exact number of meetings that Fulbright had with Johnson in the first half of 1965. However, there is sufficient documentation to demonstrate that there were lengthy, private visits by Fulbright to the President in February, June, and July. In addition, there were phone calls and other more

[16] Tristram Coffin, *Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philosopher* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1966), 188–189.

[17] Haynes Johnson and Bernard Gwertzman, *Fulbright: The Dissenter* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 6, 184.

[18] Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 191.

[19] Ibid., 251–252.

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public contacts between the two, such as meals with others present, and at public functions.[20]

The content of the Fulbright-Johnson meetings was often focused on Vietnam. In the spring of 1965, the senator was troubled by the possibility that the President might commit troops to an impossible situation. After discussing his views at length with fellow senator and Johnson mentor Richard Russell, Fulbright sent the President a six point memo. The first point read:

> It would be a disaster for the United States to try to engage in a massive ground and air war in Southeast Asia. Not only would it be extremely costly, but it would also revive and intensify the Cold War which had begun to cool off following the missile crisis in Cuba, and it would lead to a revival of jingoism in the United States.[21]

Instead, the senator suggested that the President seek a negotiated settlement in order to secure an independent, albeit Communist, Vietnam. A few days later, the President invited Fulbright to the White House, where the two "conferred alone and at length."[22]

According to Haynes Johnson and Bernard Gwertzman, Fulbright had been hopeful in January 1965 "and for months to come . . . that he would be able to persuade the President. He was still seeing the President often, and he was expressing himself."[23] Not surprisingly, considering the strength of Johnson's personality, the President did much of the talking at the meetings during those months. However, all accounts agree that the senator leveled with the President while avoiding, for the most part, public criticisms of current Vietnam policy. This strategy was pursued in hopes of preventing the President from choosing to go to war.[24]

Finally, at a meeting in mid-June, which lasted for an hour and a half, Fulbright told the President that, on the following day, he would publicly oppose any escalation of the American role in Vietnam. Disappointed, Johnson asked the senator to at least point out how patient the President had been in seeking negotiations with North Vietnam. Thus, on the afternoon of Tuesday, 15 June, after again sharing his views privately with the President, Fulbright rose on the Senate floor to say:

> It is clear to all reasonable Americans that a complete military victory in Vietnam, though theoretically attainable, can in fact be attained only at a cost far exceeding the requirements of our interest and our honor . . . Escalation would invite the intervention or infiltration on a large scale of North Vietnamese troops . . . this in turn would probably draw the United States into a bloody and protracted jungle war in which the advantages would be with the other side. . . .[25]

[20] "Contacts Between the President and Senator Fulbright," undated, "Name File: J. William Fulbright," LBJ Library.
[21] Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 243.
[22] Johnson and Gwertzman, *Fulbright*, 205.
[23] Ibid., 202.
[24] Ibid., 202; and Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 253.
[25] Quoted in Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 254.

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Ultimately, of course, as Fulbright later put it, Johnson "was not persuaded."[26] Nonetheless, the President was fully aware that his friend and fellow southerner, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, felt deeply that Johnson would be choosing the wrong course by irrevocably committing the United States to the defense of South Vietnam. A year later, their friendship by then effectively over, Johnson sent a note to Fulbright after encountering him briefly at a diplomatic reception: "I listen to everyone I can, but I must take the responsibility for deciding the policy—not my 'advisers' . . . I have a fondness for you and Betty that is real."[27]

When he was off the record, Lyndon Johnson was by all accounts a colorful personality. On the record, whether it was press conferences, televised speeches, or published materials such as his memoirs, Johnson tried to exhibit what he thought was presidential dignity. Thus, the colorfully opinionated Johnson was rarely evident on such occasions. One exception to this is the long oral history he recorded for his library in 1969. In the transcription, one finds an opinionated, occasionally bitter, and frequently colorful Lyndon Johnson to match the legends about his forceful personality. For instance, speaking the year after Robert Kennedy was assassinated, Johnson had a blunt recollection of Kennedy's 1965 proposal that Dean Rusk be ousted as secretary of state and replaced by Bill Moyers: "I just couldn't believe he was serious and I wondered if there was something wrong with his thinking process."[28]

In that transcript, we find Johnson's view of what a vice president should have to say at National Security Council meetings, based on his years as vice president in the Kennedy administration. It begins with a memory of the one time Johnson could recall speaking up at an NSC meeting by asking a "leading question" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His distinct memory of that inquiry had President John Kennedy showing "some irritation." So, in the future, Johnson avoided making even such limited contributions to meetings when he and the President were together with others:

> I . . . had a general policy of never speaking unless I was spoken to and never made a recommendation unless the President asked me, and never differing with him in public. Frequently, he and I would talk and I would say, "We have this difference and here is my viewpoint." But I never thought it would be appropriate or desirable to debate differences of opinion in open meeting with others. I thought it would be unproductive for the Vice President and President to do it.[29]

Others back up that recollection. William Bundy recalls, "I never heard him [Vice President Johnson] express his views."[30] George Ball, who also served in the Kennedy

[26] Ibid., 244.
[27] "Confidential Name File: J. William Fulbright," 27 May 1966, LBJ Library.
[28] Lyndon Johnson, oral interview, LBJ Library, 20.
[29] Ibid., 7.
[30] W. Bundy, oral interview, LBJ Library, I-27.

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and Johnson administrations, recalled of Johnson's participation that "He said relatively little."[31]

Hubert Humphrey

With such experiences in mind, Lyndon Johnson expected the same considerable degree of restraint from his vice president. According to Ted Van Dyk, a top aide to Humphrey during his vice presidency:

> Johnson had talked to him at great length before he took office saying he didn't want Humphrey disagreeing with him at meetings, and that they should discuss their difference privately. And right at the start Humphrey breached this. I'm sure this angered the hell out of Johnson—maybe even more than the fact that Humphrey disagreed with him.[32]

Humphrey biographer Albert Eisele calls the Johnson-Humphrey understanding at the beginning of Humphrey's tenure the "private disagreement" pact.[33]

Interestingly, however, Humphrey's memoirs make no mention of such a pact, nor of Johnson's strong desire for vice presidential reticence in White House meetings. Instead, Humphrey complains that after restricting his thoughts on Vietnam to "the councils of government . . . the President . . . apparently thought I had leaked something about the meetings. I had not, but that became irrelevant."[34]

The topic under discussion, as Humphrey indicates, was American policy in Vietnam. What were the vice president's views? They are capsulized in a prophetic memo that Humphrey sent to the President in February 1965. Because Humphrey became a prominent cheerleader for the President's Vietnam policies *after* the escalation decision was made in July, his pre-July 1965 opinions have been obscured somewhat. His memo is worth quoting at some length:

> I have been reading the Vietnam cables and intelligence estimates of the last two weeks. Because these may be the most fateful decisions of your Administration, I wanted to give you my personal views. You know that I have nothing but sympathy for you and complete understanding for the burden and the anguish which surrounds such decisions. There is obviously no quick or easy solution, and no clear course of right or wrong. Whatever you decide, we will be taking big historic gambles, and we won't know for sure whether they were right until months or perhaps years afterwards. The moral dilemmas are inescapable. . . . Some things are beyond our power to prevent . . . American wars have to be politically understandable by the American public. There has to be a cogent, convincing case if we are to enjoy sustained public support. . . The public is worried and confused. Our rationale for action has shifted away now even from the notion that we are there as advisers on request of a free government, to the simple and politically barren argument of our "national interest" . . . People can't understand why we would run grave risks to support a country which is totally unable to put its own house in order

[31] Ball, oral interview, LBJ Library, I-3.
[32] Quoted in Albert Eisele, *Almost to the Presidency* (Blue Earth, Minn.: Piper Co., 1982), 233.
[33] Ibid., 231.
[34] Hubert Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 325.

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> . . . Politically in Washington, beneath the surface, the opposition is more Democratic than Republican. This may be even more true at the grassroots across the country. It is always hard to cut losses. But the Johnson Administration is in a stronger position to do so now than any Administration in this century . . . If . . . we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting in Vietnam over the next few months, political opposition will steadily mount . . . I intend to support the Administration whatever the President's decisions. But these are my views.[35]

Humphrey prefaced his memo with an acknowledgment that he was "no military expert." Instead he based his credibility on his and Johnson's "many years of political life in the Senate," their recent "successful national election together," and Johnson's "respect for . . . my ability to relate politics and policies. . . ."[36] That relationship went back to 1949, when Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey were sworn in as highly touted freshmen senators.

It is far beyond the scope of this article to draw a definitive picture of the Johnson-Humphrey relationship. Though much has been written about both men, no published work has focused exclusively on this love/hate relationship, which lasted for decades and became most intense during the Johnson presidency. Humphrey's close friend Edgar Berman surveyed the scope of the relationship in a biography of Humphrey. He relates how Johnson liked to say that Humphrey was "all heart and no balls." Yet Johnson aide, Jack Valenti, told Berman, "At Lyndon Johnson's lowest point, it was only Hubert who would spend hours holding LBJ's hands, making him laugh, helping him forget the war—and it was a godsend."[37]

Humphrey made arguments corresponding to those in his long memo at NSC and ad hoc meetings of the President and his advisers in February and March of 1965.[38] Humphrey's opposition to a retaliatory raid on Hanoi in February was recalled by Ball as "forceful and very frank."[39] But after March, the President put Humphrey in "limbo," to use the vice president's own words.[40] The vice president was no longer invited to all of the NSC meetings that took place on Vietnam, though he did attend one NSC meeting in July prior to the President's ultimate decision.

Despite Humphrey's entry for some months into political limbo, the intense personal relationship between Johnson and Humphrey did not end. One Humphrey aide recalls, "There were times when Johnson would call him up every day and have him over for long talks. And then a couple of weeks would go by and he wouldn't hardly [sic] see the President. . . ."[41]

[35] Ibid., 320–324.

[36] Ibid., 321.

[37] Edgar Berman, *Hubert*, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1979), 88, 94.

[38] Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man*, 319. Also see minutes of NSC meeting, in National Security File, NSC Meetings, Volume 3, LBJ Library, showing Humphrey at the 26 March meeting, but not at subsequent NSC meetings in April and June.

[39] Eisele, *Almost to the Presidency*, 233.

[40] Humphrey, *Education of a Public Man*, 327.

[41] Eisele, *Almost to the Presidency*, 236.

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Certain points are clear about the Johnson–Humphrey relationship and the Vietnam issue. First, the vice president was usually excluded from top meetings from late March through the latter part of July, when the decision to escalate was made. It is not, however, entirely clear from the evidence if it was the content of Humphrey's advocacy or the less-than-private forms it sometimes took that angered Lyndon Johnson. The evidence from Johnson's own vice presidency suggests it may well have been the latter. Second, once the escalation decision was made, Humphrey kept his word and, as is well known, became a top public defender of the American war effort. Last, however politically maladroit his approach may have been in the spring of 1965, Humphrey expressed himself to the President in strong language urging against escalation, so that the President knew the personal views of his vice president.

Mike Mansfield

Prior to entering the United States Congress in January 1943, Mansfield taught history at Montana State University, with a specialty in the Far East. On entering the U.S. House of Representatives, he was appointed to its Foreign Affairs Committee. There he caught the attention of Franklin Roosevelt, who sent him on a secret mission to China. As a freshman senator in 1953, Mansfield was awarded by Lyndon Johnson with membership on the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Four years later, the majority leader asked the Montanan to become majority whip, a job that he accepted with some reluctance. In 1961 Mansfield succeeded Johnson as majority leader. By then, of course, Lyndon Johnson had become something of a Washington legend through his use of the powers of the office of majority leader in the Senate. However, one chronicler of Mansfield's career writes, "As his old mentor faded from the Senate scene, Mansfield began infusing the leadership functions with his own principles and personality."[42]

For a year before Lyndon Johnson made the major escalation of the American role in Vietnam, Mike Mansfield had been advising him to do just the opposite. It is also clear from archival records that Johnson and his foreign policy staff spent much time with Mansfield and that the majority leader attended numerous NSC and ad hoc meetings.

What is striking in reading the Mansfield letters and memos to the President, is the tact and sympathy he showed in dealing with Johnson, all the while telling him very bluntly that escalation would be a disaster. In early June, Mansfield congratulated the President for his "resistance to pressures for an irreversible extension of the war in Asia . . . In keeping the lid on these pressures you are on sound historic and realistic grounds. . . ."[43] In an earlier letter written on 24 March, the

[42] Louis Baldwin, *Hon. Politician: Mike Mansfield of Montana* (Missoula, Mont.: Mountain Press, 1979), 15, 18.

[43] Mansfield, Memo to the President, 5 June 1965, Nat. Security File, Name File: Mansfield, Box 6, LBJ Library.

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senator tried to summarize the views expressed in preceding months' letters. First, Mansfield reminded Johnson of his central opinion "That the United States does not have interests on the Southeast Asian mainland to justify the costs in American lives and resources which would be required if we were to attempt to exercise, in effect, primacy over what transpires in that region. . . ." He then outlined, in typically detailed fashion, various diplomatic options and warned of the necessity of keeping troops already present in Vietnam concentrated in order to avoid unnecessary loss of life or unintended combat activities. Then he went on to add:

> I think it is correct to say that the trend of our policies over the past few years has been in a direction opposite to the main lines of thought which are contained in my memorandums over the past few years. I say this, as you know, without rancor or criticism. I know that my thoughts have received your careful attention. I know that your assistants and the bureaucracy have studied them and occasionally even have concurred in ideas expressed in them. . . . In the end, I fear that this course, at best, will win us only widespread difficulties which will play havoc with the domestic program of the Administration. . . . I have written frankly and at length of a deep concern over the present trend of events in Vietnam. We are in very deep already and in most unfavorable circumstances. In my judgment, we were in too deep long before you assumed office. . . I shall not trouble you further with memorandums on this situation and I do not expect an answer to this letter . . . I did want to put certain possibilities before you in the event you have not yet had an opportunity to explore them. And I want you to know that you have my support on a personal as well as official basis.[44]

Despite Mansfield's vow not to "trouble" the President with further memoranda on Vietnam, such communications continued, with both the President and McGeorge Bundy responding to them. Bundy had been instructed by the President to "keep up to date" in making detailed replies to Mansfield.[45] However, in terms of quantity alone, the communications to the President from Mansfield became so frequent (on occasion, more than once a week) that it became difficult for Bundy to keep up with them. Thus, in late June, Bundy confessed to Mansfield, "I have been very slow in carrying out an instruction from the President to respond to your memoranda of June 5 and June 9. He has now passed me in addition your memorandum of June 14. I hope you will forgive me if I comment on all three at once."[46] There were also frequent telephone calls.[47] And the majority leader was seeing the President almost daily. A Mansfield biographer writes, ". . . as Majority Leader and a longtime friend of Lyndon Johnson, he was in an acutely uncomfortable predicament. Some of us today may look back on

[44] Mansfield, letter to the President, 24 March 1965, National Security File, Memos to the President from M. Bundy, Vol. 9. Box 3, LBJ Library.

[45] See McGeorge Bundy, Memo to the President, 11 February 1965, National Security File, Name File, Mansfield, Box 6, LBJ Library.

[46] McGeorge Bundy, letter to Mansfield, 27 May 1965, Nat. Security File, Memos to the President from M. Bundy file, Vol. 11, Box 3, LBJ Library.

[47] See for instance, reference in 9 June 1965 letter from Mansfield to the President, Nat. Security File, Memos to the President from M. Bundy file, Vol. 11, Box 3, LBJ Library.

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Johnson's attitude toward the war in Vietnam as that of a backwoods ruffian nailin' coonskins to the wall . . . Mansfield, however, worked with him intimately, saw him almost daily, and could see at first hand what the war was doing to him. It was a painful thing to watch."[48]

One gets the impression that in their conversations the President treated Mansfield with a sort of deference that was not extended to Hubert Humphrey. But Mansfield, too, felt the force of Johnson's personality. William Bundy recalls an NSC meeting after the Viet Cong bombed the American installation at Pleiku in February 1965. All advisers present at the meeting, including George Ball, agreed on the need for a military response. Bundy recalls:

> Somebody was bringing messages . . . "Are they unanimous in Saigon?" "Yes," and so on . . . But at some point, Senator Mansfield was brought into the meeting and sat right across from the President . . . and what had happened [i.e., the bombing] was gone over, its background, the recommendations from the field, the whole thing. The President, in effect, rehearsed all that he already knew for the benefit of Senator Mansfield . . . I do recall very vividly . . . that Senator Mansfield said to the President, "I would negotiate. I would not hit back. I would get into negotiations." And it was dryly, but very feelingly put, and the President was . . . unexpectedly brusque in dismissing it—"I just don't think you can stand still and take this kind of thing. You just can't do it." . . . knowing, as I had some reason to do, the close personal relationship over the years between the President and Senator Mansfield, I was a little taken aback that the President should be as crisp as he was on that occasion. What I think it reflected was that he'd gone through this in his mind 46 different times; he tried that exit, and he didn't see anything but darkness and gloom in it.[49]

Given the limitations of space, I cannot present excerpts from more than a few Mansfield communications to Johnson; all, however, appear consistent with one written in December 1964: "We remain on a course in Vietnam which takes us further and further out on the sagging limb."[50] Indeed, his messages to Johnson were in line with what he said a decade earlier on the floor of the Senate: "The terrain of the Indochinese conflict—the flooded deltas, the thousands of scattered villages, the jungles—is made to order for the nibbling of mechanized forces. The French have been nibbled and chewed for eight years. . . ."[51]

Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History* devotes some attention to Mansfield's efforts (along with those of Senator Richard Russell) to steer Johnson away from escalation:

> He could not ignore their concerns about the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In particular, he listened to Mansfield, a former professor of Asian history . . . Now the course of events troubled Mansfield, who voiced his anguish to Johnson in private con-

[48] Baldwin, *Hon. Politician*, 149, 150.

[49] W. Bundy, oral interview, LBJ Library, II-12.

[50] Mansfield, letter to the President, 9 December 1964, National Security File, Name File: Mansfield, Box 6, LBJ Library.

[51] Baldwin, *Hon. Politician*, 56.

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versations and memorandums—just as he had cautioned Kennedy a year earlier . . . On July 27, 1965, in a last-ditch attempt to change Johnson's mind, Mansfield and Russell were to press him again "to concentrate on finding a way" out of Vietnam—a "place where we ought not to be". . . .[52]

Karnow writes that Johnson "had not been deaf" to the pleas of Mansfield and others, "nor had he simply swallowed the Pentagon's plans. He had waffled and agonized during his nineteen months in the White House, but eventually this was his final judgment."[53] Some months later, after watching Johnson explain his Vietnam policy on television, Mansfield commented, "I feel so sorry for him. I can imagine what he's going through."[54]

Richard Russell

During the holiday season at the end of 1964, Russell telephoned a journalist friend from his Georgia home and said, "I see you have just been in Vietnam, and I would like to get your impression of the situation out there. But first, let me tell you my impression which I am inclined to give to my friend, who called me from the [LBJ] ranch this afternoon. He said they have just blown up the Brink's officers' quarters in Saigon, and on top of that the South Vietnamese government seems to be trying to declare Max Taylor persona non grata. I am inclined to tell the President when I call him back that if I were President I would sail the Seventh fleet up the Saigon River, load those 23,000 Americans aboard and bring them home."[55]

It is not known precisely what Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said to his friend Lyndon Johnson when he returned the President's call. Neither the senator nor the President were in the habit of making memos on their conversations, nor indeed were they apt to communicate in writing on matters relating to Vietnam. Instead, they talked privately, four or five times a week.[56] Nonetheless, the archival record shows that Russell was a longtime opponent of involving American troops in Southeast Asia, well before Lyndon Johnson "committed to major combat" (to use Johnson's own words) with his July 1965 decision.[57]

A great irony concerning Russell, Johnson, and Vietnam is that in 1954, when the two men were in the Senate, they worked together to fight American intervention in Southeast Asia. Russell later took pride in describing the two-man part-

[52] Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 326–327.

[53] Ibid., 327.

[54] Baldwin, *Hon. Politician*, 27.

[55] Eugene C. Patterson, "Sen. Richard Russell: A Study in Division," *Washington Post*, 25 January 1971, in U.S. Congress, *Richard Brevard Russell: Memorial Tributes in Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 86–87.

[56] Dean Rusk, oral interview, Richard B. Russell collection, Russell Memorial Library, University of Georgia, Athens, 10.

[57] Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 153.

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nership that took on pro-intervention figures within the Eisenhower administration. One of many accounts of the episode can be found in a confidential letter written by Russell in January 1966 to his friend Louis Wolfson. In it he remembered a showdown conference with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford:

> I must ask you to regard most of this letter as personal. The first meeting held with the congressional leadership relative to our involvement in Vietnam was in 1954 about the time the French surrendered at Dienbienphu. I opposed our involvement very vigorously because I have always been afraid of a conventional campaign on the land mass of Asia . . . President Johnson was in this conference, he was then Majority Leader, and he supported me to the hilt. At that time, it was decided not to go into Vietnam. Later, and after the adjournment of the Congress, Secretary Dulles prevailed on President Eisenhower to send a military mission and a great deal of equipment to Vietnam.[58]

Russell's accounts of that episode often described how he "managed to keep us out" of Vietnam until the Eisenhower decision was made to assist the South Vietnamese government.[59] In one such letter, written in June 1965, he made it clear that his views on American intervention in Southeast Asia had not changed in the intervening years. He recalled that he "vigorously opposed our being involved there in the first instance. I have never seen where Vietnam has strategic, tactical, or economic value, and in addition to the billions we are spending there now, we lost three billion down the drain supporting the French in Dienbienphu."[60]

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Russell was something of an enigma in his views on fighting communism. He prided himself on giving the strongest possible support to the American military, yet could say of himself, "I am, by instinct, an isolationist."[61] Russell was in fact a fervent anti-Communist, but he thought the United States should choose its battlegrounds with communism carefully. Some months after the July 1965 decision, he wrote to a friend:

> The Communists have been probing constantly all over the world (as they will continue to do as they pursue their program of world domination), and we have undoubtedly selected the worst possible place to fight them . . . I earnestly and vigorously fought to kick communism, Castro, and the missiles out of Cuba instead of temporizing with the Russians. This was 90 miles from home, whereas Vietnam is about 9,000.[62]

Thus, to Russell, the very fact that America entered the Vietnam war represented a tactical victory for ". . . Communists [who] outwitted us in getting us pinned down in the most unfavorable place in Asia to fight a war, unless it be Afghanistan."[63]

[58] Russell, letter to Louis E. Wolfson, 4 January 1966, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[59] Russell, letter to constituent, 6 January 1966, Series F-Dictation, Russell Library.

[60] Ibid., 22 June 1965.

[61] Ibid., 23 February 1966.

[62] Russell, letter to L. Wolfson, 4 January 1966, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[63] Russell, letter to constituent, 26 January 1966, Series F-Dictation, Russell Library.

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Despite Russell's instinctive isolationism, he also professed to being "an American who supports the flag when it is committed to any danger or trouble."[64] Nonetheless there is ample documentation of his opposition to escalation in Vietnam in the months prior to the 1965 decision. Consistent with his views dating back through the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations, Russell urged Lyndon Johnson to find some way to avoid greater entanglement in Southeast Asia. We find one example of this in a detailed memo from Mike Mansfield to Johnson concerning a meeting in July 1965 that Mansfield had with Russell and three other senators having doubts about escalation. Though there is no record that Russell joined his efforts with those of Senator Fulbright to the degree he did with Mansfield, the two southerners had long, "gloomy" conversations about the possibility of American escalation in Vietnam.[65] Russell's views have been documented in various places, but the senator apparently did not put his thoughts on paper for the President as did others like Mike Mansfield. Mansfield restated views which he and Russell had already expressed to the President and reported "full agreement" among the five senators that "insofar as Vietnam is concerned we are deeply enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going out of control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves." Further there was "substantial agreement" among the senators on the following: "The main perplexity in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a 'vital' area of U.S. concern. . . ." Further, "The country is backing the President on Vietnam primarily because he is President, not necessarily out of any understanding or sympathy with policies on Vietnam; beneath the support, there is deep concern and a great deal of confusion which could explode at any time. . . ." About Secretary McNamara, the senators said he had been "a disappointment in his handling of this situation. . . ."[66] Russell lamented to friends that McNamara had made many mistakes in handling Vietnam, but seemed to "exercise some hypnotic influence over the President, just as he did over President Kennedy."[67]

Distressed with the escalation decision, Russell temporarily and uncharacteristically parted company with Johnson in a television interview in Georgia, just three days after the President's troop announcement. Russell shocked Johnson by stating publicly his view that South Vietnam had "no strategic value for the United States." He added that the United States would be right in pulling out if the South Vietnamese government did not want to fight. Furthermore, he questioned whether the war would be worth the billions of dollars it would cost, and finally delivered the almost heretical opinion that if a plebiscite were held in South Vietnam to choose a leader, Ho Chi Minh would win "hands down."[68] And while he hated

[64] Ibid., 23 February 1966.

[65] Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 242.

[66] Mansfield, Memo to the President, 27 July 1965, International Series-Vietnam, Subject file-23-31, July 1965, Russell Library.

[67] Russell, letter to L. Wolfson, 4 January 1966, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[68] Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 261.

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Ho Chi Minh, Russell actually supported throughout the Johnson presidency the idea of holding free elections in Vietnam in which the Communists could be eligible for selection as a new leadership. He explained, "If a majority of the people in that area vote for any specific form of government freely and of their own accord, then they are entitled to live under that government."[69]

Such an opinion from a different source, Wayne Morse for instance, wouldn't have distressed Johnson nearly so much. But Russell, by numerous accounts, was the most widely respected member of the Senate.[70] Furthermore, Russell and Johnson had a relationship that was described typically by one White House aide as being "father/son, or elder brother and younger brother."[71] Lady Bird Johnson says her husband considered Russell "the one, the towering figure, the one that he respected most, admired most."[72] Senator Sam Ervin, who served with both men in the Senate, said Johnson "loved Dick Russell above any other member of the Senate or any other person in public life."[73]

Doris Kearns's *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* describes how Johnson recognized the central role Russell played in the Senate and succeeded in 1949 in having the Georgian become his longtime mentor and benefactor. Ultimately, Russell was the man responsible for Johnson's selection as Democratic leader in the Senate. Though Kearns does not hesitate to chronicle the ways in which Johnson used people, she writes that Johnson shared with Russell "a genuine and consuming devotion to the Senate" and that Johnson "honestly respected and understood" Russell's fidelity to the institution. Johnson told Kearns:

> Richard Russell found in the Senate what for him was a home. With no one to cook for him at home, he would arrive early enough in the morning to eat breakfast at the Capitol and stay late enough at night to eat dinner across the street. And in these early mornings and late evenings I made sure that there was always one companion, one Senator, who worked as hard and as long as he, and that was me, Lyndon Johnson. On Sundays the House and Senate were empty, quiet and still, the streets outside were bare. It's a tough day for a politician, especially, if like Russell, he's all alone. I knew how he felt for I, too, counted the hours till Monday would come again, and knowing that, I made sure to invite Russell over for breakfast, lunch, brunch or just to read the Sunday papers. He was my mentor and I wanted to take care of him.[74]

If Lyndon Johnson talked frequently with Russell in the years after Johnson had become President, it wasn't simply because of sentiment; for Richard Russell was a very powerful man. Dean Rusk recalls that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee could make unilateral decisions on certain issues: "When the ques-

[69] Russell, letter to constituent, 6 May 1967, Series F-Dictation, Russell Library.

[70] See for instance, Coffin, *Senator Fulbright*, 241; and Doris Kearns, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 103.

[71] Harry McPherson, oral interview, LBJ Library, 31.

[72] Lady Bird Johnson, oral interview, Russell Library, 8.

[73] Senator Sam Ervin, oral interview, Russell Library, 15.

[74] Kearns, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the American Dream*, 105, 104.

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tion came up as to whether this or that or the other country would be given an American destroyer, Richard Russell's view of that was absolutely final. There were no ifs, or ands, or buts about it. He decided that question."[75] Rusk also recalls, as others have, that Russell was "de facto chairman" of the Appropriations Committee because its official chairman was the elderly and ill Carl Hayden. Thus it was a man too powerful to ignore whom Johnson would praise in a personal message as "a man whose friendship I cherish above all others."[76]

After the Johnson administration came to an end, Russell could write, "I have not accepted the Vietnam policies of any of the administrations since 1954."[77] Yet in many letters Russell portrayed a Lyndon Johnson who listened to him and who was anxious to get out of Vietnam: "I have been in touch with the President a number of times, and you may be sure that I will vigorously urge that we extricate ourselves just as soon as we can . . . I may say that, in my opinion, the President is also very anxious to clean up the situation in Vietnam. . . ."[78] In another letter: "In each conference that I have attended and in private discussions with the President I have urged him to seize every opportunity to negotiate and I must say he has expressed a willingness to enter into negotiations under almost any condition and circumstance."[79]

Thus we are left with the picture of a President who did not ignore but, when push came to shove, could not agree through July 1965 with Russell's views that escalation would be a disaster. Nor would he go along with Russell's urgings over the subsequent months and years that the President either "win the war" or get out of Vietnam.[80]

Clark Clifford

A less sentimental relationship than that between Johnson and Russell was the President's association with Clifford. In 1968, of course, Clifford would become secretary of defense and steer Lyndon Johnson away from any further troop escalations and toward a bombing halt over most of North Vietnam. But in 1965, Clifford was a member of an informal but influential group sometimes referred to as the "wise old men,"[81] who would occasionally meet with Johnson to discuss matters. Members of the group included John McCloy, Dean Acheson, and Douglas Dillon, to name a few.[82]

[75] Dean Rusk, oral interview, Russell Library, 10.

[76] Lyndon Johnson, telegram to Russell, 15 June 1965, Series XV, General Red Line File, Special Presidential Correspondence File, Russell Library.

[77] Russell, letter to constituent, 3 November 1969, Series F-Dictation, Russell Library.

[78] Russell, letter to L. Wolfson, 4 January 1966, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[79] Russell, letter to constituent, 3 September 1965, Series F-Dictation, Russell Library.

[80] See for instance, Cabinet meeting notes 9 January 1967, LBJ Library.

[81] See, for instance, Kearns, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the American Dream*, 345.

[82] This same group played a role in reenforcing Clifford's efforts to turn Johnson away from a deeper commitment in 1968.

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Clifford's work in the political world began in the Truman administration where he was a naval aide. His services became crucial when the young lawyer was an architect of Truman's winning campaign in the 1948 presidential election. John Kennedy used Clifford as a personal attorney and in organizing his White House staff. Johnson also used Clifford on such organizational matters and appointed him chairman of his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a panel intended to monitor the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. In general, Clifford was what one writer called an "extracurricular" player who was "faultlessly close-mouthed" as a Johnson "insider."[83]

In the months before the escalation decision, Clifford attended various NSC meetings, as well as some of the smaller meetings of senior advisers. In May, Clifford confided his doubts about the wisdom of escalation in a confidential letter to Johnson:

> I wish to make one major point.
>
> I believe our ground forces in South Vietnam should be kept to a minimum, consistent with the protection of our installations and property in that country. My concern is that a substantial buildup of U.S. ground troops would be construed by the Communists, and by the world, as a determination on our part to win the war on the ground.
>
> This could be a quagmire. It could turn into an open end commitment on our part that would take more and more ground troops, without a realistic hope of ultimate victory.
>
> I do not think the situation is comparable to Korea. The political posture of the parties involved, and the physical conditions, including terrain, are entirely different.
>
> I continue to believe that the constant probing of every avenue leading to a possible settlement will ultimately be fruitful. It won't be what we want, but we can learn to live with it.[84]

On 25 July, Johnson met with Clifford and four other men at Aspen Lodge at Camp David. With pro-escalation hardliner Robert McNamara present, Clifford again made a case against escalation. Two sets of notes of that meeting show Clifford arguing against going to the United Nations for a resolution on Vietnam and against "talking about Vietnam" by high level officials such as Rusk and the President. According to notes of the meeting, Clifford's reasons behind those points were:

> I don't believe we can win in South Vietnam. If we send in 100,000 more [troops], the North Vietnamese will meet us. If the North Vietnamese run out of men, the Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and China don't intend for us to win the war. If we don't win, it is a catastrophe. If we lose 50,000 plus [men] . . . it will ruin us. Five years, billions of dollars, 50,000 men, it is not for us. At the end of monsoon, quietly probe and search out with countries—by moderating our position—to allow us to get out. (I) can't see anything but catastrophe for my country.[85]

[83] Charles Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle* (New York: Delacourte Press, 1974), 174–175.

[84] Clifford, letter to the President, 17 May 1965, National Security File, Deployment of Major Troops, Box 41, LBJ Library.

[85] Meeting Notes File, Box 1, 21–27 July 1965, LBJ Library. Also, "Views of Clark Clifford on Vietnam," notes taken down by Jack Valenti, 25 July 1965, Reference File, Miscellaneous Vietnam Documents folder, LBJ Library.

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Lyndon Johnson mentioned Clifford's views briefly in *The Vantage Point*, saying, " . . . my old friend Clark Clifford was in a reflective and pessimistic mood" at Camp David.[86]

Clifford made the case again the next afternoon at the White House at a meeting that included the President, Dean Rusk, and Henry Cabot Lodge. This meeting preceded a larger NSC meeting that evening with seventeen people present. In the first of these meetings, Clifford opposed Lodge's support for the idea of a major American speech at the UN to explain the American role in Vietnam. Lodge asked, "How do you send young men there in great numbers without telling why?" Clifford responded, "We have already explained why we are there." He then went on to repeat his contention that ". . . We cannot win the war in South Vietnam. China and Russia don't intend for us to win the war. They will match us in manpower. No matter how many men we send, they will match us."[87]

After the escalation decision was made, Clifford became a loyal public supporter of Johnson's policies, much as Russell and Humphrey were. A trip to Vietnam in 1967 reawakened his previous doubts about the feasibility of the American effort in Southeast Asia. In early 1968 he succeeded McNamara as secretary of defense and quickly realized that the war was, as he later recalled, a "bottomless pit."[88]

Analysis

In taking this excursion through the advice of six men who had significant relationships with Lyndon Johnson, I have had three purposes in mind. The first is explicitly empirical and historical-revisionist in nature; the second is more theoretical, concerning implicit and explicit models of presidential decision making; the third is aimed at drawing attention to a hypothesis held by some of the six men as to why Johnson ultimately followed the advice of pro-escalation figures like Robert McNamara rather than the opposing advisers such as Clark Clifford.

An examination of what the six men under study said to Lyndon Johnson makes it clear that the numerous books claiming that Johnson was confronted with little or no serious advice from important advisers that he should avoid a ground war in Vietnam are simply incorrect. Does this mean that there was no ambiguity to their opposition to escalation? While all were against major ground troop involvement, one thing not found in the advice of these politically aware figures is lengthy recognition and analysis of the likely political storm that would have faced Johnson upon the fall of South Vietnam. Still, in the memos and letters presented here, we have seen: escalation unambiguously rejected as leading to an "unwinnable war" (Ball); an acceptance of an "independent, albeit Communist Vietnam" (Fulbright); the suggestion of "moderating our position . . . to allow us to get out"

[86] Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 148.

[87] Meeting Notes File, Box 1, 21–27 July 1965, LBJ Library. Compare Clifford's strong dissent with Gelb and Betts's milder description of Clifford's advice, 125, 127.

[88] Clark Clifford, oral interview, LBJ Library, II-25.

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as "not what we want, but [something] we can learn to live with" (Clifford); the advice that the Johnson administration was in "a stronger position to cut its losses than any other" (Humphrey); and analyses that South Vietnam had no "strategic or tactical or economic value" (Russell); and that the U.S. did "not have interests on the Southeast Asia mainland to justify the costs in American lives" (Mansfield). While the question of political dangers to Johnson was rarely addressed head-on, the bottom line with these men seems to have been that whatever political price Johnson would pay for refusing to go to war in Vietnam would be less than that to be extracted for engaging in an unwinnable war.

Certainly Johnson understood and agreed with Humphrey's analysis that, whatever he decided, the President would be taking historic military and political gambles, with no clear course of right or wrong. Prior to meeting with advisers six days before he chose escalation, the President lamented to Jack Valenti, "All these recommendations seem to be built on a pretty soft bottom. Everything blurs when you get almost to the gate."[89]

Avoiding judgment as to the usefulness of the groupthink thesis in analyzing the Johnson war effort after July 1965, this article's most important assertion is the relatively simple one that such a thesis does not explain the crucial events of the first half of that year. Nor is it true that Johnson would not take the time to listen to those giving anti-escalation warnings. Historians and political scientists who take on the unfinished task of explaining how and why the United States went to war in 1965 would do well to look elsewhere than these old myths in explaining why Johnson chose as he did.

The evidence of this article suggests a particular lesson for political scientists doing historical analyses of presidential decision-making systems. The lesson is that they should beware of allowing certain assumptions, or what I shall call implicit models of advisory systems that exclude political and personal intimates of presidents to guide their historical research. Authors such as Janis and Kattenburg set forth ideas similar to those of Alexander George[90] in making the case for presidents hearing differing but well-prepared advocates presenting their arguments for alternate options. Kattenburg, for instance, asks:

> What keeps . . . any American President from asking the head of the AFL/CIO, the President of Yale, the head of General Motors, or the Chairman of any Senate committee (to use only four from a potential multitude of examples) for key advice on an issue in foreign policy? Nothing really, but the resistance of executive branch-appointed advisers who therefore seek to fill every nook and cranny in the advisory brain. . . ."[91]

Ironically, while Kattenburg proposes that future presidents employ the equivalent of what George calls multiple-advocacy systems, his historical research into the early Johnson period seems to have been guided by assumptions that reified

[89] Jack Valenti, *A Very Human President* (New York: Pocket Books, 1977), 271.
[90] Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980).
[91] Kattenburg, *The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy*, 231.

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an administration's staff flow chart: it naturally included such figures as the secretaries of State and Defense, the special assistant for National Security Affairs, and even an under secretary (Ball). What such implicit models of advisory systems tend to leave out, though, are the political and personal intimates of a president, the Clark Cliffords, Richard Russells, and William Fulbrights.

Another example is a *Journal of Politics* article, in which John P. Burke offers an explicit model of the obligations that advisers and presidents have to each other and to the wider polity they serve. Among two case studies outlined by Burke is one dealing with the 1965 Vietnam decision making of President Johnson, whose "use of advising can be considered a failure of responsibility" and who "acted in ways that discouraged disagreement. . . ."[92] Burke describes a White House discussion that "exemplifies" Lyndon Johnson's use of advising:

> The channeling of discussion in preferred directions is perhaps best exemplified in the transcripts of meetings in which George Ball was present. At one point, Ball articulated critical views but Johnson then replied, "I don't believe that," and then asked around the table, "Does anyone believe that?" It is not surprising that no one expressed a contrary view.[93]

Burke doesn't say what Ball's "critical" views were, leaving a reasonable reader to infer that Ball's statement at that moment was critical of escalation proposals. With this "typical" example in mind, Burke goes on to criticize George Ball for having facilitated "Johnson's claim that he had heard all sides" and for having "contributed to bad consequences: the domestication of dissent and presidential deception about decision making."[94]

A look at the original transcript of the meeting given great credence by Burke suggests a somewhat different picture. Meeting in the cabinet room on 21 July 1965, Ball gave a presentation to Johnson, McNamara, and others in which he argued against the proposed combat role for troops in Vietnam. Johnson responded to Ball's proposal with a number of respectful and unemotional questions and comments. At one point, Ball mentioned that Nguyen Van Thieu (the eventual president of South Vietnam) ". . . spoke the other day and said the Communists would win the election." Clearly reacting to Theiu's prediction, Johnson said, "I don't believe that. Does anyone believe that?"[95] The others present said they did not believe such a thing, and the discussion of Ball's presentation resumed. Thus a passing moment in which Johnson responded to Ball's mention of a news account coming out of Vietnam regarding Thieu is transformed by Burke into a typical example of a belligerent Johnson cutting George Ball down to size.

It is natural that political scientists will analyze the advisory systems of presi-

[92] John P. Burke, "Responsibilities of Presidents and Advisers: A Theory and Case Study of Vietnam Decision Making," *The Journal of Politics* 46 (August 1984): 818–845.

[93] Ibid., 839.

[94] Ibid., 841.

[95] Minutes of 21 July 1965 meeting, Meeting Notes File, Box 1, LBJ Library.

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dents who pursued unsuccessful foreign policies in order to determine if flaws in that system were responsible for those presidents' failures. While the explicit models of ideal advisory arrangements offered by political scientists may be useful, it is important that they not explain past failures by relying on historical research using implicit, narrow models of past presidents' advisory systems. It may be the case instead, as it was with Johnson, that a president under study reached widely beyond "regular" organizational lines for information and advice.[96] Furthermore, a president's advisory system and the extent to which he reached beyond formal executive branch advisers may reflect more than just presidential personality and style. Recent scholarship suggests that attention to such personal factors can obscure the influence of presidents' political and policy goals and interests as well as the external political environment in which presidents function.[97]

Finally, one cannot delve into the thoughts and advice of six men who almost passionately advised the President against escalation in Vietnam without encountering some strongly held views and speculations about why Johnson finally chose as he did. All of the six figures, with the subsequent exception of Senator Fulbright, felt that the President had listened to their advice and had agonized over the options before him prior to deciding in favor of escalation.[98] Their advice having been finally rejected, some of these friends of the President developed and occasionally voiced their own personal theories about why Johnson chose to go to war in Vietnam. In this final section, we shall briefly outline this view that some of our six figures shared regarding Johnson's choice.

Specifically, George Ball and Richard Russell (and, to a lesser degree, Hubert Humphrey and Mike Mansfield) offered strong opinions that in matters of foreign policy Lyndon Johnson was unusually susceptible to the influence of the so-called intellectuals in the Johnson administration who were holdovers from the preceding presidency of John Kennedy. These intellectuals included McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, and most especially, Robert McNamara.

McGeorge Bundy had served Kennedy as special assistant for National Security Affairs before working under Johnson. A graduate of Yale with Phi Beta Kappa honors, Bundy's background was that of Harvard professor and dean. A man of reserved, some would say cold, demeanor, Bundy had little in common with the President personally, but had Johnson's considerable respect. Dean Rusk was another Phi Beta Kappa man, a Rhodes scholar, and former president of the Rock-

[96] Emmette Redford and Richard McCulley, *White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 200.

[97] Paul A. Anderson, "Deciding How to Decide in Foreign Affairs" in George Edwards III, Steven Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., *The Presidency and Public Policy Making* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1985), 151-172; Charles Walcott and Karen M. Hult, "Organizing the White House: Structure, Environment, and Organizational Governance," *The American Journal of Political Science* 31 (February 1987): 109-125.

[98] J. William Fulbright, oral interview, Russell Library, 6. In this interview, Fulbright says Johnson "rarely consulted in the sense of seeking advice and certainly being influenced by it."

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efeller Foundation. While probably not as influential with Johnson on Vietnam matters in the early days as McNamara was, Rusk and Johnson shared a personal bond as southerners who had done well on the national scene. Robert McNamara was not only the most influential member of the Johnson cabinet during the early war years, he was also a man who had become a legend during the Kennedy administration for his brains and his Johnson-like capacity for work.[99] He was, said Johnson, the "smartest man" he had ever known,[100] a man in whose presence you could "almost hear the computers clicking."[101] A few weeks after taking office, Johnson exclaimed about his secretary of Defense, "The myth of McNamara is really true!" And, despite the fact that McNamara continued to be close to the Kennedy family, he was the administration official most frequently invited to join Johnson at Camp David.[102]

With that admittedly brief sketch in mind, let us see what Ball, Russell, Mansfield, and Humphrey observed about the men who urged Johnson toward the policy of escalation. In Ball, we find a man who developed the most strongly held theory as to why Johnson finally chose as he did: "President Johnson was overawed by these people around him – Rusk, the Rhodes scholar and former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Ivy Leaguers Bundy and Rostow, Taylor the scholar, and McNamara the brain. The fact that Johnson never went to a high-class school meant that he took them more seriously than he should."[103] In the years after Ball lost his battle to turn the President away from escalation, he retained an affection for Johnson and said of that era and the President's relationship with the Kennedy holdovers, ". . . Johnson did not suffer from a poor education, he suffered from a belief that he had a poor education."[104] On another occasion, Ball portrayed an uncertain Lyndon Johnson who was ". . . always a very reluctant fellow, but he always got kind of dragged along, kicking and screaming. The impetus toward escalation never came from Lyndon Johnson, I can assure you." Johnson was "dragged" into Vietnam, according to Ball, by men like Bundy who saw the Vietnam situation as a "fascinating set of operational problems" and McNamara who "was analyzing this thing as a man who was trained in quantification, who believed in systems analysis, who believed in application of games theory to strategy, who was enormously persuaded by the disparity in military power."[105]

I chronicled earlier the distress that Richard Russell felt about Robert McNamara's influence over Lyndon Johnson. In early 1965, the problem he saw with the defense secretary's influence was that McNamara was a man who let "his

[99] Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle*, 130; and Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 376.
[100] Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man*, 289.
[101] Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 268.
[102] Roberts, *LBJ's Inner Circle*, 130.
[103] T. George Harris, "A Policy-Maker's View: Experience vs. Character," *Psychology Today*, March 1975, 39.
[104] Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 373.
[105] George Ball, oral interview, LBJ Library, I-26, 34.

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enthusiasm cloud his judgment in the area of international relations."[106] Russell's judgment was not made from afar; his committee leadership ensured that he was the object of frequent McNamara phone calls and personal visits.[107] A great many of these calls were on the issue of Vietnam, which the senator confided to a friend was "the most frustrating problem of my long public career." He further lamented to his friend, after 1965 came to a frustrating end, that the secretary of defense had "made a number of mistakes" but nevertheless exercised a "hypnotic" influence over the President.[108]

Like Russell, Mike Mansfield saw in Robert McNamara a man who was pushing a somewhat reluctant Lyndon Johnson into Vietnam. Throughout the many letters written by the majority leader to the President, the name of McNamara frequently pops up as one giving what Mansfield saw as disastrous advice. Thus, for instance, Mansfield would directly challenge McNamara's estimates of troop levels necessary to prevail in Vietnam: "Secretary McNamara spoke of 300,000 Americans to deal with Giap's forces if they came south. That is but a beginning." And Mansfield would plead with the President, "I think it is about time you got an accounting from those who have pressured you in the past to embark on this course and continue to pressure you to stay on it. It is time to ask, not only what immediate advantages it has in a narrow military sense, but where does it lead in the end?"[109] In contrast, Mansfield often referred to Rusk in more moderate terms as a figure "concentrating on attempting to get us out" by diplomatic initiatives.[110] Writing on behalf of himself and other senators, Mansfield told Johnson in July 1965 that McNamara had been a "disappointment in his handling of this situation. . . ."[111] But Johnson responded, "I consider Bob McNamara to be the best Secretary of Defense in the history of this country."[112]

While less open in his views on this, Hubert Humphrey similarly saw a Lyndon Johnson trying "desperately and sincerely" to continue the Kennedy mandate, to "assuage the Kennedy people," and "to be the heir to the affection of the Kennedy insiders as well as the nation."[113] In particular, he felt slighted and even betrayed by McNamara in some of the Vietnam meetings at which both men were present.[114]

[106] Russell, letter to L. Wolfson, 15 January 1965, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[107] See Russell's calendar for June and July 1965, Series II, Intra-office communications, Russell Library.

[108] Russell, letter to L. Wolfson, 4 January 1966, General File, International Series-Vietnam, Russell Library.

[109] Mansfield, letter to the President, 5 June 1965, Nat. Security File, Name file: Mansfield, Box 6, LBJ Library.

[110] Mansfield, letter to the President, 27 July 1965, International Series-Vietnam, Subject file 23–31 July 1965, Russell Library.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Lyndon Johnson, letter to Mansfield, 28 July 1965, International Series-Vietnam, Subject file 23–31 July 1965, Russell Library.

[113] Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man*, 288.

[114] Carl Solberg, *Hubert Humphrey: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 271, 277.

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The view held by Ball, Russell, Mansfield, and Humphrey—that Lyndon Johnson's insecurity vis-à-vis the "intellectuals" led him to be unduly influenced by them—has of necessity been only briefly touched on here. The four mens' informal, psychologically-oriented theory about Johnson's relationship with the intellectuals whom he inherited (and kept in service) from the Kennedy administration appears to be a subject worth further investigation.

In his memoirs, Lyndon Johnson warned future historians that only presidents themselves know "how and why they reached particular decisions and the many considerations that affected them." Further, he wrote, "I have never considered any important decision irrevocable until it has been announced and acted upon."[115] Perhaps an investigation into Johnson's (or any other president's) relationship with advisers, can have only partial success in describing that president's decision-making process in a definitive and noncontroversial fashion.

What can be said more definitively is that the warnings given Lyndon Johnson by George Ball, Mike Mansfield, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell, William Fulbright, and Clark Clifford were remarkably prophetic; entry into an active combat role in Vietnam did indeed "play havoc" on American society.[116]

The tragedy is there to see in *The Vantage Point*, where Johnson recites the premises and conclusions of a domino theory urged on him by McNamara, Rusk, and others. That tragedy is found in the sentence where Johnson refers to the assault by anti-escalation figures such as Clifford and Ball on the "chain of conclusions" derived from the prevailing version of the domino theory. Of these men, Johnson wrote, none had given him ". . . facts or arguments that broke or even weakened this chain of conclusions."[117] From this assessment by Lyndon Johnson of the arguments that swirled around him ensued a tragedy of immense proportions for Southeast Asia and the United States.*

[115] Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 365.

[116] The words are Mansfield's, from a letter to the President, 24 March 1965, Nat. Security File, Memos to the President from M. Bundy, Vol. 9, Box 3, LBJ Library.

[117] Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 153.

* I would like to thank Peri Arnold, George Lopez, Suzanne Marilley, and Mary E. Stuckey for written critiques, the staffs of the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell Libraries for their assistance, and Barbara Bartosik, Bret Kincaid, and David Dileo for their aid.

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Prospects for Revolution in South Africa

JEFFREY HERBST

The unprecedented violence that has engulfed South Africa's black townships since 1984, the creation of the United Democratic Front, and the emergence of large black trade unions have once again focused attention on the prospects for a revolutionary overthrow of the white government. Speculation has been further fueled by the relatively easy overthrows of dictatorships by popular rebellions in Iran, Haiti, and the Philippines. Indeed, some scholars and many inside the African National Congress now argue, in direct contrast to the strategic thinking of the Congress over the last twenty years, that a quantitative increase in the current form of popular protest may lead to a successful rebellion in South Africa. An examination of the revolutionary opportunities and constraints created by the most recent outbreak of protest is, therefore, necessary if the future evolution of South Africa is to be understood. After arguing that the present protest activities do not pose a threat to the continued existence of the white regime, the article will suggest what developments would indicate that a truly revolutionary situation is developing in South Africa.

The Strategic Doctrine of the African National Congress, 1960–1984.

Since its turn to violence in the early 1960s after decades of peaceful protest, the African National Congress (ANC)—the most important black protest movement in South Africa—has had a relatively clear conception of the struggle it faced in South Africa. The ANC's perspective on revolution has centered around a vanguard party of committed partisans who would lead a guerrilla war. It argued in

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its major strategic document that guerrilla warfare was, "the special, and in our case the only form in which the armed liberation struggle can be launched."[1] While it repeatedly stressed the need for support among the people, the ANC rejected popular uprisings as a viable route to revolution in South Africa.

> Untimely, illplanned or premature manifestations of violence impede and do not advance the prospect for revolutionary change and are clearly counter-revolutionary. . . . The riot, the street fight, the outbursts of unorganised violence, individual terrorism; these were symptoms of the militant spirit but not pointers to revolutionary techniques.[2]

The ANC argued that mass popular revolt was likely to fail because "Under the modern highly sophisticated police state (which South Africa is) it is questionable whether a movement can succeed in a programme of mass political organisation beyond a certain point without starting a new type of action."[3]

In addition to strategic considerations, the leaders of the ANC rejected popular rebellion as an option because of the dangers it posed to blacks in South Africa. Nelson Mandela, speaking from the dock at the Rivonia trial where he was convicted for sabotage in 1963, said that the ANC sought to "canalize and control the feelings of our people" through organized armed struggle.

> Already small groups had arisen in the urban areas and were spontaneously making plans for violent forms of political struggle. There now arose a danger that these groups would adopt terrorism against Africans, as well as whites if not properly directed. . . . It was increasingly taking the form, not of struggle against the Government—though this is what prompted it—but of civil strife amongst themselves, conducted in such a way that it could not hope to achieve anything other than a loss of life and bitterness.[4]

Mandela also argued that an unorganized mass insurrection would pose insurmountable problems for a post-apartheid South Africa because "there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war."[5]

The ANC, in partnership with the South African Communist Party (SACP), therefore formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation) in the early 1960s to overthrow the white regime. The vanguard party model was kept for over twenty years even though there were occasionally moments when popular revolt seemed to be occurring in South Africa. For instance, even after the violent Soweto uprisings in 1976, the SACP still rejected the strategy of promoting mass insurrection by arming the people.

[1] African National Congress, (ANC), Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress (Morogoro, Tanzania: African National Congress, 1969), 9.

[2] Ibid., 5–8.

[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] Nelson Mandela, "Rivonia Trial Statement" in *No Easy Walk to Freedom* (London: Heineman, 1983), 164–169.

[5] Ibid., 164.

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> The events [in Soweto] could not, in themselves, have been transformed into a successful all-round armed uprising even if adequate stocks of weapons had been available. We must not play with the idea of an armed uprising by treating it as a question only of logistics and organisation.[6]

This strategic doctrine was not successful; indeed, the only threats to the regime between 1963 and 1984 were unorganized popular revolts, which the ANC and SACP had warned would not lead anywhere. It was not surprising, therefore, that when unprecedented popular protest engulfed South Africa in 1984 the strategic doctrine of the ANC, and many analysts' understanding of how the revolution would proceed, was thrown into confusion.

The New Uprisings

The popular unrest in South Africa that began in 1984 provided those who oppose the white regime with new opportunities and, as is far less well understood, new dilemmas. The protests began with spontaneous boycotts and disturbances at black schools. Violence spread in the run-up to the August 1984 election of coloreds and Indians to a new parliament that ostentatiously excluded blacks. Popular unrest further intensified in September 1984 when there were large-scale protests against rent increases in the Vaal Triangle.[7] The violence spread unevenly through South Africa and there were soon major township disturbances in the eastern and western Cape, the greater Durban area, and the Witswatersrand. Less serious disturbances were reported in parts of Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the northern Cape.[8] On 20 July 1985, the government was forced to declare an indefinite state of emergency throughout large parts of the country, the first such action since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Because of continuing unrest including school boycotts, scattered consumer boycotts, and violence in the townships, State President P.W. Botha declared a national state of emergency on 12 June 1986.[9]

The intensity of popular protest can to some extent be understood by examining the development of street fighting in Alexandra, a black township near Johannesburg. Popular protest was ignited in Alexandra in February 1985 with the stabbing of Mukukeng Kumuka, a prominent black politician. After the stabbing,

> "The township's teenagers went to war" as the streets were transformed into battle zones, barricades were built, and police vehicles were petrol-bombed and stoned. Troops armed

[6] South African Communist Party, "The Way Forward from Soweto: Political Report of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, April 1977" reprinted in Brian Bunting, ed., *South African Communists Speak* (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1981), 422.

[7] South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1984* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1985), 68.

[8] South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1985* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986), 536.

[9] Martin Murray, *South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny* (London: Verso, 1987), 429.

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> with automatic weapons and gas masks "lined perimeter roads" protecting Sandton, the country's richest white residential area. . . . On 5 March, more than 40,000 people "crammed into the township's dusty soccer stadium" to attend an emotion-laden funeral for seventeen unrest victims.[10]

In late April, after the resignation of the town's mayor and the beginning of a rent strike to protest the presence of troops in the township, a group of "balaclava-clad" men, believed to be off-duty policemen, went on a rampage leaving eight political activists dead and scores of homes firebombed. The next day a crowd estimated at 10,000 confronted the police, and some angry residents directed rounds of AK-47 fire at the security forces. The residents, in a rally attended by 45,000 people in the local stadium, vowed to establish self-defense committees to defend themselves against the regime. The Alexandra Action Committee dug tank traps and all black policemen were forced out of the township. By the beginning of 1985, black militants claimed that they were in complete control of the area and that they had become the de facto government.

The violence that occurred in Alexandra was repeated with numbing regularity in many parts of the country. Between September 1984 and November 1987, more than 2,600 people were killed in the popular protests.[11] The South African Institute of Race Relations estimated that for the period between September 1984 and January 1986 approximately two-thirds of the dead were killed by South African state bodies and that the remainder of the deaths resulted from black-on-black violence.[12] Through January 1986 a total of 3,658 people had also been injured—2,229 of them by state forces.[13] Damage from the violence up to 27 March 1986 was estimated at $69 million (though probably much higher if the cost to business from stayaways and property damage is included).[14]

More than anywhere else, the violence in the townships was directed against local government structures and the blacks who ran these agencies for the white state. For instance, between September 1984 and the end of March 1985, "there were 243 acts of violence against community councillors, including 66 petrol-bombings which totally gutted 32 homes."[15] Between September 1984 and June 1985, 240 black officials, including 27 mayors, resigned.[16] So few blacks were willing to serve on the discredited local structures that the minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, had to appoint white civil servants to manage township

[10] Ibid., 405–6. Murray is quoting newspaper reports from that period. Descriptions of Alexandra in this paragraph are all from Murray, 404–408.

[11] "Towards a Black Civil War in South Africa," *The Economist*, 7 November 1987, 45.

[12] South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986, 533.

[13] Ibid.

[14] BBC Monitoring Report, 27 March 1986, quoted in *ANC News Briefing* 10, no. 13, 30 March 1986, 3.

[15] Michael Morris, *Soapy Water and Cabinda* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1985), 17.

[16] Murray, *South Africa*, 303.

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affairs.[17] In contrast, the first white security officer, a sergeant, did not die in the unrest until January 1986.[18]

The uprisings in the townships coincided with, promoted, and were themselves accelerated by other manifestations of popular protest. One of the most important political developments outside the townships was the establishment of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 as an umbrella organization for groups opposed in some way to apartheid. It claims to have 650 affiliates with 2.5 million members.[19] While the UDF denies having links with ANC, it is formally committed to abolishing white rule and seeks to promote a nonracial, democratic South Africa.

The period of unrest also saw the consolidation and growth of militant black unions, which sought to confront employers over a wide range of work-related issues. The unions have been growing dramatically over the last few years; in 1985 they formed the 500,000-strong Congress of South African Trade Unions.[20] The most dramatic instance of union development was probably the strike in August 1987 by the National Union of Mineworkers (membership 300,000) against the major mining houses. This biggest strike in the nation's history in the end forced the employers to concede only slightly more than what they originally offered, but the labor action did demonstrate that the unions had an organizational capability and internal cohesiveness far greater than most suspected.

The Heightened Prospects for Popular Revolt

The new wave of rebellion in the townships, the development of large political organizations with determinedly antigovernment stances, and the precedent of successful and relatively easy popular rebellions in the Philippines, Haiti, and Iran have caused many to revise their estimates about the prospects for revolution in South Africa and the path that revolution will take. As speculation about a post-apartheid South Africa becomes a cottage industry, many now take it for granted that when the present type of revolt increases to a certain level, the South African regime will fall. Barry Buzan and H. O. Nazareth present a typical view:

> The recent upheavals in South Africa almost certainly mark the beginning of the end of white rule. They demonstrate that the blacks are close to acquiring the power to make the country ungovernable and that they already have the ability to disrupt South Africa's international economic position.[21]

More than any other figure, the ghost of the shah of Iran haunts discussions concerning the prospects for revolution in South Africa. While almost all analysts

[17] Ibid.

[18] *Weekly Mail*, 28 February 1986, quoted in *ANC News Briefing* 10, no. 9, 2 March 1986, 2.

[19] South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1986, 38.

[20] Ibid., 180.

[21] Barry Buzan and H. O. Nazareth, "South Africa versus Anzania: The Implications of Who Rules," *International Affairs* [London] 62 (Winter 1986): 35.

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recognize the strength of the South African state that is derived from its overwhelming military superiority, many now hesitate to predict what will happen in South Africa after the shah, possessor of a seemingly omnipotent security apparatus and army, was overthrown quickly through popular protest. Xan Smiley captured well the impact of Iran on those contemplating the turbulent South African situation: "And yet, bearing in mind the sort of explosion that overthrew the Shah, there is a nagging feeling that if and when the smouldering anger of the black millions is cleverly stoked up and catches alight, the place could go up in smoke remarkably quickly."[22] Similarly, Tom Lodge, perhaps the leading expert on the ANC, has also been influenced by the ease of the shah's removal:

> In Iran a government was forcibly supplanted without the presence of a revolutionary army. The parallel is not so far-fetched; in particular, South African revolutionaries can point to the demoralisation of a significant section of the security apparatus, the black police, and the apparent inability of the administration in its economic policies to meet the most basic material requirements of the urban black population.[23]

The Iran precedent has not been lost on some within the ANC. Mzala, while discussing the possibility of insurrection, wrote in the official organ of the ANC:

> Let us look at the history of Iran. The Shah's regime collapsed only under the pressure of political uprising of the masses, without this process being preceded by any kind of war or military organisation of the oppressed against the ruling class. What can prevent the apartheid regime in South Africa from collapsing for the same reasons as the Shah's regime?[24]

Others in the ANC also "now believe there is a chance that the whole edifice of white minority rule could collapse as suddenly as the shah's regime in Iran."[25]

In light of the Iranian precedent, many have detected evidence that the ANC is altering its tactics to encourage the new wave of popular rebellion, even though such a stance would mean a virtual abandonment of its traditional strategic doctrine. One report from South Africa has noted a "radical restructuring in the pattern of resistance" by the ANC in order to mobilize the "fighting youth" of the townships.[26] Lodge also argues that "ANC strategical conceptions have in the last few years shifted away from the conventional guerrilla scenario which would assign a predominant role to the specialised military force which Umkhonto constitutes" and toward "broadening the social base of the armed struggle."[27] Similarly,

[22] Xan Smiley, "A New and Bloodier Image for the ANC?" *The Times*, 27 June 1983, 8.

[23] Tom Lodge, "The Second Consultative Conference of the African National Congress" reprinted in Committee on Foreign Relations, *Situation in South Africa*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 July 1986, 247.

[24] Mzazla, [pseud.] "Umkhonto we Sizwe: Building People's Forces for Combat War & Insurrection," Part 1, *Sechaba*, [London], December 1986, 20.

[25] Johnathan Steele, "ANC Believes White Majority Rule could Collapse Suddenly," *The Guardian*, 11 August 1985, 7.

[26] "ANC Consultative Conference," *Weekly Mail*, 11 July 1985, quoted in, *ANC News Briefing* 9, no. 28, 14 July 1985, 2.

[27] Tom Lodge, "Mayihlome!-Let Us Go To War!: From Nkomati to Kabwe, The African National Congress, January 1984-June 1985," *South African Review III* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986), 230.

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Stephen M. Davis claims that there has been a significant departure from the ANC's previous perspective on evolution in South Africa:

> The Congress's ultimate objective in the 1980s was defined as a cataclysmic insurrection guided by trained units of Umkhonto but carried out by black masses armed with whatever weapons they could find. Apartheid's collapse would be speeded by demoralization in the ruling white community and desertions from police and defense forces. Insurrection itself would be the final thunderclap in a growing storm of labor strikes, township rebellion, and armed attacks.[28]

These assertions have been reinforced by some statements from inside the ANC itself. Mzala, while reviewing the ANC document *Planning for People's War*, gives a clear indication of the impact of the township revolts on some rebels' strategic conception of revolution:

> In 1969, the realistic military perspective was to wage only a protracted guerrilla struggle, but in the 1980s we have seen our struggle take a leap forward, and the situation today has within it the seeds and concrete possiblity for an insurrection. The person who now speaks only of protracted guerrilla war is behind the times. . . .[29]

Joe Modise, commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, also called in July 1985 for "a people's war . . . by all the oppressed against the oppressors. He called on people to arm themselves with home-made weapons, and ambush security personnel and capture their weapons."[30] Ronnie Kasrils, a member of Umkhonto, has also argued, in direct contrast to the traditional doctrine that was reemphasized after Soweto: "That army of stone-throwers [the people in the townships] has to be transformed into an army with weapons. Our people have the mood and spirit; every stone-thrower wants a gun. We have to put guns in their hands."[31]

At the very least, ANC officials have tried hurriedly to adjust their strategic doctrine to the new outbreaks of violence by arguing that the popular uprisings are an integral part of the ANC's onslaught against South Africa. Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress, now declares that the role of Umkhonto we Sizwe is to lead the "mass combat units" that are now forming in the "mass insurrectionary zones" in South Africa's townships.[32] In a demonstration of just how far some in the ANC have moved from their traditional doctrine, ANC radio now urges blacks in South Africa to train themselves in guerrilla warfare in order to promote insurrection.[33] Yet at the same time, Tambo has acknowledged that the pace of the revolutionary struggle will be determined by organized political violence spearheaded by Umkhonto.[34]

[28] Stephen M. Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 117.

[29] Mzala, "Towards People's War and Insurrection," *Sechaba*, April 1987, 5.

[30] Quoted in South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986, 532.

[31] Quoted in "People's War, Revolution and Insurrection, " *Sechaba*, May 1986, 4.

[32] Oliver Tambo, "Attack! Advance! Give the Enemy no Quarter!" *Sechaba*, March 1986, 6.

[33] Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels*, 133.

[34] Oliver Tambo, "Render South Africa Ungovernable," *Sechaba*, March 1985, 11.

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Given the changes in ANC doctrine and analysts' new uncertainty over the stability of the South African regime, the critical question is what impact the recent events in South Africa will have on the prospects for the overthrow of the white government. If the current type of protest, accelerated by ANC encouragement, could threaten the regime, then those who equate South Africa with other recent instances of popular rebellion are correct in arguing that revolution will happen much quicker than is usually anticipated. The change in ANC rhetoric and perhaps also in tactics would also be justified if the current type of protest can pose a real threat to the white regime. However, if the current type of protest, even at significantly higher levels, cannot threaten the regime, then the analogy with other successful popular revolutions would be incorrect. Correspondingly, if the current type of protests cannot be successful, ANC tactics that use Umkhonto at least partially to encourage popular insurrection will be ineffectual at best and potentially disastrous.

The Nature of the South African State

To understand the actual prospects for revolution it is first necessary to understand the nature of the South African state as it faces the security threat. Unfortunately, far too many have only examined the recent round of popular protest and show no evidence of an informed understanding of the repressive environment that confronts potential revolutionaries in South Africa. The South African state is fundamentally different from the type of state overthrown in Iran, Haiti, and the Philippines. Those states were authoritarian regimes that were led by one man, often with the major goal of enriching the ruler and his relations. In contrast, the South African state is an institutionalized system of repression that is dedicated to preserving the political and economic superiority of an entire racial group. This distinction is important because in an authoritarian regime the leader (be he the shah, Jean-Claude Duvalier, or Ferdinand Marcos) is the glue that holds the whole regime together. When the paramount leader falls, the entire regime, regardless of the strength of the repressive apparatus, dissipates, leading to an unexpectedly early and easy victory for the rebelling forces. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick writes:

> Authority in traditional autocracies is transmitted through personal relations: from the ruler to his close associates (relatives, household members, personal friends) and from them to people to whom the associates are related by personal ties resembling their own relation to the ruler. The fabric of authority unravels quickly when the power and status of the man at the top are undermined or eliminated. The longer the autocrat has held power, and the more pervasive his personal influence, the more dependent a nation's institutions will be on him. Without him, the organized life of the society will collapse, like an arch from which the keystone has been removed.[35]

[35] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 38.

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However, because the South African state is a modern system designed to control the black majority rather than the anachronistic administration precariously centered on the personalistic rule of one family, there is little reason to believe that it will immediately be found to have feet of clay when challenged by rebellious groups.

In this light, the differences between the recently overthrown regimes and the South African state are immediately apparent. For instance, the repression the shah brought to bear on revolutionary forces was, reflecting the different nature of the regimes, far less powerful and unsystematic compared to the capabilities of the South African state. When the opposition to the shah first became public in September and November 1978,

> the monarch made no attempt to destroy the fanatically critical opposition and its highly effective "mosque network" and he refused to countenance an attempt on Khomeini's life. Although the more aggressive military leaders . . . pressed for a much more vigorous campaign aimed at undercutting the dissident's power base and forcing the opposition to be more amenable to compromise, nevertheless both the religious and secular dissidents *were allowed to operate without serious hindrance.*[36]

During the Iranian revolution, troop commanders were only allowed to fire in the air, and security patrols were overwhelmed by attackers who were able to control the streets even in wealthy suburbs.[37] Strikers, whose economic pressure became a significant factor in the shah's fall, continued to receive their wages when they left their jobs, because there was no provision in the law for withholding pay.[38]

In contrast, in South Africa the African National Congress has been outlawed for twenty-five years and is the subject of constant harassment through overt and covert military action. To take only the most recent example, there are now reports of a widespread worldwide assassination campaign against ANC officials that may have resulted in several hundred deaths. Between January and July 1987, eleven ANC officials were killed in Swaziland alone.[39] Among the victims was Cassius Make, the number four man in the command structure of Umkhonto and the youngest member of the ANC executive, who was gunned down outside Mbabane by three whites in a South African-registered car.[40]

The structure of the South African state's security system exemplifies the differences between it and the authoritarian rule of the Pahlavi, Duvalier, and Marcos families. While details are by necessity sketchy, the South African National Security Management System (NSMS) was designed to be a comprehensive response to revolutionary activity. The purpose of the system is to

[36] John D. Stemple, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 135. (Emphasis added.)

[37] Ibid., 146.

[38] Ibid., 121.

[39] *Business Day*, 17 July 1987.

[40] "Campaign to Assassinate the ANC," *New African*, September 1987, 15.

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> [1] counter what the state believes is a revolutionary onslaught against it. In practice, this means crushing all popular organisations working for radical political and economic transformation outside official structures; [2] to contain political resistance on an ongoing basis . . . [3] to co-ordinate a far-reaching "hearts and minds" strategy by improving social and material conditions in black areas . . . [4] to act as an early-warning system, spotting potential problems and dealing with them on a military or material level, before they erupt in open revolt.[41]

The NSMS system is under the guidance of the State Security Council (a crucial Cabinet comittee led by the former head of Military Intelligence) and is structured around twelve regional Joint Management Centres (JMCs) which coincide roughly with the country's military command areas. Each of these is staffed by approximately sixty security officials. Below the regional JMCs are sixty sub-JMCs covering the metropolitan regions and consisting of civic, local military, and police officials. Finally, there are 448 mini-JMCs corresponding to municipal councils that are made up of local officials.[42]

While it is always dangerous to simply extrapolate from paper organizational charts to real structures, the resources and capabilities of the NSMS system appear to be formidable. Comrade Ramat, writing in the official organ of the ANC, notes:

> For our cadres operating on the ground inside the country, the Joint Management Centre network, that spread right across the country, poses serious problems. The Intelligence Committee allows the police, military, National Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence to pool information at a local level. This co-ordinated action of all intelligence systems is new, and gives the racist regime an improved capability in identifying individuals and groups that are opposed to it.[43]

Comrade Ramat, quoting South African researcher James Selfe, says that the JMCs "know precisely who was at what meeting and what was said by whom. They also keep tabs on those regarded as important community figures."[44] Comparisons between South Africa and other recent examples of popular rebellion are, therefore, dubious at best. The revolutionary task of the recent popular rebellions—overthrowing a hated leader—is not the problem in South Africa. South African revolutionaries face the much more difficult problem of rebelling against an institutionalized political system.

Actual Danger Posed by the Protests

The recent township protests and other developments in South Africa undoubtedly do represent the beginning of a new era in the country. However, it is impor-

[41] Joy Harnden, "The Creeping Coup," *Sash* [Johannesburg] 30 (May 1987): 3.

[42] The above information is all from Ibid., 4.

[43] Comrade Ramat, [pseud.] "Pretoria's Security System: The Network that Spreads Across the Country," *Sechaba*, January 1987, 29.

[44] Ibid.

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TABLE 1

Comparative Political Violence

	Political Deaths per 1,000 Citizens per Year		
Burundi (1972)	21.58	Madagascar (1948–1952)	.44
Lebanon (1976)	18.91	Kenya (1948–1952)	.38
Nigeria (1968)	18.57	Cameroon (1963–1967)	.32
Pakistan (1971)	4.92	Greece (1948–1953)	.25
Yemen (Sana) (1968)	2.88	Bolivia (1948–1952)	.21
Rwanda (1963–1967)	1.68	Zaire (1963–1967)	.10
Indonesia (1963–1967)	1.10	Colombia (1948–1952)	.08
Uganda (1974)	.90	Argentina (1953–1957)	.07
Hungary (1953–1957)	.81	Chile (1973)	.05
Jordan (1970)	.75	South Africa (1984–1986)	.03
Algeria (1958–1962)	.70	Malawi (1958–1962)	.01
Ethiopia (1975)	.58		

Sources: Political violence data are from *The Economist*, 7 November 1987, 45; and Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd ed., vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 48–49. Population statistics from United Nations, *Demographic Handbook 1979* (New York: United Nations, 1979); and South Africa Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1985* (Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1986).

tant, especially in light of the state's actual repressive capability, to understand systematically the threat posed by the new violence. Table 1 presents comparative figures on political violence, broadly defined, for countries across the world that have been involved in revolutionary situations. While the South African statistics are undoubtedly underestimates, this is also probably true for many of the other countries listed in the table. In addition, all South African deaths from mob violence and security force actions from September 1984 onward were counted as political, even though many resulted from the settling of personal scores or were simply random acts of violence. Indeed, the actual statistics are not that important, because even an order of magnitude increase in the number of South African political deaths would mean that South Africa is only beginning to experience the type of political violence normally associated with attempts to introduce radical change. Political violence is not always a necessary condition for change but, as Table 1 indicates, those who extrapolate from the recent township protests in South Africa and conclude that the country is suffering from violence on a truly revolutionary scale are incorrect if a global perspective is taken. It is particularly striking that the white population, which presumably must be threatened for any change actually to occur in South Africa, has not been touched by the most recent round of protest.

The nature of the conflict, even it it were increased dramatically, also suggests that the present kind of protest cannot threaten the South African state. The townships do not present terrains that are at all amenable to successful revolution. Most

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of the townships in South Africa were designed to contain black protest and are, therefore, far from white areas and can often only be reached by one road. As the armed vehicles at the gates of so many black urban areas constantly emphasize, these neighborhoods can easily be cut off if a protest threatens to spread beyond the confines of the township. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the townships are ideal venues for repression, because the regime can easily concentrate security forces in them to forestall popular revolt. For instance, in Sebokeng in October 1984, a joint South African Police-South African Defence Force group consisting of 7,000 men entered the township to quell protests by conducting house-to-house searches for weapons and potential suspects.[45] Similar exercises have occurred in many other townships including Sharpeville and Tembisa.

The poor nature of the townships as spawning grounds for revolution was amply demonstrated by the series of events in Langa, a township near the white town of Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape. The United Democratic Front was strong in Langa, and by February 1985 it had defeated a rent increase and forced fifteen of sixteen black councilors to resign.[46] Conflicts with the police occurred often and during a day of protest on 21 March 1985 the police shot at least twenty-one blacks walking to a funeral. After the funeral, which was attended by 80,000 people, the UDF quickly became the de facto government of the township and established street committees that dealt with all issues facing residents. However, after the state of emergency was declared, the authorities moved in and imprisoned all those who had led the popular protests. In a vivid demonstration of the state's continued ability to shape the terrain of protest, the entire population of Langa was then relocated to a different site. The township today does not, for all practical purposes, exist.

In addition to the townships being poor terrain for revolution, the gross disparities in firepower between the security forces and the population of the townships makes it even more unlikely that township protest will pose a real threat to the South African state. John Saul notes:

> Events since June 1985 suggest that the ANC is still a long way from being able to provide enough of this kind of clout to the resistance movement. Government bullets still tend to be met by sticks and stones; defenseless Africans die while white policemen escape reprisal and the rest of the white population remains cocooned in its comfortable suburban lifestyle.[47]

For instance, in what would become an oft-repeated demonstration of the regime's superior firepower, a combined force of fifty security force vehicles, some of them armored, supported by helicopters and foot patrols in a convoy that stretched 1.2

[45] Michael Morris, *South African Political Violence & Sabotage 1 July 1984–30 June 1985* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1985), 49.

[46] The description of Langa in this paragraph is from Steven Mufson, "The Fall of the Front," *The New Republic*, 23 March 1987, 18.

[47] John S. Saul, "South Africa: The Crisis Deepens" in John S. Saul and Steven Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa*, rev. ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), 231.

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miles went through the townships of New Brighton, KwaZakhele, Zwide, and Veeplaas in April 1985.[48]

Firepower alone does not always determine the course of a revolution, and the ANC has always claimed that material strength may not be a decisive factor in its struggle if certain precepts of guerrilla war are followed. The outlawed organization described in 1969 the kind of tactics necessary to confront a nominally more powerful enemy:

> Surprise, mobility and tactical retreat should make it difficult for the enemy to bring into play its superior fire-power in any decisive battles. No individual battle is fought in circumstances favourable to the enemy. Superior forces can thus be harassed, weakened and, in the end, destroyed.[49]

However, the type of guerrilla war needed to overcome superior material resources is the very opposite of what is occurring in the townships. In the townships the white state is able to concentrate its forces and thereby easily defeat the protesters who cannot make a tactical retreat. While it is conceivable that the balance of firepower could change in the future, the ease with which the security forces can seal off and search the townships suggests that it is unlikely that enough weapons can be brought into the townships to present a significantly greater threat to the white state.

An indication of the long-term disutility of township protest has been the large increase in black-on-black violence it has caused among the population of the townships. Nelson Mandela's warning at the Rivonia trial now seems prescient given the black-on-black violence that the township protests have bred. While it is important not to overestimate the scale of nonpolitical (that is, not directed against the state or its puppets) violence and thereby play into the hands of the regime, the dangers posed by random acts of violence spawned by the present form of popular protest have become very clear. *The Sowetean* noted:

> Every so often somebody calls for a stay-away, and more violence follows. After the funerals of those killed during the violence, more violence erupts and more people get killed. We need to seriously consider what we are achieving. Clearly, this cannot go on forever.[50]

Martin Murray, in perhaps the best account of the recent uprisings in South Africa, reached a similar conclusion:

> Without the massive influx of weaponry to the townships, armed insurrection was completely out of the question. In fact, any direct confrontation with the security forces was tantamount to suicide. In some townships, the popular movement turned inward, in effect creating phantom adversaries and striking at available targets of opportunity. This undermined the movement, weakening the resolve of even the most ardent supporters and strengthening the hand of local puppet administrations.[51]

[48] Morris, *South African Political Violence, 1985*, 103.
[49] ANC, *Strategy and Tactics*, 10.
[50] Quoted in John Kane-Berman, "How Black Anger Backfired," *The Guardian*, 7 December 1984, 12.
[51] Murray, *South Africa*, 392–3.

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This is not to belittle the achievements of the township protests to date. They have succeeded in destroying the facade of local black government that the white state was trying to establish in order to make its rule more palatable. The actual significance of this action is unclear, however, because most reports from South Africa indicated that these local structures never had much legitimacy. The protests have not, despite claims to the contrary, made the townships ungovernable. They are governed in the most profound sense by the South African security forces who are successfully preventing the population from mobilizing to overthrow the state. Government structures including rent boards, local councils, and other structures have been destroyed, but these bodies do not pertain to the security of the white state.

The other political developments, while of great importance to the pattern of South African politics, also do not seem to promote a long-term threat to the state. The state's ability to decapitate popular organizations by simply imprisoning their leadership and harassing their members will prevent them from becoming security risks in the future. Trevor Manuel, a member of the UDF's national executive, noted the impact of state repression on the UDF:

> Two years and one month after its inception, the UDF finds itself bearing the full brunt of the government's onslaught. Two-thirds of our national and regional executive members are out of action through death, detention or trial. At least 2,000 rank and file members of the UDF are in detention.[52]

For instance, in July 1987 Murphy Morobe and Mohammed Valli were detained, leaving the UDF without even its acting national publicity secretary or its general secretary.[53] Similiarly, in February 1988 the South African government used its powers under the state of emergency to impose harsh restrictions that made it all but impossible for the UDF and other protest groups to operate.

The trade union movement, although a crucial development for black workers trying to improve their welfare, also does not appear to be a security threat to the white state. While the new black trade unionists in South Africa undoubtedly do see their long-term struggle in political terms, the short-term struggle around which their movement revolves is mainly about economic matters and therefore does not present a real threat to the government. For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa, the leader of the South African National Union of Mineworkers, said of the recent mine strike, "As much as we have tried to say that our strike is about wages and conditions of employment, the police intervention and the intransigence of employers are making this strike a political issue."[54] Joe Slovo, leader of the SACP

[52] Saul, "South Africa," 222.

[53] "The UDF: Under Cover but not Underground," *Weekly Mail*, 17 September 1987, 6. Morobe himself was filling in for Patrick "Terror" Lekota who has been imprisoned for the last two years as a defendant in a treason trial.

[54] John B. Battersby, "Mine Union Leader Says Pretoria Politicizes Strike," *New York Times*, 25 August 1987.

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and until recently a top official in Umkhonto, argues that trade unions, unless they are somehow integrated into the armed wing of the ANC, cannot become a political threat to the government.

> Left to itself, without the participation and leadership of our revolutionary movement, we cannot expect great things from the great events that are happening in South Africa, i.e. the growth of the organisation of the black workers . . . on its own the trade union movement does not spontaneously generate revolutionary politics. It does not lead to more advanced revolutionary action.[55]

The ANC's analysis twenty-five years ago concerning the prospects for popular struggle now appears to have been substantiated. Despite unprecedented violence, the current round of protest has not and probably cannot pose a serious revolutionary threat to the white state. The exuberance of many scholars and ANC officials who see immediate prospects for popular revolt and, therefore, call for a corresponding change in tactics is ill founded. While continued unrest, even at significantly greater levels, can accomplish some tasks, especially destroying any remaining parts of the local government system and shaking investor confidence in South Africa, it cannot become significant enough to present a security threat to the state or initiate a severe economic crisis that might cause whites to reconsider their commitment to minority rule.

Those who recognize inherent shortcomings of the present type of revolt are now searching for a new avenue of protest that has the potential to threaten the basis of white rule. For instance, Gleb Starushenko of the USSR's Academy of Sciences (Africa Institute) claims:

> There exists a danger, however, that the struggle against apartheid may lose momentum and even bog down at the present pre-revolutionary stage. The historical experience of other countries attests to the fact that if revolution does not go ahead, does not set any new tasks and does not gain appreciable results, it is bound to sustain defeat. Considerable strata of South African society still keeps away from the struggle. . . . The process of the shaping of a revolutionary situation which we now witness in South Africa is far from being completed. Protest demonstrations are largely confined to African townships around big cities. The broad masses of the black population, particularly in bantustans, often stay aloof.[56]

If the current types of protest, which have attracted so much attention, will not pose a security threat to the regime, where should analysts look if we are to detect the truly important aspects of the armed struggle against the South African state?

[55] "People's War – The Task is to Make these Words a Reality: Interview with Comrade Joe Slovo," *Sechaba*, April 1983, 12.

[56] Gleb Starushenko, "For Peace, Co-operation and Social Progress," reprinted in *Southern Africa Record* 46 (April 1987): 77–78.

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The Course of Armed Struggle

The armed struggle waged by the ANC itself is the key to understanding the course of revolutionary activity in South Africa. However, for several reasons the ANC has been notably unsuccessful in its efforts to bring down the white regime through guerrilla warfare. First, the topography of South Africa does not offer impregnable areas that would be conducive to establishing large internal bases for guerrillas of the type that were so important in China, Cuba, Angola, or Mozambique.[57] South African attacks on neighboring states have also prevented the ANC from establishing guerrilla camps near its borders. For instance, by funding antigovernment rebels, the South African government has forced Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord, which effectively forced the ANC out of Mozambique. Today all major ANC operations (in Zambia, Angola, and Tanzania) are at least one country (or in the case of Namibia, one colony) away from South Africa's borders. As a result, the ANC has given up the possibility of establishing rear bases that would serve as the launching points for guerrilla attacks.[58] While South Africa no longer has the cordon sanitaire that it possessed before the mid-1970s, the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe has not caused as much deterioration in its geopolitical position as many had predicted.

The ANC also faces numerous other problems in conducting armed warfare. In sheer size it is overwhelmed by the South African security forces. A recent interview with Joe Slovo suggests that the armed wing of the ANC receives between $8 million and $25 million a year from the Soviet Union and that aid is about matched in logistical and humanitarian contributions from western countries.[59] In contrast, South Africa spends over $2.8 billion on its military alone.[60] The ANC has about 10,000 trained guerrillas of whom approximately 400 are operating in the country at any one time.[61] The South African Army alone, not counting the South African Police and the police and armies of the homelands, has 82,400 men.[62]

As a result, the ANC military campaign has been ineffective in threatening the state. The accompanying chart traces the path of all attacks against South Africa that have not occurred as part of a township disturbance.[63] While the chart almost

[57] Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (London: Longman, 1983), 295–96.

[58] Mzala, "Umkhonto we Sizwe," 22.

[59] Steven Mufson, "Uncle Joe: The White Guru of the ANC," *The New Republic*, 28 September 1987, 20. Davis estimates Umkhonto's budget at $50 million. Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels*, 66.

[60] Jeffrey Herbst, "Political and Economic Implications of South Africa's Militarization," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 8 (March 1986): 45.

[61] Tom Lodge, "State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 9 (January 1987): 5.

[62] Herbst, "Political and Economic Implications," 48.

[63] While it is always difficult to systematically retrieve this sort of information, the chart presents the best available evidence of military activity against the South African state. The chart and all subsequent figures cited include all offensive actions against the South African state, some of which may have been conducted by groups other than the ANC. The statistics, therefore, do not include other

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

Sources: Michael Morris, *South African Political Violence & Sabotage* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years) and Michael Morris, *South African Bomb Summary* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years).

certainly underestimates total ANC activity, the general trends are correct and it includes all significant instances of guerrilla attacks against South Africa. By only including attacks that could not be a part of uncoordinated popular rebellions, the chart is also a more accurate representation of the military threat to the South African state than estimates that simply count all ANC-inspired incidents. The chart shows that there has been a general increase in the number of attacks against South Africa over the last few years. However, the absolute number of attacks is still low. Even in the second quarter of 1986, when the greatest number of attacks ever recorded occurred, there was actually only one new incident every three and one-third days. The ANC has also had to pay a heavy cost for its forays against the white state. For instance, in the period between October 1976 and December 1984, there were 262 ANC attacks while 185 trained Umkhonto men were cap-

ANC-inspired incidents such as shoot-outs with the police when guerrillas are captured. The statisitics also do not include attacks successfully prevented by the South African security forces. All information on the attacks is from a series of reports by Michael Morris, *South African Political Violence & Sabotage* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years); and Michael Morris, *South African Bomb Summary* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years).

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TABLE 2

Types of Armed Attacks against South Africa, 1979–September, 1987

Target of Attack	*Percentage of Total Attacks*
Armed Propaganda	34.1
Attacks against Infrastructure	29.7
Attacks against Security Forces	12.0
Attacks against Government	11.4
Attacks against Businesses	8.0
Assassinations	4.9

Source for Tables 2 & 3: Michael Morris, *South African Political Violence and Sabotage* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years); and M. Morris, *South African Bomb Summary* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, various years).

tured and another 64 were killed. Therefore, only 262 violent incidents, the vast majority of them of little military significance, cost the ANC 249 people.[64] Similarly, between July 1985 and June 1986 the ANC carried out attacks that resulted in 54 people being killed and 349 injured,[65] but at the cost of losing approximately 489 ANC guerrillas.[66]

The actual type of attacks occurring in South Africa also indicates that at present the ANC has been unable to threaten the South African government. Table 2 lists the frequency of different types of attacks that have occurred in the last few years. "Armed propaganda" (an ANC term) is any type of attack that is not directed against a specific target. The explosive device near Johannesburg Station on 12 February 1982 that scattered ANC and SACP leaflets is an example of armed propaganda.[67]

Table 2 presents strong evidence that the ANC has not been able to mount a significant military threat to the South African government. Over 60 percent of the attacks against South Africa are against infrastructure (such as power line pylons) or done for symbolic purposes.[68] These are the same types of attacks that the ANC was conducting twenty-five years ago when Nelson Mandela was first arrested. There is very little evidence that the ANC is, in the words of Oliver Tambo, "moving from sabotage acts to attack the enemy face to face."[69] While attacks

[64] Morris, *Soapy Water and Cabinda*, 38.

[65] Mufson, "Uncle Joe," 20.

[66] "Apartheid Barometer," *Weekly Mail*, 17 September 1987, 4.

[67] Morris, *South African Political Violence & Sabotage 1 January-30 June 1982* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1982), 28.

[68] A similar conclusion has been independently reached by Tom Lodge in his review of ANC activity between 1976 and 1983. Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976–1983: Guerrilla War and Armed Propaganda," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 3 (1983/1984): 169.

[69] "Armed Struggle Escalates," *Sechaba*, January 1983, 3.

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against infrastructure can occasionally be quite damaging[70] and armed propaganda sometimes results in many injuries,[71] in the main they are of little more than nuisance value. Attacks against businesses that could generate a large amount of damage and cause despondency within the white population are still low. Similarly, attacks against the state itself, especially against its security apparatus, are relatively infrequent.

While the ANC has developed into a more sophisticated military organization in the last few years, its attacks against South Africa do not provide any evidence that it is now capable of inflicting truly significant damage on its opponent. For instance, the type of attack responsible for much of the increase over the last few years—land mines—is relatively unsophisticated and, while undoubtedly having a high probability of success, can never cause significant damage. Joe Slovo himself noted the inadequacy of sabotage attacks ten years ago when reviewing the early military efforts of the ANC:

> Sabotage of property, even on a more sophisticated scale than MK [the abbreviation for Umkhonto we Sizwe] was capable of mounting [in the 1960s], is at best a weapon auxiliary to revolutionary armed struggle. It could neither bring about the downfall of the government, nor draw into action those not already in the fairly small conspiratorial group of activists.[72]

The ANC, therefore, needs both quantitative and qualitative changes in its attacks against South Africa if it is to pressure the South African regime. However, given all the disadvantages that the guerrilla movement faces, is it possible for the ANC to actually mount a significant threat to the South African regime?

Importance of Rural Guerrilla Warfare

The ANC will only present a truly significant threat to the white regime if it is able to conduct an extensive guerrilla war in the rural areas of South Africa. In many ways the new protests in the townships have directed analysts' attention to precisely the wrong area for understanding revolution in South Africa. A true guerrilla presence in the rural areas would be threatening to the South African regime because the state would have to spread its security forces over a vast amount of land. A campaign that caused a dispersion of security forces would make many targets more vulnerable and would pose more dangers to the security forces themselves, because they would be unable to find safety in numbers. Finally, a scat-

[70] For instance, the sophisticated ANC attack against the Koeburg nuclear power plant on 17 December 1982 considerably delayed construction of the facility. Michael Morris, *South African Political Violence & Sabotage 1 July-31 December 1982*, 49.

[71] For instance, the bomb placed in a shopping center in Amanzimtoti on 23 December 1985 killed five and injured forty-three. Michael Morris and T. Combrinck, *South African Bomb Summary* (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1986), 64.

[72] Joe Slovo, "South Africa-No Middle Road" in Basil Davidson et. al., *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1976), 180.

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TABLE 3

Location of attacks against South Africa, 1979–September 1987

Type of Location	*Percentage of Total Attacks*
White Major City[1]	39.4
Rural Area[2]	30.3
White Minor City	14.7
Black Urban Area	6.7
Border Area	8.9

Note: [1] Includes Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban.
[2] Includes the "homelands." 6.1 percent of the total atacks occurred in the homelands.

tering of forces would also cost the South African government significant resources above and beyond what it is now paying for security.

The present type of township protest allows the regime to do just the opposite: security forces are easily concentrated in urban areas in a way that does not impose significant costs on the regime. The only way township protests may ever become important security threats in and of themselves is if a large enough part of the security forces is drawn off into protecting the rural areas. Therefore, the surest sign that the security of the white regime is being seriously challenged would be if urban uprisings are not suppressed or are even allowed to spread because the regime has committed a large number of troops to combat the guerrilla war in the rural areas.

The ANC has in fact had a few successes in developing a military campaign in the rural areas. Due in part to the low-level struggle, especially land mines, it is now reported that 43 percent of the white farms on the Botswana border, 39 percent on the Zimbabwe border, and 14 percent on the Mozambique border have been abandoned.[73] However, in general the ANC's rural campaign is still underdeveloped. Table 3 lists the distribution of all attacks that have occurred between 1979 and 1986 for which information on type of location is available.[74] While all of South Africa's border areas are also in rural areas, this category was considered separately, because attacks on the border are of considerably less strategic value to the ANC than attacks in South Africa's vast interior hinterland.

Attacks in rural areas do constitute a significant percentage of total military attacks against South Africa; however, they are not yet high enough to present the kind of rural threat that would require a significant dispersal of South Africa's security forces. The best evidence that the current level of rural warfare is not adequate for the ANC's strategic needs is the large security forces that the South Africans have been able to concentrate in the urban areas. Thousands of troops

[73] Murray, *South Africa*, 210.
[74] Location could not be deduced for 23 of the 350 attacks.

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are routinely placed in the townships with no apparent loss of security in other areas of the country. Indeed, in its most recent review of events in South Africa, the ANC admitted that its efforts in the rural areas were inadequate.[75]

However, the ANC faces severe problems intensifying any rural campaign. As noted above, the South African security system now covers the entire country in a comprehensive manner. Beyond its intelligence and command system, the South African military has substantial military assets—especially a powerful air force and well-trained commando units—that will pose substantial obstacles to guerrillas. Even in the "independent" homelands the South African security apparatus is actually quite strong. All the homelands have banned the African National Congress and have implemented security legislation that is at least as harsh as South Africa's.[76] Indeed, the security forces in the homelands have been called "the largest homeland growth industry." In Ciskei, for instance, 66 percent of the total funds allocated to economic development goes to the security forces.[77] Finally, unlike other areas where guerrillas have been successful, there are no forests or mountain ranges in South Africa that could provide sanctuary to guerrillas attacking the government. The prospects for the ANC developing a significant rural presence in the near future are, therefore, dim.

Survival of the White Regime

The white regime is not threatened by the current type of unrest, even if there is a quantitative increase in the level of popular protest. The South African state is of a fundamentally different nature from other regimes that have recently folded under popular pressure, and the current type of protest is particularly amenable to government repression. The real key to overthrowing the regime, as the ANC recognized twenty-five years ago, is military struggle, especially in the rural areas. However, the ANC has been notably unsuccessful is posing a military threat to the regime and faces an extremely difficult task in developing an armed threat in the rural areas. The prospect, therefore, in South Africa is of continued white rule for the foreseeable future with increasingly violent popular protest that, while not posing a significant threat to the government, will result in repression and suffering. Although the ANC turned to violence twenty-five years ago, the war for South Africa has only just begun.*

[75] African National Congress, "Political Report of the National Executive Committee to the National Consultative Conference" in *Documents of the Second National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress* (Zambia: African National Congress, 1985), 21.

[76] Fund for Free Expression, *Human Rights in the Homelands* (New York: Fund for Free Expression, 1984), 6.

[77] Ibid., 129.

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Labor Power and Social Equality: Union Politics in a Changing Economy

VERNON COLEMAN

Despite American labor's societal significance, union politics does not command the scholarly attention it once did, in large part because most of the postwar literature has concluded that American trade unions behave much like other pressure groups. Comparativists have little difficulty demonstrating that U.S. unions lack the class orientation of their European counterparts. In the workplace U.S. unions have largely ignored production control and corporate participation in exchange for high wages and job security. Similarly, American unions have never mounted a serious effort to organize a political movement aimed at challenging management's right to control capital. At the same time, political behaviorists cite union electoral and lobbying activities to argue persuasively that organized labor pursues narrowly defined political goals, the principal purpose of which is to extract rank and file benefits from government, benefits otherwise unattainable through collective bargaining. Also consistent with group theory is the fact that though the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) remains aligned with the Democratic Party, rank and file unionists break frequently with both the federation and the party in presidential elections.

Despite these well known tendencies, American labor cannot be characterized as a mere trade union movement. Since the early 1960s organized labor has behaved much like a social movement: pressing for a higher standard of living and better working conditions for less fortunate segments of our society such as blacks and the urban poor. Moreover, recent studies by J. David Greenstone, Harry Hol-

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loway, and Karen Orren have documented union leadership's increasing preoccupation with interest aggregation and the promotion of broad social issues.[1]

While these scholars question the group interpretation of American labor, the question of why the movement cuts across the grain of interest-group politics remains unanswered. Most frequently, labor's growing social agenda is explained in terms of some variation of Democratic Party coalition politics.[2] One version stresses instrumental legislative coalition building. Union leaders back redistributive social policies such as the minimum wage, food stamps, and urban revitalization in exchange for support on measures directly beneficial to rank and file union members, import protection, the closed shop, and the like. This explanation is questionable, however, given the fact that prominent union leaders supported redistributive social legislation long before disadvantaged groups attained a modicum of clout in national politics. Another variant contends that labor promotes social policy in order to aggregate unorganized groups, namely minorities and the urban poor, into the Democratic Party and thereby enhance union influence within party organizations.

Although the aggregation thesis might have seemed quite plausible during the 1960s, when blacks and the urban poor were almost completely disenfranchised from national politics, its present utility is questionable. Since the 1960s black registration has increased dramatically, and 90 percent of all blacks vote Democratic. Blacks and the urban poor have no realistic alternative to the Democratic Party, yet organized labor continues to press for expansive poverty programs. Most important, labor politics cannot be reduced to mere Democratic Party politics. Industrial union officials were in the forefront of both the civil rights and War on Poverty movements, and they continue to support redistributive social programs even though many Democrats have abandoned the movement for social equality.

Focusing on the post-1960 politics of the AFL-CIO, this article argues that American labor is best understood as a social movement whose political power is determined by union leadership's ability to solidify permanent linkages with unorganized segments of the work force. Lacking the institutionalized power afforded to unions in class-oriented labor party systems, American labor's influence in national government is contingent upon the extent to which the state recognizes union leaders as representative of the larger unorganized work force. This power is subject to erosion, however, as transformations in the modes of economic production create new groups of workers and with them new political formations. Confronted with a changing postwar economy, organized labor has sought to address the problem of declining political influence by building alliances with unorganized, low-wage

[1] J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Harry Holloway, "Interest Groups in the Postpartisan Era: The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Spring 1979); Karen Orren "Liberalism, Money, and the Situation of Organized Labor in American Politics" in J. David Grcenstone, *Public Values and Private Power in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 173–206.

[2] This position is outlined in Holloway, "Interest Groups in the Post Partisan Era."

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workers around the issue of social equality. These alliances have outdistanced Democratic Party politics and have led labor movement leadership to assume the role of social advocate: demanding redistributive social programs and an expansion of the welfare state. In return, organized labor has been able to buttress its eroding power base as its leadership entrenches itself in national policy arenas heretofore not available to union officials.

The Position of Organized Labor in American Society

The contemporary American labor movement underwent two developments during its formative years, 1900–1950, which pushed it toward interest-group politics. First, U.S. union leaders did not engage in a collective struggle to organize the work force; on the contrary, most American unions developed individually.[3] Organizing efforts tended to focus on particular sectors of the work force and groups of workers within those sectors without much assistance from established unions so that union movement solidarity was almost completely absent from the beginning. Second, American labor leaders failed to organize an independent labor party specifically designed to consolidate and represent working-class interests. Instead, the U.S. labor movement began and continues to be a fragmented political movement in which several large unions compete to influence Democratic Party politics.[4] The AFL-CIO, chiefly due to its vast resources, dominates labor's party activities, while smaller federation members are relegated to seeking influence in state and local campaigns and in policy-making bodies overlooked by the larger unions. One major consequence of this fragmentation is that American labor in many respects fits the pressure-group model of politics, for its influence mirrors that of traditional interest groups. This fact is undeniably clear when one examines the electoral and policy-making basis of labor power.

Lying outside the formal structure of government, the electoral basis of labor's position in American politics is anchored in the Democratic Party. U.S. labor operates as a principal faction within the national Democratic Party. Union officials hold leadership positions within the party, and in return labor contributes heavily to the party's fund raising and organizing efforts. In this case, the focal point of influence is not merely organized labor's ability to effect specific electoral outcomes, but more importantly the extent to which union leadership is able to shape the substance of party politics. Empirically, this is demonstrated in labor's ability to influence the party's agenda on matters such as resource deployment, candidate selection, and policy priority.[5]

The second aspect of labor's political status is the informal penetration of public

[3] See Andrew W.J. Thomson "The United States of America" in E. Owen Smith, ed., *Trade Unions in the Developed Economies* (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), 155–77.

[4] Ibid.

[5] For a detailed description of labor's electoral activities see Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics*.

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policy institutions. American labor's participation in policy making can be illuminated if one compares it to the British experience. In Britain, labor officials participate directly in policy-making institutions by virtue of the fact that union leaders are elected to office and appointed to administrative posts as representatives of a political party.[6] By contrast, U.S. labor plays no direct role in government but participates in the policy process as an interest group seeking access to decision-making institutions. Here, much like a plethora of other so-called voluntary associations, organized labor is sanctioned by the state to participate in the policy-making process. This foundation of group power has been explored extensively by scholars investigating the democratic effects of private associations on public policy.[7] According to this thesis, the state delegates decision-making responsibilities to private institutions in order to legitimate government regulatory authority in a democratic, free market society, and as a result these groups come to dominate policy formulation and implementation. Most important, this pattern of group influence runs along functional policy lines. In other words, banking associations gain access to and dominate agencies responsible for regulating financial institutions; farm groups, those making agricultural policy; and so forth. Extrapolating from this thesis, organized labor's position in American politics is also a function of union leadership's ability to capitalize on the participatory road to group power. Participatory power is typically thought to be manifested in labor's ability to influence government structures that regulate the American work place, such as the Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Department of Commerce.

Underlying the political dimension of labor's power, a crucial factor defining organized labor's position in American society is the extent to which union leadership represents the larger work force. Traditionally, students of labor politics conceived representation in terms of the rate of unionization, a measure of how many rank and file workers labor leadership actually speaks for. The question at hand goes much deeper than unionization, however; a more pivotal issue is the degree to which unions as manifest employee organizations, by virtue of which labor leadership gains access to national government, are representative of politically latent segments of the work force primary to the production of goods and services. This conception is rooted in the unwritten relationship between American business, organized employees, and the larger unorganized work force. Historically, few U.S. workers have joined unions. However, union officials, through their collective bargaining and lobbying efforts, set the tone of labor-management relations through the American workplace. This fact is most apparent with respect to wages. Salary schedules defined in collective bargaining agreements won by major unions become guideposts for the remuneration given to unorganized workers in similar

[6] Ben Pimlot and Chris Cook, *Trade Unions in British Politics* (New York: Longman, 1983).

[7] Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966); also see Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1967).

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industries. Likewise, fringe benefits given to unionized labor, such as cost of living allowances and medical care, trickle down to non-unionized employees in other sectors of the work force.[8] In turn, state and federal laws governing workplace conditions, particularly health and safety rules, are often patterned after existing collective bargaining contracts. Because of this connection, albeit unwritten, between unionized and nonunion employees, labor leader's access to government is strengthened by the fact that they represent a much larger political constituency. For example, Caesar Chavez is able to influence California agricultural labor politics, not because the United Farm Workers (UFW) has been able to unionize a large number of farmworkers, but because UFW policies address the interests of a much larger, unorganized constituency.[9]

Historical Changes in Labor Movement Dominance

Beyond the general question of organized labor's collective position in American society, U.S. labor politics must also be understood in terms of the movement's dominance by select union leaders and the institutional alliances between sectors of the work force. An important reality of American labor politics is that the various components of the movement have not fully shared in the power to shape organized labor's political agenda. Instead, prominent leaders emerging from select segments of the labor force have monopolized the movement historically. Moreover, the movement's politics has been predisposed towards the concerns of particular unions and the work sectors they represent, while neglecting the problems of others.[10] Though a multiplicity of factors, both intraorganizational and systemic, can explain these tendencies, the most politically influential union leaders have, at any given historical juncture, sprung from the economically dominant sector of the employment structure. In other words, the more influential elements of the movement attain their stature not because their unions are better organized, have more precinct workers, or more campaign contributors, but because these leaders speak for sectors of the work force particularly crucial to the production of society's goods and services. Thus, Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) was a prominent figure in national politics during his heyday because one of every eight jobs was related to automobile production.[11]

Despite the fact that labor politics has historically been dominated by the few, there have occurred changes in the composition of leadership elite that at any one

[8] See Leo Troy, et al., "The Three Faces of Unionism," *Policy Review* (Fall 1980): 95–109.

[9] In 1982, agricultural employment in California was approximately 223,000. UFW membership was an estimated 30,000. See Gary Johnston and Phillip L. Martin, "Employment and wages reported by California farmers in 1982," *Monthly Labor Review*, September 1983, 27–31.

[10] Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage, 1979); Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

[11] The auto industry's importance to the American economy was responsible for the famous statement, "What's good for General Motors is good for America."

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particular point in time monopolizes the movement. The principal force behind these changes is also rooted in transformations in the nature of economic production that are inherent to the American economy. In a free enterprise system the introduction of new patterns of production is a primary way in which those who control economic resources can increase output while reducing operating costs and maximizing profits. When management elects to exercise this option, however, new modes of production not only affect the structure of capital but the character of the employment force as well. On a nationwide basis technological innovations expand or contract existing sectors of the work force, thereby increasing or reducing the significance of these workers in the creation of society's goods and services. More important, relatively novel patterns of production may be instituted giving rise to entirely new groups of workers possessing a unique set of political and economic interests. From this development emerge the labor leaders who contend with and sometimes supplant hitherto dominant union movement leadership.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this process was America's transition from an agrarian to an industrialized society and the accompanying shift in the domination of the labor movement from craft to industrial union leadership. Throughout the 1800s the economy was dominated by agriculture and small proprietorships, and the bulk of the work force was engaged in some aspect of farm production. Moreover, this pattern held true for the duration of the century; as late as 1900 some 37 percent of all U.S. workers were self-employed; and 47 percent of the total labor force worked in agriculture.[12] What little industrial production did exist at that time was small in scale and decentralized; consequently as late as 1880 manufacturing workers accounted for only 27 percent of the employment force. This pattern of agricultural labor market dominance was altered, however, by the post-Civil War industrial revolution that transformed the nature of production. With this, both the character of the work force and the shape of U.S. labor movement politics changed. On the investment front, American society underwent a fundamental change between the Civil War and World War II; it was transformed from an agrarian small-scale economy to a mass production one. Between 1860 and 1910, there occurred a twelve-fold increase in investment in the manufacturing sector. This investment allowed for the mechanization of basic industry, the creation of new enterprises based upon mass production techniques, and a substantial increase in production.[13] Also during this era completely new industries such as automobiles, hydroelectricity, and telephone communication were introduced. Mechanization resulted in phenomenal productivity increases in most of America's basic industries. Automobile production increased from about 4,200 units in 1900

[12] For a discussion of these changes in investment and production see Joseph G. Rayback, *A History of American Labor* (New York: Macmillan, 1959); and Michael Reich, "The Evolution of the United States Labor Force" in Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weiskopf, *The Capitalist System: A Federal Analysis of American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[13] Rayback, *History of American Labor.*

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to over 4.5 million in 1929. Likewise, steel production increased approximately 1,300 percent between 1890 and 1920. As a consequence of this growth the structure of American business was irreversibly altered. Proprietorship gave way to corporate ownership, resulting not only in mass production but economic concentration, specialization, and interdependence as well. Concurrently, America was transformed from a rural to an urbanized society centered around an industrial labor force. Thus, by World War II, 40 percent of the labor force worked in heavy industry and only 19 percent in farming.

Accompanying this economic metamorphosis, American labor politics was altered dramatically; the movement to organize industrial workers emerged, the CIO was founded, and national political leaders began to address the concerns of mass-production employees. More important, CIO representatives emerged to challenge AFL unionists for the right to monopolize national labor politics, eventually supplanting craft officials as the movements' dominant force.[14]

At bottom, this political transformation was made possible by another crucial characteristic of U.S. labor politics: political domination has not always been congruent with production significance. Instead, there has historically existed a lag between the politically influential elements of the movement and emergent sectors of the employment force. Because of changes in the nature of production, emergent elements have assumed a greater labor market importance than existing sectors. Moreover, during this gap period, labor movement domination is also subject to transformation, a fact borne out by the CIO's rise to power in the late 1930s.

By 1920 industrial employees had surpassed farm labor as the largest sector of the work force, and it was clear that unskilled factory workers, not craft workers, were the most vital element of America's mass-production economy. Nevertheless, the craft-oriented AFL continued its dominance over union movement politics throughout the 1920s. AFL officials laid claim to the labor vote and represented the "labor interest" before Congress. Not surprisingly then, most labor legislation enacted between 1900 and the New Deal was preoccupied with protecting skilled workers from labor market competition, in particular the closed shop, prevailing wage, and restrictive immigration laws. Likewise, AFL organizing and collective bargaining strategies ignored the immediate workplace concerns of unskilled production employees. Initially AFL leaders, concerned with the question as to whether the inclusion of unskilled workers would weaken existing locals, if not completely undermine craft unionism, did not organize the mass-production industries. Underscoring the AFL's apprehension, when federation representatives did decide to organize mass-production industries, they aimed their efforts at skilled

[14] Reich, "The Evolution of the United States"; an updated version of this position can be found in David B. Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, *Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

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employees, ignoring the unskilled at the very same location.[15] Meanwhile, the question of the representation of unskilled workers became a national problem as protracted industrial conflict threatened Roosevelt's New Deal Recovery. Above all, this conflict reflected the erratic labor-management relations widespread in the mass-production industries and emanating from management's lack of control over unskilled workers. In part, the CIO moved in to fill this void as its leadership focused on organizing workers in the auto and steel industries. Thus, when the federal government decided to stabilize the industrial workplace in the late 1930s, CIO leadership quickly attained political power. Initially under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and later the Wagner Act, CIO officials embedded themselves in the industrial workplace and gained access to government decision-making institutions. Later, CIO leaders, expanding upon this power granted by the state, became a crucial voice in labor movement and Democratic Party politics.[16] Most important, the CIO's rise to national prominence was made possible because its leaders represented a key sector of the work force whose interests were not being represented by established union movement leadership.

The political and economic incongruities prevalent during the 1920s and 1930s are not unique, but rather a permanent feature of the movement's history. Economic transformations, which automatically create new sectors of the work force and, therefore, gaps in political representation, are inherent in the U.S. economy. Consequently, American labor leaders are constantly faced with potential challenges to their political dominance from within both the labor movement and the political arena.

Labor and the Postwar Economy

Fundamental changes taking place in the postwar economy have produced yet another gap period for organized labor. Since the end of World War II, America has been undergoing a transformation from an industrial to a service-oriented economy. This transformation, much like the one occurring in the early 1900s, has produced a large sector of disenfranchised workers, who have no link with established labor leadership. Consequently, by the late 1960s and early 1970s American labor was confronted with the problem of maintaining political dominance when it no longer represented the character of the work force.

Between 1950 and 1980, American business expanded its high-technology, com-

[15] The battle between the AFL and CIO, and the ensuing rise of CIO leadership as the dominant force in American labor politics has been the subject of numerous works on U.S. labor history. See for instance Phillip Taft, *Organized Labor in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); and Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*, 96–180.

[16] Trade unions were sanctioned by government under section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Taft associated this with the need to stabilize the labor force, reduce uncertainty in the workplace, and restore economic productivity during the Great Depression. See Taft, *Organized Labor*, 416–423. This argument was made even more forcefully by Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*.

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mercial, fast-food and personal-service operations, which in turn has resulted in changes in both the size and composition of the work force. The most glaring effect has been a doubling of the labor force form 45.2 to 90.4 million workers. More important, service-related employment has come to dominate the labor force, the result of explosive growth in the service sector. The greatest postwar occupational gains took place in wholesale and retail employment, which expanded from 9.4 to 20.3 million workers. Also expanding significantly during this thirty-year period were personal services workers (from 5.6 to 17.9 million employees) and government employees (from 6 to 16.2 million). These growth patterns further resulted in a change in the relative composition of the U.S. employment force. In 1950 manufacturing-sector workers comprised the largest group at 33.7 percent of the labor force, while wholesale-retail and government employees were 11.9 percent and 13.3 percent respectively. The picture was much different in 1980, however, as wholesale and retail workers surpassed the number employed in manufacturing, and government employees comprise 19.8 percent of the work force.[17]

Despite America's transition to a service-oriented economy, national patterns of unionization and labor movement do not reflect the fundamental character of the work force. In 1978 manufacturing and construction workers represented 50 percent of all union membership, but only 27 percent of the labor force. In contrast, wholesale-retail and service employees comprised 41 percent of the labor force, but only 16 percent of all rank and file union members.[18]

The unrepresentative nature of organized labor can also be seen in union movement politics. Leadership within the AFL-CIO remains dominated by the old guard craft and industrial unions—officials from the UAW, Steelworkers, Rubberworkers, Garmentworkers, Machinists, Electricalworkers, Plumbers, and Carpenters Unions. Conversely, with the exception of representatives from the Association of Federal, State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the AFT, and Food and Commercial Workers, few service-sector union officials hold key leadership positions within the so-called house of labor.

All told, changing work force composition has placed the post-war labor movement in a precarious economic position, reminiscent of the situation that confronted the AFL in the 1930s. Despite these parallels, the postwar labor movement has responded quite differently to the problem of maintaining dominance during periods of economic change. While the AFL closed its eyes to unorganized mass production workers, contemporary union leaders have addressed labor force transformation by forming permanent alliances with disenfranchised workers on the question of social equality.

[17] The best consolidated sources for these figures is the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982–83* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), tables 682, 683, 659.
[18] Ibid.

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Labor Politics and Social Movements in the 1960s

Black demands for the desegregation of public accommodations in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 triggered the beginning of what was to become a national movement for racial equality. Perhaps more than any other established political interest, organized labor embraced the civil rights cause, advancing racial equality in both the workplace and through congressional legislation. Later in the decade, union leaders devoted a considerable amount of time and resources toward the passage of legislation designed to reduce poverty, redistribute income, and extend opportunity to many disadvantaged segments of American society, not just blacks. This marked a sharp departure from the pre-1960 labor movement, which was primarily concerned with trade union issues, import protection, less restrictive organizing laws, and the like. Thus, organized labor has been transformed from a narrow trade union movement to one with a societal orientation.

From the outset, industrial union leaders expressed a deep, though not unqualified, commitment to the national civil rights cause.[19] Led by the UAW, industrial union officials lobbied both President John F. Kennedy, and the U.S. Congress on behalf of voting rights, fair employment, and open housing legislation.[20] Moreover, industrial union leaders were instrumental in building public support for civil rights by holding numerous conferences and by using union newsletters and the mass media to educate the white working class about the pervasiveness of racial injustice and why its elimination was crucial to the formation of a cohesive, effective labor movement. In addition to these lobbying and educational activities, industrial union leaders played a pivotal role in the grassroots aspect of the civil rights movement. Representatives from the Packinghouse Workers, Steelworkers, and UAW lent organizational and financial support to the black voter registration drives in the South. Outside organizational support was crucial to these drives, because the white-dominated southern Democratic Party machinery was largely responsible for black disenfranchisement. Not only did industrial unions send funds and organizers to help black civil rights groups, but in some cases rank and file union members went to the rural South to register black voters. Additionally, representatives from these same unions participated in the sit-ins and protest marches designed to bring racial injustice to national attention, including those in Selma, Alabama and Washington, D.C. and later the Charleston and Memphis strikes.[21]

[19] Most prominantly, these very unions were slow to integrate the industrial work force. Even in 1968 blacks held few leadership positions in the Steelworkers or the UAW, and blacks had made few inroads into craft jobs within basic industry. See Phillip Foner, *Organized Labor and the Black Worker* (New York: International Publishers, 1981), 397–424; and James Geswender, *Class, Race, and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[20] See Foner, *Organized Labor*, 332–354; and Frank Comier and William J. Eaton, *Reuther* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

[21] See Foner, *Organized Labor*, for a discussion of these efforts. Also sample the UAW's monthly publication, *Solidarity*, 1960–1964.

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The AFL-CIO's support of the civil rights movement was much more tenuous. The federation wholeheartedly backed federal civil rights legislation, and it assailed the Senate's filibuster rule that enabled southern members of Congress to stifle the passage of civil rights bills. At the same time, however, the federation's leadership did not participate in nor endorse protest marches or sit-ins. Most notable was George Meany's refusal to support the 1963 March on Washington.[22] This difference between the federation's support of the civil rights movement and that expressed by its industrial affiliates can be traced to differences in leadership and rank and file. Industrial unions generally had more progressive leaders and had established long-standing local alliances with blacks that grew out of the need to dissuade blacks from becoming strikebreakers.[23] In contrast, the federation was dominated by craft union leaders, who were not only more conservative but also represented locals that continued to exclude blacks from the labor market. Regardless of these differences, labor's legislative push for civil rights was consistent and exceeded the efforts put forth by the Democratic Party.

Labor further expanded its advocacy of social equality with the emergence of the War on Poverty movement. By 1946, both the AFL and the CIO had developed a general legislative program designed to reduce poverty and improve living conditions in America's central cities. However, it was not until the mid-1960s that organized labor activity sought to make this program a reality. Much of this had to do with timing. As in the case of labor's participation in the civil rights cause, it took the emergence of a broader social movement, in this instance the War on Poverty, before labor launched its campaign for social equality. Nevertheless, labor eventually became the War on Poverty's chief spokesperson and by doing so moved to the forefront of the Democratic Party.

Most of labor's War on Poverty activities were directed at the drafting and passage of legislation whose purpose was to reduce social inequality.[24] The AFL-CIO legislation concentrated on four policy areas: compensatory education, job training for the disadvantaged, urban renewal, and subsidized central city employment. Armed with this agenda, AFL-CIO leaders testified before numerous House and Senate committees responsible for drafting War on Poverty legislation and lobbied individual members of Congress when these bills came before the floor. The AFL-CIO and its larger affiliates also employed their extensive union operatives to build mass support for War on Poverty legislation in congressional districts. AFL-CIO officials worked in their local party organizations to elect leaders sympathetic to the War on Poverty to congressional office, and they pressured incumbent officeholders to vote for pending antipoverty legislation. Moreover, several union or-

[22] For an analysis of the AFL-CIO'S participation in the civil rights movement see Foner, *Organized Labor*; and Archie B. Robinson, *George Meany and His Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981).

[23] These differences are discussed in Ray Marshall, *The Negro and Organized Labor* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

[24] See Foner, *Organized Labor*, 355–396.

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ganizations, including the AFL-CIO, the Steelworkers, and the UAW, used their own publications to build rank and file support for Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs.[25]

In addition to these legislative-oriented activities, industrial union leadership played a significant role in the movement to organize the urban poor.[26] The UAW was instrumental in the formation of two national poverty organizations—the Citizen's Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP) and the Poor People's Campaign (PPC). Walter Reuther was chairman of the CCAP, while local and national UAW members were active in the PPC. Most important, the UAW pledged over one million dollars to fund the Crusade. On the local level the UAW, the Steelworkers, and the Packinghouse Workers funded and participated in antipoverty organizations including the Watts Labor Community Action Committee in Los Angeles and the Chicago Freedom Movement.

Taken together, union leadership's participation in the civil rights and War on Poverty movements demonstrated that labor had taken on a new role in American politics. The defining characteristic of this new role was labor's representation of a new constituency—low-wage disenfranchised workers. These were workers who had no institutionalized link to the political process and were employed in the secondary labor market: blacks, the urban poor, the marginally employed, and unskilled service workers. Thus labor's constituency expanded from one that was chiefly comprised of unionized high-wage workers to one that included the disenfranchised. Just as important, this change in postwar labor politics should not be viewed as an outgrowth of the labor-Democratic Party alliance. To be sure, the Democratic Party laid claim to this same constituency, and labor did much to aggregate disenfranchised workers into party politics. However, there were major differences between labor's and the party's relationship to the disenfranchised. Most significant, organized labor, particularly industrial unionists, played an independent role in the movement for social equality; and labor's efforts exceeded those put forth by the party. Furthermore, labor pressured party leaders to broaden the scope of War on Poverty programs, and union leaders continued to push for redistributive social legislation long after the Democratic Party abandoned the Great Society campaign in the late 1960s.

Beyond description, the question remains: why did labor undergo this transformation in its postwar politics? Labor's social dimension is best understood in terms of the relationship between labor's declining status in American society and how that status was boosted by union movement leadership's advocacy of social equality. From World War II until the early 1970s, organized labor enjoyed a strong economic position. Wages increased, unemployment remained relatively low, and employment expanded. However, this favorable economic position masked labor's tenuous political status. In the late 1950s, the newly merged AFL-CIO launched

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid. Also see John Barnard, *Walter Reuther and the Rise of the Auto Workers* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983).

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a major organizing drive aimed at white collar and southern workers, which failed miserably. Labor suffered another major defeat in 1959 with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, a bill that made it even more difficult to organize the workplace. Moreover, seven states enacted open shop laws during the 1950s, bringing the total number of states with such laws to nineteen. Finally, labor unionization was declining. Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the War on Poverty, non-agricultural employment increased by 16.7 million, but union membership by a mere 2.4 million; as a result, the rate of unionization declined from 35 percent to 29 percent.[27]

Union leadership's participation in the movement for social equality did much to bolster organized labor's declining status, for the War on Poverty programs expanded the scope and size of government and enhanced labor's influence in public policy-making institutions. The implementation of War on Poverty programs resulted in the greatest increase in social welfare spending since the Great Depression. Equally important, this implementation demanded the massive expansion of federal and state administrative agencies. War on Poverty legislation created a new federal department, Housing and Urban Development, and several agencies below department level—the Office of Economic Opportunity; a vast array of new programs, including the Job Corps, Head Start, and the Community Action Program.[28] Accompanying this administrative expansion was an equally significant political expansion as War on Poverty programs created a new political constituency, the urban poor, and government officials sought to integrate this new constituency into the policy implementation process. This pattern of administrative-political expansion paralleled other instances of government intervention in the private sector, where the inclusion of private associations legitimated state authority. There was, however, a major difference between War on Poverty programs and other cases of administrative expansion. In previous instances of government regulation, policy focused on clearly definable task-oriented or functional constituencies, and public authority was delegated to economic or professional associations crucial to successful policy implementation. Thus, when the federal government sought to regulate the use of western grazing lands in the late 1800s, local cattlemen's associations, presumably representative of those using range land, were incorporated into policy implementation.[29] Likewise, when federal officials moved to stabilize labor-managment relations during the New Deal, CIO unions were recognized as the legitimate representatives of mass-production workers, organized and unorganized. Thus union officials played a key role in the implementation of labor legislation.[30] By contrast, the War on Poverty's primary constituency, the urban poor, was much more ambiguous, lacked an economic base, and was to a large extent unorganized. Consequently, it was not clear which political

[27] See *The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982–83*, tables 682, 683 and 659.
[28] The growth of the welfare state is discussed by Lowi in *The End of Liberalism*.
[29] McConnnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*, 196–211.
[30] Ibid., 298–311.

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organizations actually represented the urban poor. Moreover, this problem was complicated by the fact that those groups most crucial to the successful implementation of War on Poverty programs were not the representatives of the poor, but entrenched business and labor interests who controlled local economic development and jobs. In order to solve this constituency dilemma, War on Poverty officials incorporated two sets of groups into the policy process—local political organizations claiming to represent the poor and entrenched economic interests. Most crucial to our analysis, government's decisions to redefine the War on Poverty's political constituency expanded organized labor's control over public policy.

Nowhere was this fact more evident than in War on Poverty programs directly related to employment. Prior to the 1960s, labor's access to policy making was chiefly confined to workplace regulation issues: licensure, wages, workplace safety, collective bargaining, and organizing rules. War on Poverty programs added another dimension to government intervention in the workplace as administrative officials sought to devise projects aimed at integrating blacks and the urban poor in the private-sector labor market. When it came time to design and implement these projects, federal agencies relied heavily upon business and labor to plan and administer the programs. Industrial unions, including the UAW and the Steelworkers, were principal participants in the Department of Labor's pre-apprenticeship, hard core hiring, and on-the-job training programs.[31] Most important, these programs were not forced upon the unions as we saw in the case of affirmative action and contract compliance. On the contrary, unions solicited, designed, and controlled these programs, therefore giving labor a new inroad into public policy making. A similar pattern also developed in Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) projects. OEO officials solicited labor's participation in the War on Poverty through the formation of the National Labor Advisory Council. Comprised chiefly of representatives from craft and service unions, these labor leaders advised OEO officials on how to design training programs and to determine the needs of the inner city work force.[32] Related to that, unions also played a major role in implementing OEO programs. One of the more notable cases was a 1966 OEO minority employment program in Oakland, California. This program was cosponsored and implemented by the Oakland Alameda County Central Labor Council. The project itself was designed to create summer jobs for inner city youth, which would hopefully enable "disadvantaged minorities" to penetrate the primary labor market. In the final analysis, these types of programs did little to integrate inner city workers into the economic mainstream, but they did enable organized labor to expand its influence on public policy.[33]

[31] The UAW was one of the biggest promoters of employment projects, many of which did not relate to automobile industry jobs. The UAW sponsored a city-wide pre-apprenticeship training program in Detroit in 1966, auto industry pre-apprenticeship projects from 1966–1978, and a city-wide on-the-job training program in Detroit from 1966–1977. Interviews with UAW International staff, and UAW contract performance reports, Department of Labor.

[32] See *AFL-CIO Federationists*, April 1966.

[33] Ibid.

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Arguably, labor can claim a right to influence public policy related to employment, even if the workers serviced are not union members and are not employed in the mainstream economy. There was another dimension of labor's expanding policy influence that was not so justifiable, however. War on Poverty programs enabled labor to expand its influence into policy areas not directly related to employment. Walter Reuther testified before the Congress more than any other individual since World War II, sat on the National Housing Commission, and had personal access to cabinet level policy makers. Similarly, AFL-CIO leaders gained access to numerous congressional hearings and sat on commissions related to poverty, education, and housing.[34]

By claiming to represent the urban poor, union leaders were able to enhance their influence in local policy-making institutions. This was particularly true in the area of urban redevelopment, where union officials sat on community boards that set goals, designed projects, and raised funds for economic development and low-income housing projects. This pattern held true in cities where labor was influential in local politics, two of the more notable cases being Detroit and Oakland. In Detroit, Reuther was chairman of the Metropolitan Detroit Citizen's Development Authority and was instrumental in the establishment of the New Detroit Committee, organizations that guided that city's redevelopment effort.[35] In Oakland, a city in which unions have long been politically influential, representatives of the Oakland Alameda County Central Labor Council worked in conjunction with local businessmen, politicians, and planners to bring housing and economic development programs to the city. Moreover, labor was represented on the Employment Plan Review Board, a quasi-public advisory commission that reviewed applications for small-business and economic development loans funded by the Economic Development Administration.[36] To be sure, labor was already influential in electoral politics in these cities, but War on Poverty programs enabled labor to transform electoral clout into institutionalized policy-making influence. Even more significant, the new inroads provided to union leaders enabled labor to transcend the functionally defined lines of public policy influence afforded most other interest groups.

[34] Few political scientists have examined labor's penetration of national policy-making institutions during the 1960s. Instead, much of the literature dealing with the War on Poverty has focused on whether or not the poor gained political power through Great Society programs. Bits and pieces of the extent to which labor extended its influence over policy making as a result of its representation of the poor can be found in several biographies of major union figures. See for instance Robinson, *George Meany and His Times*; Comier and Eaton, *Reuther*; and Victor Reuther, *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW: A Memoir* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).

[35] See B.J. Widcik, *Detroit: City of Class and Race Conflict* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972).

[36] For a discussion of these projects and labor's role in their promotion see Aaron Wildavsky and Jeffery Pressman, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

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Labor in the 1970s

The relationship between organized labor's status in American society and union politics became more apparent in the 1970s. Organized labor's political and economic status declined even further as America's service economy continued to expand. In response to its declining power, union movement politics took on an even greater societal dimension. Labor's declining political status was particularly evident in the numerous national legislative defeats suffered by the AFL-CIO. In the early part of the decade, the federation developed a political agenda designed to expand War on Poverty redistributive social programs, including public service employment and national health care. Much to labor's dismay, not only was this agenda soundly defeated, the growth of existing programs was curtailed by the Nixon administration and funding for social welfare programs was cut under the Carter administration. Moreover, the federation did not fair much better on labor-related legislation. Union leadership was defeated on common-site picketing legislation, on proposals to restrict the importation of manufactured goods, and on a proposed national workers compensation program.[37] Adding to these political losses, labor's workplace position further eroded as unionization declined dramatically. Between 1970 and 1980 the U.S. workforce increased by nearly twenty million employees, yet union membership grew by a mere one million. Even more damaging, for the first time in the postwar period major manufacturing unions including the UAW, the Machinist, the Rubber Workers, Steelworkers, and Garment Workers lost membership.[38]

Within this context of declining union power, organized labor moved to further strengthen its alliance with disenfranchised workers. First, labor broadened its social agenda, seeking more comprehensive job training and employment programs for low-wage, marginal employees, particularly blacks. Thus, labor was the main force behind proposed public service employment, the Comprehensive Education and Training Act, and the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill. Most important, these were the types of programs that provided union leadership not with jobs, but with access to decision-making institutions and control over public policy. Second, labor sought to cement its alliances with disenfranchised groups during the 1970s. The AFL-CIO maintained a tenuous relationship with black groups throughout the 1960s, chiefly because of George Meany's conflict with A. Phillip Randolph of the NAACP and the federation's failure to support black demonstrations. In contrast, in the late 1970s, the federation softened its stand against protest groups and attempted to woo civil rights organization back into the labor movement.[39] Despite these AFL-CIO overtures to mend old wounds, the greatest

[37] See Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, "Common-Site Picketing: A Major Defeat for Labor" in their *Interests Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1978). Labor's other defeats are chronicled in the *Congressional Quarterly.*

[38] Trends in union membership can be found in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982–83*, table 681.

[39] See Harry Berstein "Labor, Liberals Join Forces to Counter Reagan Agenda," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 September 1981.

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effort to solidify links between labor and disenfranchised workers were made by industrial unions and were centered on the problem of plant closurers.

The federation approached the problem of plant closurers like many other legislative issues. AFL-CIO officials worked within the Democratic Party to formulate and enact plant closing legislation; they testified before congressional committees, lobbied individual members, and worked in congressional districts to win support on the issue. In contrast, several industrial unions used the plant closing issue to resurrect their linkages with grassroots black organizations. The best example of this was the formation in 1979 of the Progressive Alliance, a coalition of some 130 civil rights, civic, religious, and labor organizations. For all intents and purposes, the alliance was organized by the UAW, even though it claimed to be a grassroots group. The purpose of the organization was to raise public awareness about the problem of plant closurers and to promote the passage of plant closing legislation.[40] The tactics used by the alliance were very similar to those used by civil rights groups during the 1960s. Progressive Alliance leaders conducted educational conferences and distributed newsletters to inform members and the public of plant closurers and their impact on America's economy. The organization participated in several demonstrations, including Labor Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C. to publicize the plant closurer problem, and alliance leaders testified before congressional committees on behalf of plant closing legislation. Despite these activities, however, the Progressive Alliance was primarily a symbolic coalition dominated by the UAW and other industrial unions. From the beginning, UAW International officials held top leadership positions in the organization, and UAW President Doug Fraser was the alliance's first director. Similarly, industrial union officials dominated the organization's lobbying activities, which were directed by the UAW Legislative Department in Washington, D.C. Though they claimed to represent the alliance, industrial union leaders provided most of the groups' testimony before congressional committees.[41] Likewise, the alliance was never able to mobilize the mass participation associated with the civil rights movement. To be sure, members of the alliance participated in several Labor Day marches. However, local-level demonstrations to protect particular plant closurers never materialized.

In the larger scheme of things, the plant closing movement provided industrial union leadership with political access. Industrial unionists gained access to policy-making institutions as a national movement formed to enact plant closing legisla-

[40] For information on the alliance's goals, see the *UAW Washington Report*, 16 January, 2 March, and 6 July 1979; and 28 March 1980.

[41] In 1979, Fraser was chairman of the alliance and UAW official Bill Dodds its executive director. For insight into the extent to which union officials dominated the organization examine the number of union leaders representing the organization before the following congressional committee hearings: House Budget Committee, Budget Impact Hearings, 28 February 1979; House Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities and Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations; Hearings on H.R. 5040, the National Employment Priorities Act of 1979, Los Angeles, 18 January 1980. Also see the *UAW Washington Report*, 11 May, 6 July 1979; and 14 March 1980.

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tion. Moreover, participation in the plant closing movement enabled unions like the UAW to remain in the forefront of labor movement politics, even though their membership was shrinking.

Conclusions

Since 1960, organized labor has moved away from its traditionally trade unionist orientation, and now constitutes a major force for social equality in American society. This process began with industrial union leadership's participation in the civil rights movement and crystallized with organized labor's vanguard role in the War on Poverty movement. Since that time, the AFL-CIO has assumed the role of social advocate, pressing for an expansion of the original War on Poverty programs and calling for greater government involvement in the equalization of opportunity. Moreover, labor has continued with its social agenda, even though the support for redistributive social programs has dwindled.

More important than the transformation itself are the reasons behind it. Since World War II, the U.S. labor movement has been dominated by manufacturing-sector union leaders, while the economy has increasingly taken on a service orientation. As a result, labor power in both the workplace and political arena has been declining. In response to this problem of declining power, union movement leadership has cultivated an alliance with disenfranchised low-wage workers through the promotion of social equality, and this strategy has boosted organized labor's political influence in the welfare state.

This analysis raises two questions about our perceptions of postwar labor movement politics. First, American labor might not be the narrow, ineffectual trade union movement commonly portrayed in the literature. To be sure, the U.S. union movement, when compared to its European counterparts, is weak and disorganized. This fact is particularly evident in union leadership's failure to develop a labor party, its failure to organize working-class political movements, and its inability to place union officials in political office. At the same time, however, American labor's societal agenda has compensated for some of these weaknesses. Most important, labor's advocacy of social equality has given the union movement a sense of continuity and cohesion, and has facilitated the formation of permanent linkages between organized and unorganized sectors of the work force. In addition, labor's ability to penetrate the welfare state's administrative apparatus, a development made possible by the movement for social equality, has institutionalized union leadership's influence in the policy process.

Second, this study sheds light on the debate over the extent to which the state structures the representation of American workers. Studies of New Deal labor politics have concluded that the state plays a major role in determining the pattern of labor organization. Briefly, these studies argue the following: New Deal labor policies were instrumental in the organization of mass production workers, perhaps even more so than the efforts put forth by CIO leaders; these policies were not intended to protect workers, but to bring stability to the industrial workplace

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and expedite economic recovery; and New Deal labor policies promoted sectoral union, an emphasis on collective bargaining, and the separation of workplace from community politics, and have therefore structured the long-term development of American labor movement politics. Presently, America is undergoing another period of economic transformation, and again the state, though more subtly, has structured labor-movement politics. In an immediate sense, the state has reinforced the power of entrenched labor organizations. Government officials on both the national and local level clearly recognize the right of established unions, especially the AFL-CIO and the once-independent UAW, to represent unorganized blacks and low-wage workers before numerous decision-making bodies. Similarly, government officials have delegated welfare-state program implementation authority to established unions, enabling entrenched interests to control employment and job training programs designed to integrate low-wage and black workers into the economic mainstream. In a broader sense, state reinforcement of entrenched interests coupled with organized labor's willingness to promote broad social policy may have reinforced the power of established unions within the labor movement as well, therefore inhibiting any challenges by new, more militant organizations.

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The Public Corporation: A Potent Japanese Policy Weapon

MARIE ANCHORDOGUY

The Japan Electronic Computer Company (JECC) has no sales division, only a couple hundred employees, and at best earns profits of one to two million dollars a year; it is not surprising that few Japanese have ever heard of it. Yet, this quasi-private computer rental company has played a critical role in the development of a modern Japanese computer industry. Japan, like other industrialized nations, has used public corporations to provide important public services such as railroads and airlines. But the bureaucracy has also used an array of public corporations as operating arms of specific ministries to serve their purposes.[1] Some, like JECC, have been key players in Japan's efforts to target strategic industries.

JECC, which was created by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to promote the development of an economically viable computer industry, has been the most important single institution spurring the industry's development. Analysis of how it was established and how it influenced the demand, supply, price, and technological sophistication of domestic computers offers new insight into Japan's government-business relationship and the ways in which state intervention can spur rather than stifle industrial development.

To the all-star team of Japanese computer companies that jointly own JECC—Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and Oki—the rental company is a conduit for a generous flow of subsidized government loans. Between 1961 and 1981 the Japanese government poured some $2 billion in low-interest loans into

[1] Chalmers Johnson, *Japan's Public Policy Companies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, 1978).

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JECC to help the company purchase computers from the member firms and rent them to the public at competitive rates.[2] With these funds, JECC rented some 65 percent of all domestic computers in the 1960s, 30 percent in the 1970s, and 11 percent in the early 1980s. Through JECC, the fledgling computer makers received private bank loans they would not otherwise have had access to.[3] For MITI, which placed many of its retired officials into top management spots at JECC, the public corporation provided an arena from which to steer the computer industry through turbulent waters. Through JECC, MITI quelled price wars, rationalized development efforts, and spurred the sales of domestic computers. With the strategy and government backing of a public corporation, and the profit, loss, and product constraints of a private company, JECC maintained a strategic balance between subsidizing the firms and pressuring them to make better computers. As part of a package of sophisticated industrial policy tools, including cooperative research and development (R&D) projects, generous subsidies, and a heavy protectionist hand, JECC played a key role in the emergence of a competitive computer industry.[4]

The creation of JECC was not the result of superior insight into the market mechanism and industrial development on the part of Japanese bureaucrats. Instead, it was the outcome of a dialectic between the opposing forces of a government's desire to control and the private sector's desire to be independent. Negotiations over JECC's establishment and operations show that the process of reaching consensus in Japan is not always as smooth as commonly believed. Indeed, compromises made by both the computer makers and various government agencies in the JECC case suggest that the development of Japan's targeted industries has been the result of a complex interaction of public and private forces rather than having been either state-led or private-sector-led.

In 1960, when government and business leaders decided to promote a domestic computer industry, MITI proposed the creation of JECC as a national policy company that would plan computer production, rent computers, research large-scale computers, and promote programming. JECC would allot the development of parts of large-scale computers — mainframes, terminals, peripherals — to different firms, which would create prototypes. After purchasing the prototypes, JECC would commercialize them.[5] JECC would function as an institution of central planning for the industry.

[2] *JECC 10 Nenshi* (Ten Year History of JECC) (Tōkyō: JECC, 1973), 50–51; and *JECC Kompyūta Nōto* (JECC Computer Notes) (Tōkyō: JECC, annual). Unless otherwise noted, the exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar is used for years through 1970, 330 for 1971–1975, 200 for 1976–1981, and 240 for 1982–1985.

[3] Interview with Ishiguro Ryūji, director of the Japan Development Bank's Center for Research on Investment in Plant and Equipment, 12 November 1984.

[4] For an analysis of the other policy tools used to promote the industry, see Marie Anchordoguy, *The State and the Market: Industrial Policy Towards Japan's Computer Industry*, unpublished diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1986.

[5] "JECC Monogatari" (The JECC Story) in *Kokusan Denshi Keisanki Nyūzu* (Domestic Computer News), (Tōkyō: JECC), segment 7, no. 123, 1 April 1980, 3; segment 5, no. 121, 1 February 1980, 3; and segment 11, no. 127, 1 August 1980, 8.

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MITI's idea seemed to make sense: by avoiding redundant research and gaining scales of production, Japan would be better positioned to stand up to IBM. To cement the ties between the national policy firm and the private companies, MITI called for joint capitalization of JECC—half government, half private sector—and recommended that the private sector contribute engineers and the government long-term low-interest loans to the national policy company.

As it turned out, the Japanese companies fiercely resisted MITI's move, pointing to the deleterious impact the plan would have on competition. Kozakabashi Shojiro, a section chief at Toshiba, complained:

> The plan for a national policy company is aimed at promoting the development of [our backward] computer industry; but the kind of cooperative work [proposed by MITI] would only nip the bud of the free development that has already started.[6]

To counter MITI's proposal, NEC President Kobayashi Kōji suggested that each firm manufacture its own computers but that the government purchase and resell them.[7] Other industry people recommended that the government's Japan Development Bank (JDB) lend money to each firm to set up its own rental system. For the companies, the ideal was an independent industry receiving subsidies through low-interest government loans and guaranteed government purchases. But the Ministry of Finance (MOF), with tight control over the nation's purse strings, balked at the idea of supplying the enormous amount of funds necessary to maintain a national computer monopoly and was even more opposed to giving separate grants to each company.[8] As a compromise of the MITI, MOF, and private sector proposals, JECC was established as a centralized but private joint-venture computer rental company capitalized by seven firms. While the government could use JECC to coordinate prices and influence the types of machines the makers produced, it would in exchange offer low-interest loans to JECC to enable it to purchase computers from the private companies that joined JECC. The companies were left to compete in researching, commercializing, and marketing their computer products.

The JECC system worked in the following way. After a user made an agreement with a computer maker for a specific machine at a monthly fee set in consultation with JECC, the user signed a rental agreement with JECC, which then purchased the computer from the maker and rented it to the user. Users were required to keep the computer for at least fifteen months, after which they could trade it in for a new one at no penalty. When a computer was traded in, the maker had to buy it back from JECC at the remaining book value.

While marketing the computers was primarily the responsibility of the individual makers, JECC buttressed their efforts substantially by advertising itself as a renter of domestic machines at low monthly fees and by publishing extensively about

[6] Ibid., cited in segment 12, no. 128, 1 September 1980.
[7] Ibid., segment 7.
[8] Ibid., segment 23, no. 139 and 140, 16 August 1981, 8.

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the benefits of using computers. Moreover, JECC's management of the rental system took a huge administrative burden off the shoulders of each computer maker.

Only seven companies joined JECC, despite the fact that fifteen companies originally contracted with IBM for its basic patents.[9] A MITI committee of people from government, industry, and academia had concluded that success in the computer industry would require access to vast amounts of capital, which only the seven large, experienced electric and telecommunications firms would be capable of generating.[10] MITI believed that the computer industry could only support a few profitable firms: excessive competition would lead to redundant investment and cutthroat pricing, and thereby discourage firms from investing. Not surprisingly, the firms that joined JECC are Japan's primary computer makers today; the one exception is Matsushita, which withdrew from the computer industry in 1964 after IBM announced a new, technologically advanced series of computers. Matsushita was known for paying closer attention to short-term profits than other Japanese firms. One of the reasons for its withdrawal, according to Matsushita Konosuke, was that seven companies were too many, "about three firms would be appropriate for the computer industry."[11]

Strategic industry decisions were made by a committee of industry people, academics, and bureaucrats with expertise in diverse areas such as policy making, business, and computer technology. This committee recommended that JECC initially focus on low-priced small computers in order to avoid direct competitive clashes with IBM. This strategy not only allowed the Japanese makers to capture a niche that IBM was more willing to relinquish, but also focused the industry's scarce resources on the smallest, most simple machines. Technological expertise and scale economies gained in these products would give Japan a foothold from which to gradually expand upscale. This approach contrasted sharply with that of the French, who focused on top-of-the-line technologically-sophisticated machines that failed to appeal to a broader market. From the beginning the Japanese were interested in a marketable computer, not a national status symbol.

There were three key prices that set the parameters of this artificial market. First, the monthly rental fee was important, because it was the basis of competition between domestic and foreign makers. Second, the price for which JECC bought a computer from the maker was critical because it determined the firm's revenue. Lastly, the book value of computers was important, because the makers had to buy back from JECC at remaining book value machines that had been traded in. The method of depreciation—which determined the book value remaining after a given rental period—had a direct impact on the firms' cash flow.

[9] Ibid., segment 5, 3.

[10] Ibid., segment 9, no. 125, 1 June 1980, 2. While it is not clear which specific firms unsuccessfully lobbied MITI for membership in JECC, interviews and documents suggest that MITI intentionally used JECC to limit the number and size of firms that entered the mainframe computer market. Fifteen firms initially signed a contract with IBM for its patents, suggesting that they intended to enter the field of computers.

[11] *Kompyūtopia*, monthly magazine on the computer industry, December 1974, 94.

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There was no debate over how to set the first price—the monthly rental fee; MITI, JECC, and the computer makers agreed that it had to be set substantially lower than IBM's in order to be competitive. Indeed, even though their production costs were substantially higher and production scale far lower than IBM's, the Japanese makers had to rent their machines at prices 40 percent lower than comparable IBMs in order to attract customers.[12] The other two prices were open to negotiation. Giving the makers their return on investment in advance by purchasing their machines and renting them to the public was JECC's primary method of subsidizing the industry. But the price for which JECC purchased machines from the makers and the price at which the makers would have to buy back from JECC the machines that were traded in would determine how large that subsidy would actually be.

The computer makers naturally wanted to sell their machines to JECC for as high a price as possible—as much as fifty times the monthly rental fee—in order to get more up-front cash; but for JECC, the higher the price, the more money it would need to borrow. MITI, concerned with JECC's survival as an institution, and MOF, concerned with JECC's annual requirements for low-interest loans, fought to keep prices at a level that would subsidize the firms without bankrupting JECC. They finally settled on forty-four, a level similar to IBM's at the time.[13] Later, however, when IBM cut its sales prices to only twenty-five to thirty times the monthly fee to attract more computer sales than rentals, JECC continued to purchase Japanese computers for a costlier forty-four times the monthly fee. Thus, the makers have continued to receive huge amounts of up-front cash through the JECC system at a time when, in a free market, they would have been forced to slash prices to compete with IBM. The computer makers naturally enjoyed this favorable multiplier, but it squeezed JECC's profits, forcing the government to continue supplying low-interest loans to the rental company. A JECC official explained that JECC's profits were intentionally kept low because the computer makers—JECC's shareholders—preferred that JECC buy their machines at high prices to supply them with more cash in advance.[14]

While as a public corporation JECC could funnel substantial subsidies in the form of up-front cash to the makers, its responsibilities as a private corporation required that it post at least a meager profit and repay its loans on schedule. Thus, while JECC purchased the makers' machines at high prices, when users traded the machines in, the makers had to buy them back at the remaining book value—the value of the machine after depreciation. In effect the firms received up-front cash, which they then had to pay back when their machines were traded in; the system penalized firms whose machines were returned after a short rental period.

[12] *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan* (Electronic Industry yearbook) (Tōkyō: Dempa Shimbunsha, 1962), 154–158.

[13] "JECC Monogatari," segment 21, 1 February 1982, 8.

[14] Various discussions with Hirose Kōichi, deputy manager of JECC's Research Division; Interview of Ishii Yoshiaki, general manager of JECC's Research Division, 19 July 1984.

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In order to minimize this buyback book value, the companies tried to persuade JECC to use the accelerated depreciation method. In comparison with the slower straightline method, JECC would depreciate more in the early years, thereby reducing the book value remaining when a user traded in the computer two or three years later. The government balked: while faster depreciation would decrease the book value for which firms had to buy back machines, it would also push JECC into the red, especially in the early years, because depreciation is treated as an expense. MITI and MOF wanted JECC to depend as much as possible on private banks for loans; in fact, they wanted to shift the entire burden of renting computers to the private sector as soon as the market allowed. If JECC ran at a loss, the ministries reasoned, private banks would be reluctant to grant it loans. To prevent JECC from running at a loss, the government decided that JECC would use the slower straightline method of depreciation over six years[15] and that any potential losses would have to be borne by the makers themselves.

Thus, although JECC subsidized the industry with substantial up-front cash and low-interest loans, the constraints on it as a private corporation would not allow it to use a depreciation method that would favor the firms at the risk of bankrupting itself. These private sector constraints—JECC's depreciation and trade-in practices—put considerable pressure on the firms. By allowing users to trade in machines after fifteen months, JECC pressured the makers to continuously offer improved computers lest their competitors take away their customers. But offering new models every fifteen months inevitably made existing models obsolete before a sufficient return had been made on them to cover costs, let alone to provide a profit. There was only one way the companies could alleviate this vicious cycle: by offering models that made major improvements on existing machines, users would be more likely to keep domestic machines for longer than the average two and a half years. This would allow the firms to introduce fewer models at a slower pace, thereby enabling them to receive a greater return on a given model before it became obsolete. By having JECC function like a private company in terms of depreciation and trade-in practices, the government forced the makers to confront early on a perennial problem in the computer industry: how to manage the pace at which they introduced technologically-advanced computers in order to be profitable in the long run. This tension between technological advancement and profit runs like a thread through the history of computer development: firms constantly have to evaluate whether to delay the introduction of new advanced machines until they get a better return on their existing ones.

The 1960s: Creating an Artificial Market for Domestic Computers

Through its control over JECC, the government was able to shape the parameters of the emerging domestic computer market. With JECC renting computers for

[15] *Kompyūtopia*, December 1973, 26–27.

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low monthly fees, the percentage of domestic machines rented and the overall supply and demand for domestic machines surged. Before JECC was created only 4 percent of domestic machines were rented; this jumped to 46 percent two years after its establishment and to 78 percent by 1965.[16] The growth rate of the market for domestic computers far outstripped that of IBM and other foreign makers, despite the fact that Japanese computers were considered substantially inferior to their western counterparts until the mid-1970s. With growth of 67 percent in computer purchases from 1961 to 1962, domestic makers enjoyed a 203 percent jump from ¥2.4 billion (yen) to ¥7.3 billion ($20.4 million), while foreign firms increased only 36 percent from ¥10.8 billion to ¥14.8 billion ($41 million). By 1965 the Japanese firms overtook foreign firms in market share, increasing 51 percent to ¥26.9 billion ($74.7 million) while foreign firms gained a mere 3 percent to ¥24.6 billion ($68.4 million).[17]

In addition to stimulating the demand and supply of domestic computers, JECC acted as a conduit of huge, but relatively invisible government funds to the firms. This financing freed the computer makers from having to take on the large loans they would have needed to rent machines themselves and also supplied them with an immediate return on investment. Had the firms run their own rental systems, they would not only have had to provide financing for computer users but would have also received their return on a machine in meager payments spread over forty-four months. Receiving the money for a sale immediately from JECC had a dramatic impact on their cash flow. For example, when Fujitsu sold $63.6 million of computers to JECC in 1969, it received the total amount immediately from JECC. Had it rented its own machines, Fujitsu would have received only $17.3 million (twelve-forty-fourths) in 1969 and been stuck with financing the remaining $46.3 million. This vital up-front cash enabled the makers to concentrate their efforts and resources on production, quality, technology, and cost.

It is impossible to calculate definitively the importance of JECC to the firms. Nonetheless, we can estimate the benefit during the 1961–1969 period by calculating the subsidies implicit in low-interest JDB loans and in receiving an early return on investment. The subsidy implicit in low-interest JDB loans is the difference between the interest JECC paid on JDB loans and the estimate of what the firms would have had to pay if they had borrowed the money at the prime rate from private financial institutions. This subsidy amounted to ¥2.02 billion ($5.61 million) during the period from 1961 to 1969.[18]

The benefit of receiving their return on investment immediately under the JECC system can be estimated by comparing the firms' cash flow in the 1960s under the JECC rental system—¥217.3 billion—with the hypothetical cash flow they would have had under their own rental system—¥120.3 billion.[19] JECC thus plowed

[16] *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan*, 1970–71, 180.
[17] *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, 1970, 52.
[18] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 380–383.
[19] For a complete analysis see ibid., 150–151. Estimated cash flow under JECC is calculated by

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an additional ¥97 billion ($269.44 million) in up-front cash to the makers.[20] In the 1960s this up-front cash, which was essentially an interest-free loan, constituted an ¥8.1 billion ($22.5 million) subsidy; this is what the firms would have had to pay in interest if they had borrowed the up-front cash from private banks at the prime rate.[21] By giving the makers up-front cash, JECC made it possible for them to invest heavily to improve their computers. Indeed, if they had rented their own computers, receiving a cash flow of ¥120.3 billion, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to invest the ¥103.9 billion they plowed into R&D and plant and equipment during the 1960s.[22] Had they done so, they would have only had ¥16.4 billion ($45.6 million) remaining to cover production and overhead costs.

The crux of the issue, however, is whether the firms could have obtained enough loans from private sources to finance their own rentals and if they could have, whether they would have been willing to invest such exorbitant sums in the risky computer business. While impossible to prove, the evidence suggests that it is highly unlikely that the firms, with the possible exception of Hitachi, would have been able to acquire sufficient loans. Even JECC, with strong government backing, was not able to attract adequate loans from the private sector. To assure JECC access to capital, MITI and the Japan Development Bank established a system of cooperative financing (kyōchō yūshi). Under this system, which was used to promote other strategic industries, representatives of the government, JECC, and JDB met several times annually with a group of banks to negotiate loans adequate for JECC to rent domestic computers. In the early 1960s, private sources were only willing to match JDB loans; later, the burden has been approximately 40 percent on the JDB, 60 percent on private sources.[23] Each private bank only lent a small amount to JECC in order to minimize its risk. A high-level JDB official said in an interview that the JDB guaranteed loans that private financial institutions made to JECC in the 1960s.[24] But even with this guarantee, private banks were only willing to maintain—not substantially increase—their level of loans to JECC when the market boomed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, JECC was forced to search overseas for the funds needed to support computer rentals.

Since a JDB guarantee was needed to induce private banks to lend to the government-backed JECC in the 1960s, it is highly unlikely that private banks

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subtracting the depreciated value of computer trade-ins to JECC from sales to JECC. The hypothetical cash flow under the firms' own rental system is estimated by subtracting the depreciated value of computer trade-ins from the rental income the firms would have received had they rented computers themselves.

[20] Ibid., 152. This is calculated by subtracting the estimated cash flow under JECC (¥217.3 billion) from the hypothetical cash flow under the firms' own rental system (¥120.3 billion).

[21] This is calculated by multiplying the annual amount of up-front cash provided by JECC (totaling ¥97 billion between 1961–1969) by the annual prime rate. Prime rate data is from the *Economics Statistics Annual*, Research and Statistics Department, The Bank of Japan, annual.

[22] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 78.

[23] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 50–51, 59.

[24] Interview of Ishiguro Ryuji.

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would have made the huge loans the computer firms needed, especially given that such loans would have tightly pinched the makers' balance sheets and income statements. To rent their own machines in the 1960s, the firms would have needed at least ¥140.42 billion—the amount that JECC borrowed from 1961 to 1969.[25] But the industry only invested ¥103.9 billion in plant and equipment and R&D during this period;[26] they would have had to more than double their investment in order to rent their own computers. Could the firms have borrowed that much money and, even if they could, would they have been willing to invest it in a computer rental system?

Fujitsu, for example, whose machines accounted for 25 percent of JECC's purchases from 1961 to 1969, would have had to borrow about 25 percent as much as JECC did to finance the rentals of its machines; it would have needed an extra ¥35.1 billion, thereby doubling its long-term loans of ¥29.34 billion in this period and pushing up its already high debt-equity ratio.[27]

It is not only improbable that the firms could have borrowed enough money, but also that they would have decided to enter the risky computer business. Indeed, JECC manipulated the market to make firms view entry as profitable in the long run. Even with JECC, most of the firms' computer divisions were in the red until the late 1960s;[28] without JECC and the government backing it provided, they would have lost even more money. Had they entered, they, like RCA and GE of the United States, would have been under considerable financial pressure to withdraw from the risky business. They had little knowledge and experience in the field, and their computers were far inferior to their foreign counterparts. Who would lend money to firms operating in such a risky environment and what firms would be willing to invest their scarce resources in such a losing venture?

JECC's financial backing was vital to the industry's development. But the national policy rental company also buttressed the industry in other ways. In consultation with MITI and the computer makers, JECC set computer rental prices to prevent domestic price competition. The makers already had to sell at a loss to compete with IBM; the last thing the government and the industry wanted was for prices to be whittled away further by price competition among domestic makers.

In addition to setting the prices of domestic computers, JECC also required that all rental machines have its approval.[29] Since both JECC and the computer makers were interested in renting the type of computers that users desired, market demand and production costs were the primary determinants of the machines that JECC approved. Nonetheless, JECC did use this discretion at times to pressure

[25] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 50–51, 59.

[26] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 78.

[27] Fujitsu annual financial reports; Dokusen Bunseki Kenkyūkai, *Nihon no Dokusen Kigyō (Japan's Monopolistic Enterprises)*, vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Shin Nihon Shuppankai, 1969), 292; *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan*, 1979, 447; and *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, 1979, 377.

[28] Nikkō Shōken Kabushiki Gaisha Chōsabu, *Tōshi Geppō* (Investment Monthly) (Tōkyō: Nikko Shōken Kabushiki Gaisha), February 1969, 46.

[29] "JECC Monogatari," segment 23.

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the makers to produce certain types of machines before market demand and production costs warranted such a strategy. For example, as the firms became competitive in small machines, JECC shifted its support from the rental of small computers to medium- and large-scale ones, thereby encouraging the makers to increase their efforts to produce larger, more sophisticated machines.

JECC also used this discretion to compel the makers to manufacture computer parts locally rather than import parts from their foreign affiliates and assemble them domestically. Initially, JECC was willing to rent the computers of companies having at least 51 percent Japanese equity; however, in April 1968 MITI shifted the criteria from equity to local content, requiring that JECC only rent computers having at least 90 percent domestic content.[30] JECC warned the makers that it would not rent imitations of their foreign affiliates' computers: the makers had to make large design changes. The firms balked, complaining that it would be too difficult to meet these requirements.[31] But MITI did not budge. Consequently, firms were not able to register some of their computers with JECC. Oki, for example, delayed applying to JECC for its OUK 9000 series until it could raise the local content, and JECC deferred approval of ten Hitachi machines until 90 percent of their content was domestic.[32] The new local content requirement gave Fujitsu, which did not have a technological cooperation agreement with a foreign firm, a competitive advantage and placed Oki, which depended on its 51–49 percent joint venture with Sperry Rand for UNIVAC computers, at a significant disadvantage.

JECC thus worked in various ways to influence competition in the emerging computer market. As a public corporation it subsidized the companies, yet as a private company that needed to survive the demands of the marketplace, it pressured the computer makers to advance technologically and cut costs. Its dual public-private objectives forced a balance: JECC gave enough assistance to allow domestic firms to make the investment necessary to become competitive, but did not shelter them to the extent that they could afford to become fat and inefficient. JECC influenced firms' decisions at the margin.

Maintaining this delicate balance was no simple task. In the late 1960s JECC confronted its first serious conflict between supporting the industry on the one hand, and pressuring them to advance on the other. The conflict started when the firms, in response to IBM's introduction of a new advanced series of computers, were pressured to introduce new models earlier than they would have liked. Introducing new models inevitably meant having to buy back the machines that customers traded in for the new models. This resulted in a deluge of trade-ins that threatened to destroy the industry. The ratio of the value of machines that the firms had to buy back to their new sales reached dangerous levels in the late 1960s:

[30] *Dempa Shimbun* (Electric Waves News), 4 April 1967, 2.
[31] Ibid., 22 April 1967, 2; *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan's Economic News), 30 December 1968.
[32] Ibid., 28 April 1968, 4.

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24.3 percent in 1966, 30.8 percent in 1967, 23.1 percent in 1968.[33] As the situation deteriorated, MITI, JECC, and the makers responded with various strategies to help the firms curtail their buyback burden. To decrease the book value of traded-in computers, JECC shortened the economic life of its computers for depreciation purposes from six years to five years, four months in 1967; to counterbalance the negative impact of this on JECC's profits, the government cut the JDB interest rate on loans to JECC from 8.2 percent to 7.5 percent.[34]

The makers also tried to drum up customers for used computers, most of which remained in inventory after having been traded in; but Japanese users insisted on renting new machines. The government and the makers also tried to encourage firms to purchase rather than rent small computers. To do so, they established an installment payment system for small computers worth under ¥50 million in 1966. MITI negotiated with the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Long Term Credit Bank on behalf of the firms and persuaded them to each lend ¥3 billion ($8.33 million) to finance the system.[35] But this endeavor proved to be futile. Begun on 1 October 1966, the system's first sale was not until 17 October and that was of a Fujitsu computer to Fujitsu itself.[36] This failure underlined the necessity of a rental system; with technology changing rapidly, users were not willing to purchase computers even if they could make payments over several years.

The government also established a Reserve for Computer Buyback Losses in 1968, which allowed computer firms to place 10 percent of the sales price of a computer they sold into a tax-free reserve to cushion themselves against losses incurred when their computers were traded in. In cases when computers were traded in after only two or three years of use, causing the firms to incur a loss, this reserve allowed them to deduct this loss from the reserve fund, thereby mitigating its effects. Money remaining in the reserve had to be added back to income after five years. By permitting the companies to put aside money in a tax-free reserve, this system allowed them to take a tax write-off sooner rather than later, and thereby provided them with additional up-front cash.[37] For 1968 and 1969, this resulted in decreased tax revenues for the government (up-front cash for the firms) of ¥3.7 billion ($10.28 million).[38]

[33] Denshikeisanki Sangyō Chōsa Iinkai, ed., *Waga Kuni no Denshi Keisanki Sangyō Mondai Ten to Sono Taisaku* (Policies to Deal with the Problems of Our Country's Computer Industry) (Tōkyō: Nihon Denshi Kōgyō Shinkō Kyōkai, 1970), section 4, 29.

[34] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* 4 July 1967; *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan,* 1971–72, 83.

[35] *Denshi Shijō Yōran* (Survey of the Computer Market) (Tōkyō: Kagaku Shimbun, 1972–3), 235–6; *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* 22 September 1966.

[36] Ibid., 18 October 1966.

[37] Nihon Jōhō Shori Kaihatsu Kyōkai, ed., *Kompyūta Hakusho* (The Computer White Paper) (Tōkyō: Kompyūta Eiji Sha, 1969), 44; Jimmy Wheeler, Merit E. Janow, and Thomas Pepper, *Japanese Industrial Development Policies in the 1980s* (New York: Hudson Institute, 1982), 96, 142.

[38] *Zeisei Chōsa Kai* (Tax System Survey Committee) (Tōkyō: Kihon Mondai Koiinkai, Ministry of Finance, 1970), 31.

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The buyback problem would not have reached crisis proportions if the government had simply poured vast sums into the industry to help the firms cope. But it did not. MOF was not willing to allocate to JECC the huge extra sums necessary to support the booming market. Ironically, JECC's success in stimulating the supply and demand for computers meant that JECC had to buy an ever increasing number of computers to maintain rentals of 65 percent of the nation's machines. This could not go on forever. While JECC's *raison d'etre* was to purchase machines from the makers and rent them to users, the industry's explosive growth, far greater than expected, ultimately stretched JECC's financial resources to the limit. Indeed, according to its original plan, which assumed that the industry would be able to carry most of the burden of rentals in the late 1960s, JECC was to maintain but not increase its financial support of the industry after 1965.[39] A JECC official explained, however, that it became clear to the government early on that the industry would need more long-term assistance because of the high costs and risks of operating in the industry.[40] To get the extra funds necessary to continue purchasing an ever increasing number of computers from the makers, JECC was forced to scrounge around the world for funds. Unable to obtain sufficient loans, JECC gradually went into debt to the computer companies in the late 1960s. This debt reached ¥43.4 billion at the end of fiscal 1969.[41]

The firms, struggling to cope with the flood of computers that had been traded in, were furious that JECC could not pay them immediately for their computers. Takara Yoshimitsu, then vice president of Fujitsu, said:

> After the war, there were broad promotion policies taken to promote basic industries such as shipping and steel; the computer industry is the nucleus of the seventies. It is a private industry. If the government does not give us more money, we will be controlled by foreign capital [firms] . . . If they'd only give us money, we'd export or consolidate our firms. But first we must settle the problem of money.[42]

Similarly, NEC president, Kobayashi Kōji, argued "without army provisions [Japan Development Bank money] we cannot fight the foreign makers."[43] Kato Teruyoshi of NEC pleaded for the government to supply JECC with more finds: "We beg you to make your greatest efforts to assist us with funds."[44]

It is not surprising that the firms would complain; it was clearly not to their advantage to have JECC owe them money. But the debt was only temporary, brought on by a sudden sharp increase in the demand for new computers. Rather than having JECC close up shop, MITI decided to have the companies bear the burden until it could gather the funds necessary to alleviate the problem. Even though

[39] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 26.
[40] Interview of Ishii Yoshiaki.
[41] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 51.
[42] *Dempa Shimbun*, 27 December 1969, 2.
[43] *Tōyō Keizai Shūkan* (Oriental Economist Weekly), 24 January 1970, 42.
[44] *Ekonomisuto* (The Economist), 12 May 1970, 22.

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the firms were not temporarily receiving up-front cash in a tangible form, they still received the benefit of JECC on paper and knew that this would ultimately be translated into cash.

Having the firms bear the burden of JECC's cash crisis marked the beginning of the government's move to force the firms to shoulder more of the burden of financing rentals. Indeed, not only did the government not yield to the firms' demands that JECC immediately pay off its debt, it also pressured the companies further, demanding that they increase their equity in JECC by 33 percent in 1967. "But what was JECC established for?" asked the firms.[45] Nonetheless, they finally agreed to contribute more capital. Ultimately, the JDB did substantially boost its loans to JECC to help alleviate the national policy company's financial bind. In 1969 it lent ¥18 billion, more than double its 1968 amount (¥8 billion); in 1970, it increased its loans to JECC by 28 percent; and in 1971 it lent ¥41 billion, 78 percent more than it lent in 1970.[46] An increasingly larger proportion of the JDB budget went to JECC when the crisis became severe in 1969, and the JDB also started to guarantee loans from overseas banks.[47] By the end of 1970 the JDB was guaranteeing a total of ¥4 billion ($11.13 million) in foreign currency loans for JECC.[48] This increase in JDB assistance, however, by no means kept up with the rapidly expanding market for domestic machines.

Despite these efforts by both the firms and the government, the firms were still laden with heavy buybacks and JECC was strapped for cash at the end of the 1960s. The government, unwilling to inject JECC with a massive dose of money, had taken a stance: it was willing to help the computer makers help themselves, but not to grant JECC the huge loans it would need to continue financing rentals of the majority of domestic machines. The government started to gradually dismantle parts of the artificial market it had so carefully constructed. If the firms were to become internationally competitive, they would have to commit more of their own resources. The future of both the national policy company and the industry it had helped nurture were on the line.

1970s AND 1980s: SHIFTING THE RENTAL BURDEN TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

When the computer market started to expand rapidly in the early 1970s, the government gradually withdrew, in relative terms, its financing of computer rentals through JECC. Consequently, the proportion of domestic rentals financed by JECC plummeted from an average of 65 percent in the 1960s, to 30 percent in the 1970s, and

[45] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 4 July 1967; *Nihon Dokusen Kigyō*, vol. 5, 1971, 277.

[46] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 50–51, 59; *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, annual; and internal documents without titles given to author by the JDB.

[47] *JECC 10 Nenshi*, 60–62.

[48] *Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkō Tōkei Yōran* (Japan Development Bank Summary of Statistics) (Tōkyō: JDB, 1971), 400.

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11 percent by the early 1980s.[49] By gradually weaning the makers from their addiction to the JECC system, the government helped alleviate both JECC's financial crisis and the makers' buyback burden. Indeed, the buyback problem stemmed in part from a fundamental flaw in the JECC system: by giving the firms their return in advance, JECC made them vulnerable to plummeting profits in periods when heavy trade-ins were coupled with slow market growth. If a company rented its own computers rather than selling them to a firm like JECC, it could establish a stable flow of revenue that would not fluctuate much even in periods of sluggish growth or heavy trade-ins. By giving the makers little option but to decrease their dependency on JECC, the government not only started to shift the burden to the computer makers, it also helped them stabilize their revenue and profits.

MITI and MOF also started to demand more of the firms in exchange for the benefits of JECC. In the early 1970s, for example, they demanded that the six firms team up in three groups in exchange for JDB loans to JECC. Ministry of Finance officials argued that the government should not give so much money to support one firm like JECC when there are "six makers selfishly competing with one another."[50] In exchange for consolidating into three groups for a cooperative R&D project, the government helped shore up JECC in the early 1970s, lending ¥41 billion in 1971, ¥11.5 billion in 1973, ¥46 billion in 1975, and ¥53.5 billion in 1978.[51]

Most of the government's efforts, however, were aimed at helping the makers decrease their dependence on JECC. In 1970, for example, the government had JECC stop renting small computers, based on the rationale that the makers could afford to rent or users to buy inexpensive small computers; scarce government funds were to be used to support the rentals of the machines that were the least competitive with IBM—medium- and large-scale computers.

Two new tax measures prodded users to purchase rather than rent machines. One, enacted in 1970, allowed computer buyers to depreciate 20 percent of the cost of a computer in the first year. With the legal lifetime of a computer set at six years, the declining balance depreciation method allowed a firm to depreciate 31.9 percent of a computer in the first year. By combining this with the 20 percent special depreciation, users could depreciate over 50 percent of the cost of a new computer in the first year.[52] This 20 percent allowance was raised in 1972 to 25 percent of the cost in the first year, which together with the allowable declining balance method meant that a user could depreciate almost 60 percent of the cost of a computer in the first year.[53] The other new tax measure, passed in 1972, cut

[49] Calculated using data from *JECC Kompyūta Nōto* 1979, 10–11, 377; *Nihon no Dokusen Kigyō*, vol. 1, 292; *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan*, 1979, 447; and *Kompyūta Warudo* (Computer World), 31 May 1982, 21.

[50] *Tōyō Keizai Shūkan*, 24 January 1970, 42.

[51] *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, annual; and internal documents without titles given to author by the JDB.

[52] *Kokusan Denshi Keisanki Nyūzu*, 12 December 1970, 1.

[53] *Kompyūta Hakusho*, 1972, 117–120; 1975, 57–58.

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by one-third the fixed asset tax applied to computers to encourage purchases over rentals. Like the special depreciation measures, this one also targeted medium- and large-scale computers.[54]

The buyback loss reserve, created by the government in 1968 to allow the firms to put 10 percent of their computer sales revenues into a tax-free reserve, was increased to 15 percent of their computer sales revenues in 1970 and to 20 percent in 1972. From 1971 this reserve was allowed for any Japanese firm renting computers, not just JECC. Foreign companies with Japanese operations, such as IBM Japan or Burroughs Japan, were categorized as foreign firms and thus were not eligible for the benefits of this tax measure. This resulted in ¥56 billion ($205.55 million) in decreased government tax revenues (up-front cash flow to the makers) from 1970 through 1981.[55] In addition, from 1973 the government provided subsidies so that Chamber of Commerce offices could buy computers that had been traded in. This subsidy, which totaled ¥2.71 billion ($10.35 million) from 1973–1980, helped cut the makers' load by providing them with a market for their used machines.[56]

Despite these efforts, trade-ins continued to destabilize the makers' income. In years of heavy sales to JECC, income surged; but in slow growth years when trade-ins were high, it plummeted. The cash flow under JECC from 1970–1981 was more volatile than it would have been if the firms had their own rental system;[57] indeed, while it takes substantial capital to start a rental system, once it is in operation, the system supplies a stable flow of revenue that in some years can equal or even exceed that under a system like JECC in which the firms sell their machines to a rental firm.

Although the cash flow was somewhat volatile, up-front cash through the system continued to be substantial in the 1970s—some ¥127.16 billion ($495 million);[58] but it was small relative to what the makers had received in the earlier period. Moreover, in 1978 and 1979 they would have actually received more under their own hypothetical rental system than under JECC.[59]

One might suspect that with diminished up-front cash, the firms would have been better off switching to their own rental system in the 1970s; but they would not have been. Indeed, the benefit of ¥127.16 billion in up-front cash under the JECC system is calculated on the assumption that the firms started their system in 1961 and built it up over the decade to a stable system in the 1970s. It would

[54] *Computer White Paper* (Tōkyō: Japan Information Processing Development Center, 1973), 24.

[55] *Zeisei Chōsa Kai, Zen Shiryō Shū* (Tax System Survey Committee, Collection of Complete Documents) (Tōkyō: Gendai Burein), annual; *Zeisei Chōsa Kai, Kankei Shiryō Shū* (Collection of Documents related to the Tax System Survey Committee) (Tōkyō: Zeisei Chōsa Kai, Ministry of Finance), annual.

[56] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 243, 294.

[57] The method for calculating the estimated cash flow under JECC and the hypothetical cash flow under the firms' own rental system is explained in fn. 19. For full analaysis see ibid., 172–173.

[58] Ibid., 174. See fn. 20 for explanation of the method of calculation.

[59] Ibid.

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not have been to the firms' advantage to start a rental system in 1970. A comparison of their cash flow under JECC from 1970 to 1975—¥393.2 billion—with an estimate of what it would have been if they had set up their own rental system in 1970—¥227 billion[60]—shows that the firms would have still received a decidedly higher flow of up-front cash under JECC—¥166.2 billion or $503.6 million.[61] This underscores the heavy load on a firm in the first few years of setting up a rental system.

The firms did not, however, face the all-or-nothing option of going through JECC or through their own rental system. JECC was still willing to finance a substantial, though reduced amount of rentals. The firms thus took a route midway, relying on JECC for some rentals and renting some machines on their own. With the exception of Hitachi, the makers continued to rely on JECC to rent some 40 percent of their computers in the early 1970s and 19 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[62] Hitachi, the only maker with access to the enormous amount of capital necessary to set up a rental system, started to rent its own computers in the early 1970s, drastically curtailing its dependence on JECC. The objective of Hitachi's dramatic shift, according to Nakamura Noboru, a board member of Hitachi, was to establish a steady flow of revenue such that even in recessions and periods of excessive trade-ins they would still earn income in their computer division. They felt it was better to receive profits as they earned them rather than in advance.[63]

This decision was not without substantial cost. The injection of a massive dose of capital into the system caused heavy losses in Hitachi's computer division. Mita Katsushige, senior managing director of Hitachi, explained that when Hitachi started the rental system, computer division expenses had to be paid with profits from other divisions: "A large deficit occurred [in computers], but looking from the outside, no one knew because it was covered by other profits."[64]

The other firms did not have Hitachi's prerogative; they did not have numerous profitable divisions from which to siphon profits into computers. Moreover, computers accounted for a far greater proportion of their total business than the 7.4 percent it accounted for in Hitachi's sales. In 1973, for example, just as Hitachi's system got into full swing, the electronics giant plowed ¥60 billion ($181.82 million) into rentals.[65] In that same year Fujitsu, a much tinier firm, had after-tax profits of only ¥10.7 billion. It simply could not afford to plow some ¥60 billion into financing rentals.[66]

Indeed, loans sufficient to rent all of their machines would have tightly pinched

[60] Ibid., 177.

[61] Ibid. Calculated at 330 yen to the dollar.

[62] Calculated using data from *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, 1979, 10-11, 377; *Nihon no Dokusen Kigyō*, vol. 1, 292; *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan*, 1979, 447; and *Kompyūta Warudo*, 31 May 1982, 21.

[63] *Kompyūtopia*, July 1975, 77.

[64] Iwahori Y., *Hitachi no Keiei* (Hitachi's Management) (Tōkyō: Nihon Seihan Kabushiki Gaisha, 1978), 201.

[65] Uozumi Tōru, *Kompyūta Sensō (The Computer War)* (Tōkyō: Aoya Shōten, 1979), 190.

[66] Fujitsu's March and September 1973 financial reports.

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the makers' balance sheets and income statements. JECC borrowed approximately ¥982 billion between 1970 and 1981.[67] In comparison, the Japanese makers invested a total of ¥1.2 trillion ($5.2 billion) in plant and equipment and R&D during this period;[68] they would thus have needed almost double the amount of funds to rent their own machines. It is unlikely that they could have acquired such loans, especially in the early 1970s when money was tight, JECC was struggling to obtain enough loans, and the computer industry teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. For example, Fujitsu, Japan's largest computer maker, had long-term loans of ¥128.1 billion from 1970–1981, and Fujitsu computers accounted for 39.5 percent of JECC purchases during this period.[69] Thus, if Fujitsu had wanted to set up its own rental system it would have had to borrow about ¥387.9 billion, equivalent to 39.5 percent as much as JECC borrowed during that period. It would have had to more than triple its long-term loans in the 1970s, pushing up its already high debt-equity ratio.

Despite the makers' decreased reliance on JECC in the 1970s, the rental firm still played a key role in stimulating the demand and supply of domestic machines. An average of 30 percent of all domestic machines sold or rented during the period 1970–1981 still went through JECC.[70] The financial benefits from JECC, though diminished, were still vital to the industry: JECC funneled some ¥127.16 billion ($495 million) in up-front cash—interest-free loans—to the makers from 1970–1981.[71] Had the companies borrowed an equivalent amount from a bank at the prime rate, it would have cost them ¥11.6 billion ($45.12 million) in interest.[72] The makers also received a subsidy of ¥37.7 billion ($162.3 million) implicit in JDB low-interest loans to JECC during this period.[73] Thus, although the percentage of domestic machines that JECC rented decreased sharply in the late 1970s and 1980s, JECC continued to rent, in absolute terms, many computers, thereby injecting the firms with a huge dose of interest-free loans to keep their operations afloat as they invested heavily to compete with IBM.

JECC also took on other functions over the years. While no longer necessary for the industry's survival in the 1980s, it still plays an important role. JECC pub-

[67] JECC annual financial reports; Nakae Goki, *Kompyūta Sangyō no Shijō Senryaku* (Market Strategy of the Computer Industry) (Tōkyō: Chūo Keizaisha, 1977), 292. The loans for 1976–1978 are estimated because the data is not available. They are estimated using the data for JDB loans to JECC and assuming that JDB loans accounted for 48 percent of the total loans during these three years. 48 percent is estimated by calculating the percent of JDB loans in total loans immediately before and after the 1976–1978 period.

[68] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 248, 298.

[69] Fujitsu annual reports; *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, 1979, 377; *Denshi Kōgyō Nenkan*, 1979, 447; and *Kompyūta Warudo*, 31 May 1982, 21.

[70] Calculated using data from *JECC Kompyūta Nōto*, 1979, 10–11; Shimoda Hirotsugu, *IBM to no 10 nen Sensō* (The Ten Year War with IBM) (Kyōto: PHP Kenkyūjō, 1984), 178; and *Kompyūta Warudo*, 31 May 1982, 21.

[71] See fn. 57.

[72] See fn. 18 for an explanation of how the subsidy was calculated.

[73] Anchordoguy, *State and the Market*, 380–83.

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lishes several of the most authoritative surveys and studies of the industry; it is also being used to rent software programs; its board, composed of top MITI and JDB officials and chairmen of the shareholder computer firms, remains a critical forum for government-business interaction and interfirm linkages.

Conclusion

Analysis of a nation's public corporations provides insight into how it uses the corporate form of organization to pursue its diverse objectives. In Japan the bureaucracy has created specific public policy companies for the sole purpose of targeting strategic industries. The corporate form is particularly well suited to this purpose: as a public company, it can provide financial backing; as a private corporation, it can demand that firms in the targeted industry make better products and cut costs in exchange for government aid. Moreover, as an institution separate from its parent ministry, its subsidies are largely invisible to the public eye.

One might expect that a public corporation like JECC would become a dumping ground for machines that the makers could not sell elsewhere. This did not occur, because JECC was only allowed to purchase computers that users specifically asked to rent. If no one asked to rent your computers, JECC never purchased them. Thus, those companies with the best machines received the most benefit through JECC. Responsible to both the public and private sector, JECC was able to intervene in the marketplace to spur the industry's development without sapping the individual companies' initiative and making them dependent on the government over the long term. After a resounding success in the computer industry, MITI is now using a similar system to spark the demand and supply of domestic robots.*

* I am grateful to the Fulbright-Hayes Dissertation Research Abroad Program, The Japan Foundation, and the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University for financial support. I am indebted to David Vogel, Chalmers Johnson, Richard Holton, Robert Harris, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments.

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Book Reviews

Games of Chicken: Four Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy *by David Schwartzman. New York, Praeger, 1988. 232 pp. $37.95.*

United States nuclear policy is designed to deter aggression and avoid nuclear war. There are, however, a number of paths by which a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union could begin. The central theme of *Games of Chicken* is that the United States has consistently overestimated the risk of deliberate Soviet aggression and underestimated the danger that U.S. nuclear forces might inadvertently provoke a Soviet preemptive attack in a deep crisis or conventional conflict. There is, according to Schwartzman, a professor of economics at the New School for Social Research, a constant trade-off between constructing nuclear forces and targeting doctrines that enhance deterrence and those that enhance crisis stability: a robust U.S. counterforce capability may "deter a deliberate attack," but it also "raises the risk of preemptive attack, even though it is much greater than the risk of a deliberate attack" (p.2).

The body of the book is an administration-by-administration chronological survey of the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy and force acquisition policy. Relying exclusively on recent secondary sources, Schwartzman has produced a largely unobjectionable but also unexceptional, general account of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. He correctly emphasizes that the Berlin crisis of 1948 forced a reluctant Harry Truman to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan for the use of nuclear weapons and not just a conventional defense of Western Europe. Dwight D. Eisenhower's reliance on massive retaliation and the academic critiques the policy produced are well documented. Robert S. McNamara is accurately portrayed as allowing counterforce options to continue to exist in the U.S. war plan throughout the 1960s, despite the public rhetoric emphasizing reliance on assured destruction countercity capabilities. Finally, the difficult search for limited nuclear options in the 1970s and 1980s is properly portrayed as driven, in part, by the perceived need for enhancing the credibility of the U. S. extended deterrence commitment to NATO.

Unfortunately, Schwartzman does make a number of errors on the details. He

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asserts, without providing any evidence, that Truman's concern about strict verification measures under the Baruch plan was "a sham, since Washington would have known of any Soviet violations" (p. 40). No one in the 1960s believed that McNamara "adopted the air force goal of an unlimited missile force," (p. 88) when in fact McNamara was cutting the Minuteman force from the air force recommendation of 10,000 to the eventual deployment of 1,000. Finally, DEFCON I is the highest alert level in the U.S. force readiness system, and not, as Schwartzman states, "a state of war" (p. 126).

The most serious problem with *Games of Chicken*, however, is not such minor mistakes. It is that Schwartzman never addresses two fundamental problems with his central argument. First, while the negative impact of vulnerable U.S. counterforce weapons on crisis stability is widely accepted (witness the lack of congressional support for the MX in Minuteman silos), the effect of relatively *invulnerable* accurate weapons (such as mobile ICBMs or Trident D^5 SLBMs) on crisis stability is less obvious. A Soviet preemptive strike would not destroy such U.S. forces. Schwartzman never considers the possibility, however, that U.S. counterforce capabilities that cannot be destroyed by a Soviet first-strike may reduce the central trade-off he envisions between deterrence and crisis stability.

Second, Schwartzman pays virtually no attention to the history of improvements in the management of U.S. nuclear operations. Given the very large number of nuclear weapons that would survive and be able to retaliate after either a Soviet or American counterforce first strike, changes to the nuclear balance may have only a marginal effect on the already low likelihood of a preemptive attack. The way the United States operates nuclear forces in a crisis would, however, have a significant impact on the likelihood that the USSR might believe the United States was about to strike. There have been significant steps in the past decades to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war or a mistaken decision to launch a preemptive strike. If the author, for example, had examined the decisions to deploy PAL locks on U.S. nuclear weapons, to create an improved hotline between Moscow and Washington, to end the daily flying of airborne B-52 bomber alert missions, or to improve the reliability of U.S. warning systems, he would have perhaps given different administrations at least a modicum of credit for recognizing and reducing the danger of crisis instability.

SCOTT D. SAGAN
Stanford University

The Soviet Theory of International Relations *by Margot Light. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988. 376 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $15.95.*

The tendency to downplay or even to ignore Soviet theory in American analyses of Soviet policy is, perhaps, understandable. Over the long years of what is now termed the cult of the personality of Josef Stalin, and the period of acknowledged

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stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev, theory was indeed generally relegated to routine recapitulations of increasingly irrelevant doctrinal formulae. Yet even in those years it played a function, and the dry discourse reflected one aspect of reality. In recent years theory has again, as in the early years of the Soviet state, become an important medium for debate and for registering changing policies of substantial relevance to Soviet external relations, as well as in internal affairs.

Given this tendency, even tradition of American disinterest in Soviet theory, it is perhaps not surprising that the most comprehensive look at Soviet theorizing about international affairs comes from a British author. This study is, moreover, a good example of the British school of careful, thorough, dispassionate, and objective review and analysis of Soviet sources. It is much more than descriptive, and its analysis is critical and demanding, while maintaining a focus on the Soviet frame of reference in developing theory. The historical evolution of Soviet theory is methodically developed, usefully showing elements of adaptability as well as artificial constraint in facing a changing reality.

It is no fault of the author that much of Soviet theory set forth in the book is already being challenged and overtaken by the unusually far-reaching changes underway at present. A chapter has been devoted to "Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking," drawing on sources into early 1987. But the pace of change has made that discussion, while helpful, not adequate. Nevertheless, the study is useful not only for historical perspective, but for current analysis and for evaluation of future developments. It provides a necessary baseline for seeing what is new in the "new thinking" as it applies to theory of international relations.

The importance of ideology and theory in the Soviet political system is often recognized (or imputed) in the West with respect to communist *aims*. It is less often thought about or given much weight in terms of establishing guidelines for Soviet assessments of the world and perceptual lenses for evaluating the international environment, although this dimension is more relevant for Soviet policy calculation and decision. The broad fabric of theory on international relations presented here can help to correct that shortcoming.

A particularly insightful conclusion of the author, and one that illustrates the value of careful and critical analysis, is the observation that in the 1950s and 1960s peaceful coexistence not only reflected a conclusion that world war in the nuclear era must be avoided, but went well beyond that to represent in effect a Soviet mirror image of containment theory in the United States. It represented an activist policy of political rebuff and resistance to what was seen as an imperialist policy of aggressive pressure to roll back socialism and "progressive" forces. Also, as in the case of containment theory, the element of forceful restraint was coupled with an expectation that democratic change would ineluctably ensue, eventually mellowing the adversary and his aggressive inclinations.

A key theoretical issue today in the Soviet Union, one debated in a lively way by influential commentators and leaders, is the balance and priority between universal international interests (such as prevention of nuclear war or ecological disaster), proletarian international or class interests, and national Soviet interests.

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This is one of the issues further evolving since this study was made, but on an historical foundation well illuminated here. We need to give more attention to Soviet theorizing on such issues, both to enhance scholarship on the Soviet Union and to contribute to current American debate on issues of national policy.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

Leadership in the Modern Presidency *edited by Fred I. Greenstein. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1988. 430 pp. $29.95.*

Symposia are not usually promising crucibles for books, but this work is a refreshing exception. The Conference on Leadership in the Modern Presidency held at Princeton in spring 1987 has produced a volume of generally excellent and always stimulating papers on American presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan.

The editor sees the modern presidency as beginning with FDR in 1933 and as defined by four characteristics: "increased unilateral policy-making capacity, centrality in national agenda setting, far greater visibility, and acquisition of a presidential bureaucracy" (p. 347). One can plausibly argue that the modern presidency really began with Theodore Roosevelt in 1901; certainly the first three of the defining characteristics applied to TR and to Woodrow Wilson too.

Still, let us accept the editor's theory of modernity. He does not impose a rigid theoretical pattern on his contributors; and the authors of the essays on the presidents of 1933–1988 pretty much follow their own diverse bents. One regrets the absence of more systematic focus on the four alleged criteria of modernity, especially the last, the growth of the White House staff.

This important phenomenon receives surprisingly little attention, whether as aid or obstacle to presidential leadership. There is random discussion in some essays of the emergence of the chief of staff—an office produced when the staff became too large for the president to serve as his own chief of staff (as FDR, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson did). Statistics on the increase in the presidential bureaucracy would have been helpful. Joan Hoff-Wilson misleads when she writes that Nixon "inherited unwieldily large White House and Executive Office staffs" (p. 172); in fact, the great increase in the White House staff came under Nixon and has never been undone by his successors, though each has arrived swearing fearful oaths against the swollen bureaucracy.

Though the essays lack thematic unity, nearly all of them are valuable if somewhat disparate contributions. William Leuchtenburg makes familiar ground seem new in his expert discussion of Franklin Roosevelt. Alonzo Hamby's emphasis on Truman's "fragile" ego (p. 42) and psychological insecurities is both original and persuasive and leads the reader to look forward with anticipation to the biography on which Hamby is presently engaged. A surprising omission, however, is

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the constitutional significance of Truman's unilateral decision to go to war in Korea—surely a crucial event in the rise of the modern presidency.

Fred Greenstein ably argues that Eisenhower had an explicit and analytic concern with theories of organization. Carl Brauer offers a measured assessment of Kennedy, avoiding extremes of adulation and of revisionism while observing that Kennedy's "enduring popularity, despite best-selling exposés, critical biographies, unflattering docudramas and defamatory publicity, suggests that there was more to Kennedy's presidency than either orthodox or revisionist historians currently perceive" (p. 133). Larry Berman is dispassionate and instructive on Johnson; and Joan Hoff-Wilson's Nixon essay, usefully informed by interviews with the ex-President, portrays him as driven above all by a psychological need for risk-taking.

Roger Porter is benign and informative on the generally neglected Gerald Ford presidency. Erwin Hargrove explains Jimmy Carter's rise and fall in terms of the conjunction of skill and opportunity. William K. Muir, Jr, in the only essay to depart from scholarly objectivity, eulogizes Reagan as a man who set out "to achieve a moral revolution. . . to define a philosophy of freedom, to distinguish it from a philosophy of equality, and to plant it in the soul of the nation" (p. 262). One wonders whether the blithely disengaged Reagan can bear the weight of so portentous a mission; and though Muir makes some ingenious points, he greatly exaggerates the potency of rhetoric. Rhetoric does not change minds; experience changes minds, and rhetoric succeeds only as it interprets experience, which is one reason why Reagan's rhetoric will very likely evaporate in the midday sun. *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* provides rich fare for that ardent American tribe of president-watchers and polity diagnosticians.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
CUNY Graduate Center

The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition *by Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988. 498 pp. $27.95.*

J. Edgar Hoover was a remarkable phenomenon of twentieth-century American politics. Because his career spanned the years from Woodrow Wilson to Richard Nixon, it illuminates many aspects of American political attitudes and institutions. Hoover both influenced and reflected changing concepts of national and local political authority, the emergence and consolidation of extensive U.S. intelligence functions, and the development and exercise of the powers of the modern presidency.

Theoharis and Cox provide some of the raw materials necessary to understand J. Edgar Hoover, but their work is only a preliminary contribution to an eventual full assessment of his historical significance. Their focus is the abuses of power and civil liberties, which are the most controversial features of Hoover's official

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conduct. Especially valuable is their description of specific administrative methods Hoover used to create a backdoor system of files and communications to control illicit FBI operations and prevent their discovery by outsiders. Enough records survived Hoover's death to become accessible via the Freedom of Information Act. Athan Theoharis, David Garrow, and others have pioneered historical exploration of FBI files, and FBI Director William Webster established the position of FBI historian, staffed by a trained professional, to aid scholarly research. As more is published from these efforts, a comprehensive picture of Hoover will ultimately take shape.

Theoharis and Cox have an unfortunate tendency to mirror Hoover's FBI in their choice of language. Particularly in discussing Hoover's early years, they use loaded terminology that distracts from the force of the documented record of Hoover's eager pursuit of suspected "subversives." Not until the chapters beginning with World War II does the narrative stick more closely to solid evidence from FBI files.

The book carefully documents the relationships between Hoover and succeeding presidents and attorneys general with respect to FBI investigative methods. The central theme is the abdication of responsibility by national leaders who let Hoover's FBI operate on its own, so long as secrecy could be guaranteed. The authors see the result as sweeping violations of the rights of left-wingers. Perhaps as important, however, was the harm done to effective counterespionage. Failure to address the legal issues of surveillance of foreign powers and their agents made it extremely difficult to prosecute spies. After Hoover's death and the establishment of formal legal procedures (including a statutory court order requirement for electronic surveillance), the government has been able to secure convictions in numerous espionage cases. A thorough analysis of Hoover's role in the development of FBI counterintelligence capabilities has yet to be written.

Hoover deserves more credit than the authors give for the FBI's consistent espousal (through training programs and public example) of respect for due process in criminal investigations. When Hoover rose to prominence in the 1930s, police third-degree practices pervaded law enforcement. Hoover's policies anticipated court decisions expanding rights of criminal suspects and were cited as justification in leading cases such as *Miranda*. In an era of widespread government corruption, Hoover's insistence on rigid discipline for FBI agents produced a model that matches today's stringent ethical standards.

The hypocrisy of this image preoccupies the authors. They explain vividly how Hoover used his office for personal aggrandizement by adeptly manipulating the FBI's access to rumor and innuendo as well as to political and personal information acquired through investigations. Hoover became the self-appointed moral censor of national political life, and his services for presidents gave him virtual autonomy. Too few students of the presidency have taken adequate account of the FBI-White House relationship. On balance, the blatant anti-Hoover bias of this attempt at biography should not discourage responsible scholars from taking

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advantage of its wealth of detail about a fascinating historical figure and the organization he created.

JOHN T. ELLIFF
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(Views are reviewer's own and, of course, do not represent the Senate Committee.)

The Transformation of Old Age Security: Class and Politics in the American Welfare State *by Jill Quadagno. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988. 253 pp. $27.50.*

This outstanding book seeks to account for the distinctive features in the American welfare state by focusing on the issue of old age security. Clearly written, coherently argued, and well-researched in primary as well as secondary sources, *The Transformation of Old Age Security* succeeds in changing the character of discussion about the peculiarities of American welfare state provisions, including the late date of its establishment, its dual character distinguishing between social insurance and poverty programs, and its federal systems of administration.

Marxist in her argumentation, Quadagno, a sociologist who holds a chair in social gerontology at Florida State University, provides an approach to welfare state expansion that can explain the shared characteristics of policy in the various western capitalist democracies while simultaneously accounting for national particularities. She accomplishes this task by locating modern welfare state provisions as shaped most broadly by the social organization of production. Whereas poor laws were appropriate to agrarian societies with immobile labor forces, national welfare programs have been the appropriate vehicles for sustaining the poor and underpinning labor markets in an epoch characterized by commodified labor relations and labor mobility.

If the qualities of welfare state programs are broadly similar everywhere in the West, key differences in timing and provisions are significant. To account for these, Quadagno develops an approach to the state that rejects its autonomy; instead, she adopts Claus Offe's three-tier approach, distinguishing between policy making, the social matrix of power (understood mainly in terms of the capacities of social classes), and historical shifts in this matrix. Second, in a departure from the social democratic position that correlates the strength of labor movements with the expansion of state policy, she borrows from Gosta Esping-Andersen's work on Scandinavia a focus on the contrasting situation and political abilities of craft and unskilled workers. Third, she insists that the welfare initiatives of business be made integral to the analysis. Last, she takes seriously the idea that more than one mode of production can coexist within a given social formation with important political results.

In her skillfully presented empirical exposition, Quadagno weaves these elements

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together in a coherent analytical narrative. The argument goes like this: In the nineteenth century, the divergent political economies of South and North, as well as the legacy of the Civil War pensions system, gave the South strong disincentives to support national welfare state efforts. North-South differences joined tariff issues to welfare issues to the detriment of the latter.

In the early twentieth century, this sectional feature of the American regime interacted with two other key developments that impeded the development of an American welfare state at the precise time various European instances were being legislated. The first was the American labor movement's inability to organize unskilled industrial workers against strong business opposition and the propensity of craft unions to self-protection, in part because of their distrust of the state and in part because of their quest to secure control over a changing labor process. The second of these was the expansion of private pension schemes by large business seeking to forestall union organization.

The Depression changed the political calculations of these actors. Business could no longer sustain its pension systems; the South badly needed infusions of relief funds; Franklin D. Roosevelt's landslide enhanced the possibilities for organizing unskilled labor. That this new environment produced old age support legislation, Quadagno avers, is not surprising; but that the legislation was both market oriented, based on a contributory scheme, and that it distinguished between its federal insurance component for wage workers and its state-administered assistance plans for other elderly people demand an explanation. This she provides by arguing that large business had a pivotal role in shaping the social security side of the legislation and that the South defined the limits of federal activity in order to preserve the region's autonomy and its capacity to preserve its labor system and racial civilization.

After World War II, labor had new potential capacity, but in Quadagno's telling it contented itself with the successful quest for private pensions. Later, in the 1960s and early 1970s, as the South's political economy modernized and party competition intensified, the social security system finally achieved the retirement wage provisions common in other western societies, and the poverty side of old age security was nationalized in Supplemental Security Income (SSI).

Good books make theoretical choices, as this one does. This account of the American welfare state is attractive because it is grounded in history, theory, and comparative analysis; it is sensitive to short-term policy-making imperatives, but never loses sight of larger structural matters; it broadens conventional discussions of the welfare state to include both private sector and regional issues; and it treats the significance of labor much more subtly than most social democratic analyses.

Like all theoretically informed analyses, *The Transformation of Old Age Security* underplays some important factors, thus either explicitly or implicitly discounting these elements. Three stand out. The first concerns the state—both in theory and in terms of the treatment of state actors. Because of the important societal emphasis of the book, the state as an arena for competing class forces is stressed, thus leaving relatively unexamined those aspects of the state, such as

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the Social Security Board, which might have a distinctive shape and interest of their own. Quadagno's approach, indeed her claim that she could find no "state" but only institutional locations in government, makes it hard to treat the state, understood as an administrative apparatus with distinctive capacities and personnel, as a strategic actor engaged in transactions with social classes and interested groups. One reason this elision may be important to her argument is that in such transactions states can have a role in creating actors, identities, and definitions of situation and interest. The second element that is downplayed is that of expertise. Quadagno is so keen to refute arguments that old age legislation was mainly the product either of state or expert actors that she misses a chance to insert the experts as an integral part of her own story. Instead, experts pop in and out of her tale without a sufficiently serious analysis of their organization, role, interests, dispositions, and modes of influence. The final area, labor, she does treat at length, stressing the divide between craft and industrial workers and unions. By focusing exclusively on the working portions of the lives of members of the working class, she misses some of the peculiar features of American working class formation of work, where working class households have been integrated into political life largely by non-class-based political parties and interest associations. Without this half of the story, it is difficult to talk about a key feature of American exceptionalism—the absence of a social democratic party in the United States—or about those coalitional aspects of the Democratic Party in addition to the special role of the South that may have had a part in retarding the development of the welfare state and in shaping its content when it finally was brought into being.

IRA KATZNELSON
New School for Social Research

Political Discourse: A Case Study of the Watergate Affair *by L. H. LaRue. Athens, The University of Georgia Press, 1988. 172 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $10.00.*

The focus of this book is not on the Watergate events themselves, but rather on the rhetoric used by members of the House Committee on the Judiciary when it considered articles of impeachment against Richard M. Nixon. LaRue's thesis is that this rhetoric "tells us some important things about ourselves, our character, and our aspirations as a people" (p. 1). He believes that the representatives had a choice between two metaphors: rule of law or breach of trust. Their choice, according to LaRue, was to focus on the rule of law. Somewhat surprisingly considering his academic profession (professor of law at Washington and Lee University), LaRue would have preferred the second alternative.

The author begins with a chapter recapitulating some of the most significant aspects of the Watergate chronology. The most interesting part comes when he discusses the voting by the committee on the five articles of impeachment. He points out that only three articles were carried, the third by a 21–17 margin, and

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that a middle group of twenty representatives held the balance of power between Nixon's supporters and detractors, voting for some and against others. It turns out that the anomalous voting patterns he describes are related to the grounds on which articles of impeachment can be justified, issues taken up in the next chapters.

LaRue turns to the rhetoric of justification on the committee, pointing out that while all members were lawyers, they had to combine legal and nonlegal arguments to maintain their legitimacy and authority with the public. Chapter 4 focuses on the article that condemned Nixon for refusing to heed committee subpoenas for evidence. Here LaRue provides a close reading of the article and of the Thornton amendment to it which narrowed it considerably (condemning Nixon for refusing to furnish evidence that would have resolved questions raised by other evidence already in the possession of the committee) and prevented future impeachment inquiries from gaining an open-ended justification for demanding anything from the executive. Although the author presents his findings in the context of a rhetorical analysis, to me it seemed simply a matter of old-fashioned and downright untrendy statutory explication. But it was an especially useful analysis that demonstrated just how difficult it was to forge a winning coalition on that article.

In the next two chapters the author investigates the reasons why the committee refused to approve the articles condemning Nixon for income tax evasion and the secret bombing of Cambodia. Aside from a pithy rewording of the arguments pro and con, there is little that is important in these chapters. After all, the articles were voted down. But it is interesting to see LaRue taking reasoned exception to the thinking of committee members that Nixon's tax frauds involved unofficial conduct that was not a threat to the political system and that the bombing of Cambodia involved official conduct that had not been definitively proscribed by our constitutional history.

LaRue believes that the representatives stuck closely to the metaphor of the rule of law because it resonated with American political culture and with the institutional imperatives of Congress itself. Tampering with the judicial process (conspiracy to obstruct justice), misuse of official agencies (such as the Internal Revenue Service), and failure to heed committee subpoenas all interfered with the work of the other two branches of government. Yet rather than directly confront questions of power and institutional prerogatives, Nixon's actions could be put in a non-institutional and nonpartisan framework with greater public appeal. They emphasized, for example, the threat that Nixon's actions held to the freedoms of individuals (such as Daniel Ellsberg, whose psychiatrist's office was burglarized in an attempt to find material damaging to Ellsberg) and downplayed political questions of governmental structure involving separation of powers and checks and balances (hence the failure to press article V on the Cambodia bombing).

Most importantly, LaRue believes the committee missed the opportunity to cast the debate in terms of abuse of the public trust. The author reprints the speech of Representative M. Caldwell Butler, a Republican from the Sixth Congressional District of Virginia, who voted for the first two articles of impeachment. Butler

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raised issues of abuse of power, which the author believes "is exemplary, for it shows us how to reunite the metaphors of law, politics and trust" (p. 151). When we make law, we make promises to the American people. When presidents break or evade law, they break promises to the public and shatter the public trust in government, compromising their authority and the legitimacy of the system itself. These are the grounds on which LaRue would have had the Judiciary Committee debate and decide.

Although an eccentric and provocative argument, the analysis at the very least makes one more sensitive to the rhetoric and argumentation used by those who sat in judgment. At times it sheds new light on what exactly was being said. The book is short—perhaps too short—for it never considers the medium in which most of the rhetoric took place (televised hearings), the political game which was being played (national agenda politics with full public attention and front-page news coverage), or the effects the rhetoric had on the public (or potential effects public opinion poll results might have had on the rhetoric). These are not the concerns of the author, who is more interested in the political theory of the language. But it seems to me that the language cannot be understood in a political void, nor can it be understood without reference to the need to build a voting coalition on the committee. Though I found this work a fascinating addition to the literature of political rhetoric, I would have preferred a more inclusive approach uniting rhetoric and public opinion.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and The United States *by Sidney Verba et al. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987. 331 pp. $30.00.*

The most recent crossnational study of political culture by Sidney Verba et al. is an informative and often imaginative study of attitudes toward equality among Japanese, Swedish, and American elites. It is clearly must reading for students of political culture. And yet, like much survey research it tells us little about why things are as they are. There is no clear evidence that elite values affect anything of importance, and a fair amount that they do not. Take economic equality. Sweden has one of the fattest income distributions and the most developed welfare states in the industrialized world. The United States is at the other extreme, with Japan falling in between. So, Verba et al. have made an excellent choice of cases on an important problem. Now, what do we learn?

What we mainly learn is that elite attitudes are largely consistent with the state of affairs in each nation. A wide range of Swedish elites—the major parties, business, the media, feminist organizations, among others—largely support the welfare state, but disagree over whether income redistribution should be rolled back

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or further advanced. Comparable elites in the United States largely disagree over the welfare state but unite in opposition to income redistribution. And Japan falls in between.

This quick summary glosses over much detail, some of which is genuinely interesting. For example, the most leftish American elites—black and feminist leaders—specify ideal levels of income differentiation that are far less equal than those favored by the most conservative Swedish elites.

But do elite values affect anything? Verba et al. know that a rough congruence between elite values and existing conditions cannot prove what has caused what. But amid assertions that elite values "are, if not determinative, at least most relevant" (p. 113), they present no clear evidence of their supposed importance. There is, for example, a lengthy argument that conflict over economic equality is likely to be less "virulent and violent" (p. 241) than over political equality, but no evidence that this is in fact so. And when the authors seek to explain how Japan and especially Sweden became so equalitarian, they cite autonomous government decisions and national traditions of deference to government.

One test of whether elite values matter is what happens when elites largely disapprove of existing conditions, and the book does document cases of such disapproval. Nearly all elites in Japan and the United States, for example, feel that top business executives are overpaid. In another domain, everyone, including media elites, feels the media has too much influence. But does any of this portend imminent change? Verba et al. wisely refrain from suggesting so. But if autonomous government decisions can have effects of historic magnitude, and if large disparities between elite values and existing conditions have no particular policy consequences, why bother to study elite values, except for the values of actual decision makers?

Elites and the Idea of Equality deals comprehensively with its subject. It begins with an overview of the history of each nation as it relates to equality; examines patterns of elite support for political, economic, and gender equality; and relates all this to existing institutional and value cleavages. It is the best survey-based study of elite culture that I know of, and perhaps for that reason it makes the limitations of the genre most painfully clear. Like some others, I think cultural and elite values do matter. But solid evidence of how they matter—how, in other words, values interact with political institutions and other things to affect outcomes—is still lacking.

JOHN ZALLER
University of California, Los Angeles

Women of the New Right *by Rebecca E. Klatch. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987. 247pp. $24.95.*

Rebecca Klatch looks beyond media images of the modern conservative movement to provide an in-depth analysis of the political reality of New Right women.

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By employing a three-part methodology consisting of interviews, participant-observation of meetings, and textual analysis of organizational materials, she discovers, not the monolithic New Right outlook portrayed in more superficial analyses, but two distinct camps. Fundamentally different world views underlie the more visible aspects of the two groups' similar positions on major conservative issues.

The first group, social conservatives, consists of those women (and men) who see the aim of political involvement as restoring a once great nation to its former glory. Members advocate reliance on government policies intended to reinstate religious morality and the traditional family as the bedrocks of society. In addition to describing viewpoints of social conservatives, Klatch contrasts their appraisals of society and issue positions to those of contemporary feminists. While virtually no policy agreement exists between the two, similarities in accepted tactics for change and assessments of women's distinctive role in society are present to a degree we may not have realized.

Constituting a separate group of New Right women are laissez faire conservatives. These women base their identification with the New Right on the desire for total political and economic freedom, not on social issues. Contrary to the social conservatives, laissez faire conservatives are in more agreement with feminists on fundamental principles, particularly regarding the existence of pervasive discrimination against women in our society. Where this group parts company with feminists is in the solutions recommended. Rather than relying on government to level the playing field or provide affirmative action, this group advocates individual merit as the preferred corrective. In short, where feminists (as well as social conservatives) see government intervention as the key to rectifying a damaging situation, laissez faire conservatives see this kind of government action as an abridgment of liberty.

Klatch moves from describing the two groups of New Right women to exploring the consequences of their differences. Despite agreement on several major issues, opposing world views make the existing alliance artificial and unstable. In fact, Klatch speculates that the alliance may not survive the next presidential election. What is especially thought provoking in this discussion is further analysis of what each group has in common with each other and with feminists. Unfortunately, the considerable implications of these commonalties for novel political alliances, as well as scholarly exploration of such topics as gender consciousness, the gender gap, and policy-outcome differences based on increasing numbers of women among the political elite are touched upon only briefly.

The key contribution of *Women of The New Right* is its much needed and excellent examination of a subject that has received relatively little attention—the texture and richness of political positions taken by New Right women. Almost without exception, research on political women has focused on the intricacies and subtleties of feminist positions and ideological differences. The very real split between feminists who see women as inherently different from men versus feminists who see no fundamental differences between the sexes and the very distinctive

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kinds of public policies advocated by each is well-documented. With this additional perspective, we are able to understand more fully how women, like any other political subgroup, possess a variety of opinions and perspectives that make speaking in a unified voice difficult. Finally, Klatch's work shows us that whether or not we agree with the New Right perspective, we ought to celebrate the presence of these women, because their growing political sophistication and involvement further legitimizes women as political actors.

SUE THOMAS
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Urban Reform and its Consequences: A Study in Representation *by Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988. 154 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $10.95.*

Those periodically charged with redesigning city government structures invariably believe that their task is a serious one, that their choices will affect who has power and how it is used in the urban polity. By their struggles for or against proposed reforms, city politicians demonstrate that they too think that structure is important. The debate over particular reforms—at-large elections, nonpartisanship—invariably includes hoary claims about their effects. But the mixed and sometimes contradictory nature of decades of research findings has left political scientists uncertain. We have continued to ask, "Does the structure of city government really matter, and if so, how much?"

The welcome message of this deceptively brief volume for those who believe that urban reform can bring greater democracy and fairness to urban political systems is that structure matters after all. It matters for who gets elected, for how these elected officials view their jobs and do them, and for the feeling of connectedness of at least some citizens to the city polity.

Much is nailed down by this work that was strongly suspected but not fully proved by previous research. Nonpartisan elections do often have a pro-Republican tilt. In partisan systems, partisan differences organize differences on other issues, a result that can lead to greater visibility and accountability in the system. Earlier research showed that at-large elections were disadvantageous for black candidates for city office. This study establishes that in addition, as the reformers who advocated the adoption of such systems for city councils intended, winners in at-large contests tend to be more affluent and educated, to be less conflictual in style, and to bring a jurisidiction-wide focus to their jobs. Finally, voters, especially minority voters, prefer district systems, feel they have a greater impact, and participate more when they are used.

Entirely apart from its considerable substantive contributions, this work will have enduring value for the political science discipline as a consequence of the extraordinary data base it has generated to support further study. The authors'

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sample included 218 cities with populations of between 50,000 and 1,000,000 in forty-two states. Jurisdictions with pure at-large, pure district, and mixed electoral systems were included. A maximum of ten council members were contacted from each city. The authors' questionnaire was wide ranging and inclusive, yet constructed to test some findings of earlier work. A response rate of 61 percent produced a group of 975 respondents well distributed geographically and by city size, though some weighting was used to avoid oversampling those selected in at-large elections. Finally, results are clearly and carefully reported, both in tabular form and in the text.

Welch and Bledsoe conclude that "structure . . . played a modest role in determining who was elected to office and how that person behaved in office" (p. 104). Going a bit beyond their evidence, they speculate that the impact of these factors is not greater for five reasons: the growing importance of money in council campaigns, the emergence of media politics, the lack of a working-class party in America, increased levels of education in the electorate, and the weakening of political parties by other progressive reforms. Their normative message? ". . . [A]mong the existing choices, district elections in a partisan system probably provide the fairest representation of all groups and serve to structure political conflict and debate in the form most understandable to the modern citizen" (p. 120).

GERALD BENJAMIN
New York City Charter Revision Commission

The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age *by Roderick P. Hart. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 277 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.*

Speechmaking has become an essential component of the American presidency in the age of electronic media. Almost every action taken or decision arrived at in the White House is shaped by how it will influence what the president will say (or not say) about it, to whom he will say it, where the speech will take place, and how long it will last. Consequently, Hart contends in his important and highly provocative book, "Public speech no longer attends the process of governance—it is governance" (p. 14).

Hart's book analyzes the evolution of the art of presidential speechmaking over the past forty years, encompassing the Truman through the Reagan administrations. He employs rich data consisting of approximately 10,000 public presidential speeches gathered from the public papers of the presidents and materials in presidential archives. This ambitious longitudinal perspective reveals basic patterns that characterize presidential speechmaking in the modern era and also takes into account unique trademarks associated with individual presidents. This type of analysis also reveals trends that challenge conventional wisdom. For example, Hart documents how the "rose garden strategy" for presidential incumbents no

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longer means silence, but requires that presidents carefully orchestrate speechmaking ceremonies.

A core Hart thesis is that messages conveyed in presidential speeches are far less consequential than speech events themselves. Speech has come to be equated with action, and thus with power. Presidents' abilities to act directly on matters of national concern are hindered somewhat by constitutional, structural, practical, and political impediments. Presidents use speech acts as surrogates for direct action in situations where taking action is undesirable or impossible.

As a consequence, presidential speechmaking has become increasingly rhetoricized and personal. Rhetoric is the principal means by which presidents perform the act of leadership. Because remaining silent is no longer a viable option, presidents rely on a small number of traditional stock topics. They have found, for example, that international speechmaking is the most successful form of speech/action. In addition, presidents often use speech to distract citizens—to direct their attention toward things that are going well and to downplay those that are painful. Thus, in spite of the rise in the amount of presidential speechmaking, there has not been an accompanying increase in meaningful dialogue with the mass public.

Presidential speechmaking would have far less significance than it commands today if it were not for the mass media. Television, in particular, and radio provide showcases through which presidential speech is transformed into action. In the mass media environment, ritual and myth are emphasized. Symbolic action becomes the activity of leadership for presidents whose presence in the electronic media becomes larger than life. Fortunately for presidents, news agencies and personnel find presidential speech newsworthy. Hart notes that if the press were to stop listening, presidents would stop talking.

While the presidency and the press work together, they do not have a symbiotic relationship, but a parasitic one. Presidents make few moves without considering the likely response of the media. The media in turn rely on the president to provide them with news situations that conform to their format requirements. Hart makes the keen observation that these two institutions experience a basic tension over social control and gaining the allegiance of the citizenry. In order to maintain their position as guardian of the public interest, the press tends to portray presidents as manipulators. Hart concludes that the outcome of such coverage is that "the American people have little choice but to see their elected officials as powerful but as essentially duplicitous as well" (p.125).

This book is a lively, insightful, well-documented contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between presidential communication, the press, and the public. Hart asks us to consider the implications of the current situation for the future of American political leadership. This work should inspire many debates on these issues.

DIANA OWEN
Rutgers University

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Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process *by L. Sandy Maisel. New York, Random House, 1987. 315 pp. Paper, $16.00.*

This text should work well in undergraduate courses focusing on campaigns and elections, less so—despite its title—in those with primary emphasis on political parties. Maisel's stated intention is to focus primarily on elections as a means of holding officials accountable in a democracy and to consider parties to the extent that they structure electoral choices. Since this strategy is largely adhered to, parties are viewed in the bulk of the chapters as but one of the agents, along with political action committees (PACs) and the media, that influence candidates in their quest for nomination and election. Consequently, some traditional topics in the study of political parties, such as party organization, are ignored.

Maisel, political scientist and erstwhile candidate for Congress, does a good job of balancing the scholar's interests in the electoral process with those of the practicing politician. Each chapter ends with a section focused on the politician's view of the chapter's content. In some settings, such a juxtaposition carries a suggestion that "now we're going to tell you what politics is *really* like—not what those ivory tower types think it is." The Maisel treatment, in contrast, presents the narrower view of the politician as one that focuses on the short-term goal of winning, while ignoring the larger questions of accountability, openness, or probity considered by the scholar. As a result, the scholar does not suffer by comparison.

Maisel also draws on his practical experience and own scholarly research in two interesting chapters on nominations and elections at the state and local level. Going beyond the usual attention to the variety of legal requirements for nomination, he presents data on patterns of contestation in primaries and subsequent success in the general election. (A somewhat curious omission is the failure to consider extralegal preprimary endorsements and their impact on these patterns.) Similarly, a nice contrast is drawn between the high-tech "new politics" campaigns at the top of the ticket and the survival of door-to-door "old politics" in lower-level races. Careful attention throughout these chapters to what happens down the ticket is a useful antidote to overemphasis on presidential politics in so much of the discipline.

The chapter on voting behavior is perhaps the one disappointment in an otherwise fine text. Maisel concentrates on the "are voters fools?" question that arises from the differing perspectives of the Michigan vs. retrospective voting camps. This accurately portrays a certain aspect of the scholarly literature, but virtually ignores the pedagogical value of the concept of partisanship. To think of partisanship as a guide to behavior, other things being equal, or in the absence of information about issues, candidate traits, incumbency, and so on, is a useful organizing principle for understanding behavior in different electoral contexts. Given Maisel's laudable attention to these differing electoral contexts and his intention to consider parties as a mechanism for structuring electoral choice, it is a shame that the attachment to the parties represented by partisanship or party identification

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was not more forcefully presented. Aside from this minor flaw, it is a thoughtful text that is well worth considering.

NANCY H. ZINGALE
College of St. Thomas

Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves *by Melvin Small. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1988. 319 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $12.00.*

At long last we have an explanation for the decisions that Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon made regarding Vietnam. After interviewing over forty people in the two administrations and in the antiwar movement, and after reading much of the published and unpublished literature on the period, Melvin Small concludes that the antiwar movement and antiwar critics influenced public opinion and in turn, public opinion influenced, directly or indirectly, presidential decisions during the period 1965–1971.

Small notes, however, it is difficult to study the impact of public opinion on policy making long after the fact, a difficulty that he compounds by his disdain for empirical data and research: "The historian must rely instead on traditional tools to flesh out the often impressionistic evidence that allows one to make educated guesses about policy making" (p. 226). In the process he selectively marshals evidence to support his educated guesses. Discussing the 1967 march on the Pentagon, for example, Small favors George Christian's view of the march (it had a great impact) over that of Clark Clifford and William Fulbright (it had little or no impact) because "Christian's recollections ring true" (p. 117).

There is also some conceptual ambiguity. So many types of opinion—antiwar, university president, mass public, policy-making elite—are bundled under the rubric "public" opinion that the concept loses its explanatory power. Similarly, all antiwar people are lumped together as "doves," blurring the policy differences between them. Hanoi's role in the opinion/foreign policy process is unclear; it is not included in the conceptual model, but Small notes that in 1968 Hanoi lost the major military battles but won the battle for American public opinion. In 1969 Nixon did not worry about the movement's reaction to American bombing, but the impact of movement protests on Hanoi.

Recognizing the complexity of the opinion/foreign policy process and frequently lacking conclusive evidence, Small is forced to syllogisms to argue that the movement had a direct or indirect impact on the Vietnam war policy. To paraphrase one syllogism: if Johnson had to oversell U.S. military successes to defend himself against the antiwar movement, and if as a result the American public was unwilling to accept reports of military successes after the 1968 Tet offensive, then Johnson's decision to begin troop withdrawal in March 1968 was a victory for the antiwar movement. The causal linkage between the first two premises and the conclusion is assumed, not demonstrated. Many of the syllogisms constitute hypotheses to

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be tested rather than empirically valid conclusions; they are educated guesses, and some have greater face validity than others. Small's argument that the antiwar movement's activities led to a garrison mentality in Johnson and his advisers is well documented.

The book is most challenging in its analysis of the Johnson years; the author makes good use of the archival collections at the Johnson Presidential Library, written works, and interviews. Material on the Nixon administration is more limited (the author was unable to interview Henry Kissinger, for example), and the author seems unwilling to make educated guesses in the face of missing information. As a result, the book is less conclusive and less intellectually challenging when discussing the later war years. For example, Small is less certain why the antiwar movement declined after 1969 and why the Nixon administration seemed less affected by the actions of the antiwar movement than its predecessor. To argue that the antiwar movement succeeded in creating substantial opposition to the Vietnam war doesn't explain why Nixon and Johnson responded differently to that opposition.

JAMES J. BEST
Kent State University

The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics *by Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1988. 300 pp. $29.95.*

The field of international relations (IR) used to be blessed with a vigorous debate over fundamentals. A quarter century ago a new wave of political scientists promised to bring parsimony and progress to the development of IR theory. Traditionalists just as emphatically said it couldn't be done. Though never resolved, the debate stopped. The scientists seemed to win by default, and today most IR texts pay homage to the scientific method; if opposing views are aired, the works cited are either twenty years old or written by anthropologists.

Here, then, is a refreshing return to the vital concerns that motivated that debate. Ferguson and Mansbach allege, in unabashed opposition to much of the field, that international relations theory has never made scientific progress and that it never can. Instead, it will continue to cycle between the opposed poles of idealism and realism, rediscovering old truths in step with the "normative temper of the times" (p. 217).

Part I reviews IR theory from the middle ages to the present, arguing that it has always been shaped by broader normative imperatives. Thus the middle ages witnessed theories supporting a Christian empire and universal values; the rise of the nation state gave birth to realism and the legitimation of national sovereignty; the spread of democracy gave rise to idealism and the notion of popular sovereignty; and World War II gave rise to a new round of realism, which waned

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during the era of détente and such global problems as hunger, inequality, and environmental degradation. Realism might be on the upswing again.

The force of the book's central argument, that scientific IR theory is influenced more by normative considerations than by standards of scientific progress, is lessened by a blurred distinction between positive and normative theory. Although the two types of theories are quite distinct, and any argument concerning the impact of one on the other requires that the distinction be clear, the bulk of the book considers positive and normative IR theory as a whole. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the authors find scientific and normative concerns commingled.

In particular, the authors often appear to use normative IR theory as evidence for the proposition that scientific IR theory is slave to normative temperament. Chapter three, for example, is devoted to predominantly normative theorists—Aquinas, Dante, Padua, Machiavelli—but concludes that "what we have termed idealism and realism are not 'theories' in the scientific meaning of that term, but rather conceptual and normatively inspired prisms through which theorists and practioners view the political world" (pp. 77–78).

Even when political science theories are brought in, the distinction is blurred. Several pages in chapter four, for example, discuss early twentieth-century peace plans. It is never clear if these plans are intended as evidence of the normative climate of the times, or of the type of political science done at the time. Nowhere is idealist-inspired political science assessed on its merits. Lewis Richardson's theories, for example, are not evaluated, though his desire "to promote peace" is, as if that alone renders his work unscientific (pp. 92–93). Similarly, the most relevant point concerning post war realism, that it does not constitute a research paradigm, is made most directly in footnotes, with only a brief argument in the text (pp. 28, 144).

Without a measured assessment of IR theories, the argument reduces to a series of correlations between political science and popular norms, with causality asserted but not shown. Some assertions are plausible (postwar realism reflected the view that U.S. leadership would bring peace), while some are silly (Robert Keohane's neorealism reflects Reagan's cold war ideology). As a whole, they constitute less than compelling evidence.

The most explicit analysis of scientific IR theory takes place in Part II, a conceptual survey of the field. It offers some trenchant criticisms, the best of which draw from the authors' illuminating work on non-state actors. As a demonstration that the field is scientifically moribund, however, it suffers a fatal flaw by failing to elaborate specific criteria for judging scientific progress. Research efforts are simply peppered with a variety of criticisms, some petty, some profound. They see progress nowhere.

The authors' conclusion is bleak, though not hopeless. Research will remain noncumulative, but the search for theory will continue, if only because "our field is too important to abandon" (p. 222). Progress might become possible, they spec-

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ulate, if scholars reject the scientific method in favor of "the way in which humanists approach their materials" (p. 222).

MARC A. LEVY
Harvard University

Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making *by David W. Brady. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1988. 212 pp. $27.50.*

Brady presents here a full-blown version of "critical elections" analysis. He features treatments of good new data on House elections, committees, and roll calls during the Civil War era, the 1890s, and the New Deal. In such periods, he claims, electoral upheavals generate stable, cohesive House party majorities that in turn foster "major shifts in public policy" (p. 18) or "outpourings of new comprehensive public policies" (p. vii).

Everyone agrees that exceptional policy making in both the 1860s and 1930s was spurred, at least, by preceding electoral revolutions. Critical elections theorists, aiming for periodicity and greater generality, make the basic, familiar move of elevating the 1890s to the status of the Civil War and New Deal eras. Electoral upheavals in 1894 (congressional) and 1896 (William Jennings Bryan vs. William McKinley) invite this move. Does Brady make the move work? In his discussion of policy making he does not.

Brady cites two enactments, one policy thrust, and two time series as his evidence of major policy activity during the post-1896 McKinley administration. But the Dingley Tariff Act, Brady's first enactment, continued a routine party struggle over the tariff (though it raised rates to new heights). The Gold Standard Act of 1900 hardly constituted a major innovation. "The existing gold standard should be preserved," exhorted the 1896 Republican platform, and it was. Grover Cleveland's sturdy Democratic defense of gold (in 1893–1897) was thus carried on.

U.S. foreign expansionism, Brady's third item, fits his analysis awkwardly, since presidential administrations, not Congress, ordinarily framed policy. In Brady's favor, late nineteenth-century Republicans did outclass Democrats as imperialists, so a Republican administration was apt to outbluster a Democratic one. But historians do not credit expansionism to the 1896 election. Imperialism evidently invested both the general public and intelligentsia around 1890 and grew. As a consequence, Benjamin Harrison's administration (1889–1893) modernized the navy and approached war with Chile, a Cleveland ultimatum to Britain risked war over Venezuela (although Cleveland, unlike Harrison and McKinley, opposed annexing Hawaii), and McKinley finally fought Spain. The 1896 election, moreover, was not waged over expansionism. It lacked the causal connection between electoral activity and later military policy that one associates with, say, the elections of 1812

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(war hawks), 1844 (James Polk and Texas), 1860, and 1920 (reaction against Democrats and war).

Brady's fourth item is an 1893–1953 time series—percent change in House (nonmilitary) appropriations—showing a spike for the Congress of 1897–1899. His fifth is an 1891–1900 series showing surges in House agricultural appropriations after 1896. I have not been able to bear out these assertions of nonincremental late-1890s spending by consulting data on government outlays, data on regular congressional appropriations (i.e., both houses, without deficiency bills), or historians' discussions of late-1890s policy making. Brady's first series unaccountably starts in 1895. One starting earlier would track the evidently truly nonincremental spending triggered under early Harrison, when a Republican "billion dollar Congress" fleshed out a pension scheme that has lately been compared with European welfare-state plans, and in general enacted a legislative program grander than any under McKinley.

Bryanism was staved off in 1896, not deposed. Probably no one not under the spell of critical elections would look under McKinley for "outpourings of new comprehensive public policies." His appropriations data aside, Brady does not say what should count in principle as an "outpouring" nor does he look off his targeted times for instances. Probably most historians would trump the policies of the late 1890s with at least, in nearby decades, those of the first Woodrow Wilson and second Theodore Roosevelt administrations. There is the surprising Harrison administration. The 1876 election triggered an immediate and important, if not directly legislative, policy change—the end of Reconstruction. But all these instances violate the script of critical elections theory.

DAVID R. MAYHEW
Yale University

The Politics of Airline Deregulation *by Anthony E. Brown. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1987. 224 pp. $22.95.*

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 resulted in the elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the conversion of an industry that had been highly regulated to an industry barely regulated at all. Brown sees the process by which the deregulation of the CAB took place as defying the conventional formula that has been a longstanding doctrine in public administration. That formula sees incremental change and the process of change as so vulnerable to political pressure, most principally from the regulated industry and the regulatory body itself, that change becomes hard to accomplish. Because of that vulnerability we very rarely, if ever, see the kind of sweeping change that occurred in deregulating the airline industry.

Brown gives a fine account of the process of airline regulation. It is extremely readable and rests on a strong and solid understanding of the literature. While

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he makes stronger distinctions than warranted between his approach and the more traditional approach of public administration theorists, the book is well worth reading and the distinctions he makes are not without considerable merit. According to Brown, the mainstream analysis of the history of the CAB—both in academic scholarship and in the reviews done during the legislative process that occurred during CAB deregulation—treated the agency as reacting too often as a creature of special interests. The historic analysis did not fully appreciate the fact that the regulation engaged in by the CAB was more a function of the economic needs of the airline industry, as well as of the general economy itself, than a capture by special interests. Brown feels that the prevailing view of the CAB as being against principles of competition did not fully appreciate the pro-competitive stances that were taken by the agency, particularly when economic factors and factors within the industry made such stances feasible. Hence the critics of CAB regulation, by focusing on interest group politics and the situations where anti-competitive actions had to be taken, undervalued the effectiveness and sound policies of the agency and underestimated the contributions that the agency made. Brown believes in the classic model of the regulatory agency, a model that sees its actions based upon judgment and analysis rather than its capture by industry. He is not convinced that the movement for deregulation that began in the 1970s and has continued since then is necessarily correct. It is clear that he believes in a regulatory process that can be improved upon by managerial efficiency within the agencies themselves.

There are several things that occurred in the deregulation story that are well worth highlighting. The CAB reform started as a reform of the regulatory process, with an effort to bring the agency's discretion somewhat under control. But just as the movement for deregulation was being favorably promoted by conservatives, many liberals saw the CAB as anti-consumer and anti-competition. Thus, the coincidence of anti-competitive regulation and a climate of deregulation united the extremes of the political spectrum against the CAB.

The process of agency reform then took on the more far-reaching goal of deregulation. The legislative hearings began to intensify as well, because of the change in the public's attitude toward government, an attitude that saw so much of government regulation as evil. The lack of power and cohesion of the industry also reveals that the traditional analysis, which has always given considerable weight to the strength of the industry as an interest group, may well be more exaggerated than real. Added to these external facts was the fact that the CAB itself became an instrument for change, with agency leadership playing a prominent role in the effort to put the CAB out of business. Such a set of circumstances are those which make Brown look at the traditional theories of political change in bureaucracy with a great deal of skepticism. His message is clear: we have the need for traditional regulation, even if the regulatory process has failed to sustain the burden of justifying its utility.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Columbia University

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The New Unionism: Employee Involvement in the Changing Corporation *by Charles C. Heckscher. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1988. 302 pp. $24.95.*

This important, provocative, and highly readable book defies most traditional ideological pigeonholes. In it Charles Heckscher raises issues in such a way as to make both liberals and conservatives rethink what they believe about unions and their place in the American economic and social system. Heckscher's basic thesis is that the decline of American unions results in large part from New Deal labor law—the Wagner Act—and the logic of industrial unionism and contrived scarcity upon which it is based. He argues that the Wagner Act framework maintains a rigid, increasingly artificial boundary between workers and management. This boundary accounts for union commitment to adversarial tactics, the importance of the strike as a weapon in bilateral bargaining, and organized labor's insistence that benefits be based upon seniority rather than performance. Of course, this line can also be drawn by management, which is all too often willing to violate standards of fair dealing and tacit agreements for short-term gain and to make adjustments at labor's expense—using layoffs to adapt to market fluctuations, increasing worker discipline, and cutting wages and benefits to meet increased price competition. Heckscher acknowledges that workers are capable of solidarity and even militance, of striking and picketing in the traditional fashion, when they are treated as an inferior mass. But he insists that given the choice, they gravitate to less adversarial, more participatory modes of interaction.

Heckscher observes that managers have increasingly come to recognize the folly of treating employees as an inferior mass. To win their trust and cooperation and thereby to mobilize their intelligence and creativity, many firms now offer strong guarantees of fair treatment and employment security, and their top managers have established effective mechanisms for employee participation in the direction of the firm. Because such firms can generate an unusual degree of commitment from employees at all levels of the organization, they are often far more successful than their competitors in meeting the challenges of economic change.

Heckscher concludes that unions are declining because they have failed to meet the challenge of management reform: to adapt to participatory modes of interaction in which workers share work and allocate their own tasks and in which there is close cooperation among all the members of the organization and a strong sense of team spirit. Unions have failed to adapt because of barriers to worker participation established by New Deal labor law; under the Wagner Act worker participation is not encouraged and may even be illegal.

The paradox Heckscher sees in this development is that by displacing unions participatory modes of interaction have tended to concentrate power in the hands of management. Hence, the positive commitment, increased productivity, and higher real incomes that are the goals of management reform remain vulnerable to myopic abuse and deception. Heckscher notes, for example, that many managers are satisfied with the appearance of employee participation rather than the reality. Clearly, any ongoing cooperative endeavor requires a system of formal governance

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and representation to protect each participant in a relationship against exploitation by the others. At a minimum, such a system would promote free discussion of concerns within the organization, coordinate participation in organizational decision making, define standards of behavior, and promote trust. Creating a system of representation to check abuses of the employment relation is thus in the interests of all the members of the organization. Of course, a union is before anything else just such a system of representation. Consequently, Heckscher concludes that we need unions; but we don't need the kind of unions we have now or the Wagner Act framework that has shaped them.

FRED THOMPSON
Willamette University

Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France *by Peter Hall. New York, Oxford University Press, 1987. 341 pp. Cloth, $36.00; paper, $14.95.*

Peter Hall's excellent book on British and French political economy has already been widely praised. It also shared the American Political Science Association's Woodrow Wilson prize for 1987, an award richly deserved. It is a substantial and well-argued study in which Hall asks why Britain and France moved along different policy paths during the post-war period despite facing "similar economic challenges" (p. 21).

From this British/French comparison—a classic and fertile exercise—*Governing the Economy* discusses the general question of "the political dimensions of economic management" (p. 20). Hall wants to show in detail that the direction of a government's economic policy is not simply a rational response to current economic conditions, but is also a political choice. So much is, of course, obvious. But Hall provides an important history of the Thatcher/Mitterrand policy contrasts in the first years of their governments, and then their later convergence. He is able to show in conceptually innovative ways how politics pushes and pulls the management of the economy.

For all the book's value as a history of British and French political economy, in order to get Hall's point we need to see to whom he is speaking, conceptually, theoretically, and also politically. Hall emphasizes "the critical role played by institutions" and "institutional logic" (p. 5) in explaining how national economic policies are created and go along. To focus on institutions, he says, "challenges much of the existing literature" (p. 5). The "literature" in question is "competing functional, cultural, public choice, group-conflict, and state-centric models of politics" (p. 5). By rendering institutional variables their appropriate place in our model of politics, Hall claims to remedy a neglect in recent writing on European economic policy.

In fact, Hall's conception seems mainly a response to neo-Marxist and state-

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centric theorizing, which used to be in greater fashion at Harvard's Center for European Studies than it has been the past few years. Against neo-Marxist, class-dominant analysis (Ralph Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, Bob Jessop, Claus Offe, and others) Hall argues the contemporary European state is not simply "relatively autonomous," as we learned to say, but that state institutions and political life generally have a relative independence from social classes and the social bases of politics.

On the other hand, Hall does not really take on the state-centric theories completely, it seems to me. He wants basically to elaborate a state-centric conception of governance by adding economic and social institutions to what he argues is an overly-narrow, state-centered viewpoint. Thus he argues in particular that contemporary European states are not as autonomous as some state-centric studies contend. But the main point remains: national economic policy is a battleground for political struggles.

There are five variables of greatest importance in studying national economic policy: the organization of labor, of capital, of the state, of the political system, and also the country's position within the international economy. Hall uses "organization" as a synonym for "institution," a controversial usage conceptually. Thus he can argue that his institutional analysis shows an interdependence of the five variables, all understood as institutions in some sense. Hall contends further that some usual distinctions between institutional and free-choice decisions are "illusory": for example, the distinction between state-led economic direction and market leadership, because "markets are themselves institutions whose effectiveness varies with their configuration" (p. 282).

Organization is for Peter Hall not only of basic empirical but also theoretical significance. "Organization does more than transmit the preferences of particular groups; it combines and ultimately alters them" (p. 233). A state's choice of economic policies "will be heavily influenced by its existing capacities to carry out a range of policies. Those that require the costly development of new capacities are less likely to be pursued" (p. 16).

The main problem for British and French governments in economic policy over the past decade has been to find ways to impose austerity, *rigueur*—in other words, as Hall says, to reconcile people "to short-term sacrifice in the interest of longer-term benefits" (p.281). As paradigms, tripartite negotiations in Britain and state plans in France were postwar national characteristics. But both ways of doing economic policy making ultimately collapsed, each for its own reasons but both in the face of tough times.

In response, both Britain and France returned to market mechanisms—urgently desired by Margaret Thatcher's government, willy-nilly embraced by the Francois Mitterand government in 1982–1983. As a consequence West European societies are (or they were a few years ago) passing through a time of "class decomposition." Of great political consequence, a newly-enlarged underclass has been made to accept the worst effects of general economic austerity. At the same time, removing governments from their earlier close political responsibility for the general state of the economy resolved the "ungovernability" of West European societies.

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Because the underclass lacks the market power or the political organization to protect itself, it no longer is threatening to the politicians, who have abandoned it to the eternal tacit conspiracy of the better organized against the rest. Hall nevertheless concludes with a warning to the powerful: "in view of potential social unrest the political dimensions of a market strategy remain uncertain" (p. 283). The next wave of social protest and political organization of the disadvantaged — whenever it comes — will once again unseat established webs of political power.

RONALD TIERSKY
Amherst College

The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims *by Kristin Bumiller. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. 161 pp. $19.95.*

The author of this slender volume argues that while antidiscrimination laws assume that those who feel discriminated against will eagerly report violations and participate in enforcement proceedings, this is in fact hardly the case. A high proportion of victims, Kristin Bumiller argues, do not seek redress because they are intimidated, have lost confidence in the law, or refrain from complaining because they fear reprisals. As a result, the laws are largely ineffective. Redressing injustice through legal intervention has failed, Bumiller argues. She claims that the high hopes of those who helped enact the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and early 1970s proved to be largely illusionary, because they were based on a superficial view of the effectiveness of law in a basically unjust society.

Unfortunately, the book is long on moral indignation and short on factual documentation and methodological rigor. The source of data for the study was a household survey conducted by the Civil Litigation Research Project at the University of Wisconsin in 1980. "A sample of 560 discrimination claims was obtained from a sample of approximately five thousand households" (p. 26). There is no indication how the original sample and the subsample were obtained. In addition, a subsample of eighteen persons in Milwaukee and Los Angeles were interviewed in depth. The mail survey data give no breakdowns as to the types of the alleged discrimination, whether they concerned sexual harassment, housing discrimination, biased racial employment practices, or age discrimination. All these are among the cases discussed in the small interview subsample, but there is no indication of the relative proportions of these alleged discriminatory practices in the larger sample.

The unexplained admixture of different kinds of categories of discrimination is a serious shortcoming, because the legal redress for cases of discrimination differs considerably in various areas. In cases of housing discrimination, for example, all that can be done is a complaint to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and a case goes to court only if the individual pursues it at his or her own expense or if the Department of Justice finds this to be a case of a wide pat-

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tern of practice. All of this is cumbersome, costly, and largely ineffective. But in other areas procedures are on the face of it more effective, even if still cumbersome. In cases of racial or gender discrimination in employment, class action is a common means of asking for redress; but in housing discrimination, for example, class action cannot be used. To throw all sorts of cases into the same pot muddies the issue and makes the general argument subject to considerable doubt. This is a pity, since it is probably true that in a considerable proportion of cases victims of discrimination seem to be discouraged from pursuing their claims whether it be for fear of retaliation, lack of knowledge of legal channels, or a host of other reasons.

Had the author spent more time and space on convincing documentation and less on ideological pleading and moral outrage, this would be a much better book. This is a pity, since the subject is intrinsically important. As it is, alas, the Scotch verdict "Not proven" applies to the case at hand.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook and Boston College

Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva *by Herbert F. York. New York, Basic Books, 1987. 359 pp. $22.95.*

This is a highly credible and essential contribution to the history of American nuclear weaponry and of U.S. defense policy and programs beginning with World War II. As such, it provides wise guidance for the future. It is an equally reliable narration of aspects of arms limitations efforts in which the author has also been a rational, fervent, and dedicated member of the dramatis personnae. It will edify natural scientists, political scientists, government administrators, and scholars and students of the history of science. It will reward mature readers, inspire and encourage young ones. If a President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) or its equivalent is reconstituted by the next president, York should again be a member.

This is also an American success story. Herbert F. York was born in 1921 in Rochester, New York. His mother worked as a secretary in the shipping department of Eastman Kodak. His paternal grandfather was a railway express messenger and baggageman. His father succeeded to "exactly the same job his father had." York's father enjoyed his job, but he wanted his son to go to college. His son did; and this is the story of his life as a nuclear physicist, as a weapons designer/high-level administrator under President Dwight Eisenhower, as a negotiator for nuclear arms limitations under President Jimmy Carter, as the first chancellor of the University of California at San Diego; and, throughout, as a concerned, responsible citizen and compassionate human being.

The book starts with a concise history of the Manhattan Project, in which York was a very alert, very junior participant. The rest of the book describes the evolu-

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tion of the weapons programs, York's roles in them, and his efforts to contribute usefully to the search for "a means for maintaining peace and supporting freedom that is based on something better than the threat of mutual suicide." A panoply of major figures in these programs is spread across the pages. York knew and worked with a great many of them, and he describes their activities in vivid, dispassionate, and modestly expressed vignettes.

York regards his program for the reorganization of the United States's Space Program, approved by President Eisenhower, as the single most important act of his tenure in the Pentagon. He is certain that President Ronald Reagan's Star Wars program won't succeed. He enunciates three basic principles for survival: civil defense is impossible; there is no technical solution to national defense problems; the only hope lies in a political solution. He regards the Soviet government as different in kind, not just in degree. The United States must, he says, work out a modus vivendi with Russia. He emphasizes the practicality of being on the inside and influencing the established group rather than just being a protester. He has been greatly troubled by the hazards of the Launch on Warning doctrine. Consider the parallel to the July 1988 incident in which the USS *Vincennes* shot down an Iranian civilian plane over the Persian Gulf causing almost 300 deaths. York concludes his book and continues his work by emphasizing humankind's need for negotiated political resolution of major power rivalries.

Making Weapons, Talking Peace is an exemplary book, written with modesty, candor, and lucidity. It is outspoken without being strident, clear without being simplistic. For the generalist, this is easy reading; for the scholar there are notes and references; for all there are photographs, an index, and an illuminating glossary of acronyms and abbreviations. As the late I.I. Rabi once said, in another context, "What more do you want, mermaids?"

WILLIAM T. GOLDEN
New York Academy of Sciences

The State and the City *by Ted Robert Gurr and Desmond S. King. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 242 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.*

The past decade has witnessed a revival of interest in the state among social scientists. This development, however, has had limited impact on urban studies. In this important book, Ted Robert Gurr and Desmond S. King seek to integrate cities into recent theorizing on the state.

Gurr and King argue that national states have a major stake in the material welfare of cities. National officials are concerned above all with preserving order and maintaining their authority in urban areas. In the present day and age, this requires not simply policing, but also providing urban populations with various social services. In the United States, for example, the greatest increases in federal aid to cities occurred during the 1930s and 1960s, when threats of urban disorder

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were especially pressing; and they involved the creation and expansion of national welfare programs.

In addition to its strong interest in urban affairs, the state has considerable influence over cities. Gurr and King present data indicating that as much as 50 percent of the population of large cities in the United States receive income from the public sector through government employment or transfer payments. They recognize that market forces also shape cities, but argue that the decline of older cities in the United States and Great Britain in recent years was not brought about by the market alone. Rather, it also reflects the willingness of conservative national administrations to countenance urban decline; it could be reversed by governments with different programmatic priorities.

Finally, Gurr and King suggest that national officials have considerable autonomy in deciding how to exercise their power over cities. They support their argument by presenting a regression analysis of the determinants of intercity variations in federal aid to American cities. While acknowledging that officials pay heed to the views of voters, businessmen, and other private interests, they assert that these pressures from civil society should be regarded less as determinants of national urban policies than as constraints upon the ability of public officials to implement their own programmatic commitments.

It is possible to question some of the evidence Gurr and King present to support their argument. In their regression analysis they use various measures of urban need (for example, percent unemployed) as a proxy for the programmatic commitments of top administrative officials, because interview data indicate that administrators believe that federal aid should be distributed to cities according to need. Yet a number of the measures of need they use are incorporated into statutory formulas, and this provides the most direct explanation for why the distribution of federal aid to cities is correlated with urban distress. The problem of securing appropriate indicators is a common one in quantitative social science, however, and one of the strengths of this book is precisely that Gurr and King are prepared to subject their theory to empirical testing.

The major omission in Gurr and King's book is the absence of an international dimension in their analysis. National states, after all, operate within broader international political and economic systems, and those systems in turn shape the politics and policies of member states. Thus, international tensions played a role in bringing to power the conservative national administrations whose urban policies Gurr and King deplore. Future attempts to alter those policies will be constrained by efforts to bolster the international competitiveness of the British and American economies. *The State and the City* provides a powerful analysis of the relationship between cities and national states. It indicates the direction in which urban studies can most fruitfully develop in the years ahead.

MARTIN SHEFTER
Cornell University

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National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America *by Lars Schoultz. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 377 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $12.95.*

Written after the White House declared Central America vital to U.S. national security, this book documents the intellectual process by which policy makers link such small states to such large stakes. As long as stability reigns in the south, Schoultz argues, those nations are ignored by top officials. When Latin instability breaks through Washington's indifference, policy makers divide on its causes ("poverty" vs. "communism") more than on its consequences. As the debate moves to potential worst-case outcomes, a broad coalition forms to preclude or reverse any Latin process that might result in Soviet or Cuban gains "in our backyard."

Through unstructured interviews with 290 policy makers, Schoultz explored why most of them perceive instability in this hemisphere as damaging to U.S. national security. Their responses ran the gamut from strategic raw materials to sea lanes to hostile military bases, almost always within a bipolar context in which a loss for Washington represents a gain for the Soviets. Schoultz then evaluated these responses by researching the hard data on sea lanes, raw materials, reconnaissance, and weaponry. He found most claims voiced by policy makers to be exaggerated, dated, or bereft of context. For example, Soviet and Cuban opportunity costs are routinely ignored, future war scenarios are premised on World War II weapons and logistics, and frequently-cited statistics are often wrong (for example, the claim that three-quarters of our imported oil passes through Caribbean sea lanes).

One argument voiced by policy makers survived Schoultz's scrutiny, since it defies verification: that nameless other governments capable of tipping the global balance will perceive Washington as weak should the United States not prevail in its own region after a U.S. president has staked his prestige on a given outcome there, be it objectively important or not. Through such tortured logic, national security becomes a veil drawn across an atavistic impulse that dare not speak its name, save in Senator Jesse Helms's hearing. That impulse is our historic Monroe Doctrine "right" to interfere in the internal affairs of hemispheric states while denying other powers access to the region except on our terms.

Schoultz recognizes the existence of policy makers whose assessment of Latin America is that little tangible threat to U.S. national security exists there. Their counsel rarely permeates the top, however, for the region either is being ignored by high officials or dealt with in crisis mode—when it is assumed that national security is threatened. Even these top officials, however, hardly act as if they take seriously the national security rhetoric they invoke to mobilize each other, Congress, and the public. For instance, if the Panama Canal were as vital as claimed, a prudent administration would initiate alternatives, such as a pipeline across another part of Central America. Or if three-quarters of our imported oil passes through vulnerable Caribbean sea lanes, steps should have been taken by now to reduce that exposure, including the rerouting of Alaskan oil. The percentage of

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U.S. petroleum imports shipped through the Caribbean could be reduced to 13, according to Schoultz, were Washington willing to pay costs that seem reasonable where national security is at risk. Similarly, opportunities to reduce the threat of Soviet military bases were lost when the Reagan administration failed to support Contadora prohibitions on all foreign bases in Central America. Like a petulant spouse unwilling to do anything about a bad situation lest it lose debating points useful in another venue or another time, the Reagan administration took few concrete steps to reduce what vulnerability U.S. security actually experiences in this region.

Through contrasting rhetoric with reality, Schoultz successfully exposes most officials' flawed use of national security in addressing this region, a failing he attributes to their need to simplify under pressure. Writing from the other side of contragate, with administration attempts at perception management fully exposed, this reviewer finds Schoultz's Weberian explanation too charitable. At least at the White House we witnessed something more sinister than simplification: deliberate attempts to silence debate and to obfuscate choice by wrapping an interventionist agenda in the rhetoric of national security.

ELDON KENWORTHY
Cornell University

Crisis and War *by Patrick James. Montreal, Queen's University Press, 1988. 192 pp. $29.95.*

This is an unfortunate example of aggregate data analysis. Dependent and independent variables are poorly defined and do not characterize the events and processes of interest to the author. The analysis is terse and displays insufficient sensitivity to the problems inherent in this kind of study.

James wants to test the relative power of the "individual," state, and systemic levels of analysis for explaining war initiation. He defines "the defender (j) . . . [as] the first state to perceive an actor level crisis," and the initiator, as "the [first] state responsible for j's perception of a crisis" (p. 17). The definition is subjective and difficult to apply. Who, for example, initiated the 1967 Middle East crisis? Was it Syria, whose leaders felt threatened politically by Israel's policy of punitive crossborder raids against Fedaye'en bases in Jordan? Or Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, who feared the political consequences of not responding to Soviet and Syrian pressure to act against Israel? Or Israel, who was threatened by Nasser's remilitarization of the Sinai? Good arguments can and have been made in support of all three interpretations; they reflect different theoretical conceptions of initiation and contrasting political views of Arab-Israeli relations. James does not confront this conceptual problem.

James's specification of his independent variables blurs the distinction between the individual and state levels of analysis. He claims to be working at the individual

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level of analysis when he models the expected utility of war to policy makers. But as all rational actor models do, he defines expected utility in terms of the benefits that accrue to the attacking state and assumes a unitary actor. In practice, he measures utility in terms of relative military power, on the assumption that leaders only attack states less powerful than they. This is contradicted by empirical evidence. Adolf Hitler on several occasions, Japan in 1941, Egypt in 1969 and 1973, and Argentina in 1982—all knowingly attacked more powerful states. Initiators of recent wars almost all give evidence of having grossly miscalculated the consequences of war for themselves and their states. Examples include Iraq (1980), Argentina (1982), the Soviet Union (1979), Vietnam (1978), and Somalia (1977), whose leaders, if they could turn back the clock, would not have resorted to force.

James's operationalization of variables at the state level of analysis is even more problematic. It is based on the hypothesis that states will pursue aggressive foreign policies to cope with domestic disorder. James makes no attempt to distinguish among different kinds of internal problems (e.g., ethnic, class, or tensions within a governing elite) or among different kinds of states. Yet, there is every reason to suppose, for example, that industrially developed, relatively homogenous democratic states, whose governments face no legitimacy crisis, are likely to confront different kinds of domestic problems and respond differently to them than less developed countries with prominent ethnic cleavages and a history of frequent coups.

James's measure of internal unrest, decline in the consumer price index, is meaningless when divorced from the political context that determines its consequences. Once again, this differs dramatically from country to country. James admits that he chose this measure primarily because data were available for it. This consideration appears to have determined his choice of other measures as well, like the use of gross national product to measure military capability. It is one thing to exploit available data sets, but quite another to use them for purposes for which they are clearly inappropriate. Because James has done the latter, his research does little to advance our understanding of the origins of war.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Cornell University

Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal *by Theodore Cohen with editing by Herbert Passin. New York, The Free Press, 1987. 533 pp. $27.50.*

This account adds to an impressive string of studies by participants in the occupation of Japan. Like the others, this one is celebratory. It praises the success of reform-minded Americans, above all "the essentially populist" (p. 457) Douglas MacArthur, in bringing about "the wholesale transformation of the economy and society" (p. 463) of postwar Japan. But this volume offers much more than the familiar celebration. It is a sophisticated, polished, and even at times lively per-

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sonal recital that belongs on the "must read" list of all students of the occupation. Even the more general reader will find fascinating this fresh installment in the old and continuing story of the American effort to recast the world in its own likeness.

Theodore Cohen was well equipped and well placed to chronicle the occupation, especially its role in economic affairs. His expertise on Japanese labor, developed while doing graduate work at Columbia University, drew him into the wartime Washington policy process that produced the main occupation directives. Early in 1946, at the ripe age of twenty-eight, Cohen arrived in Tokyo to take charge of labor affairs and implement the very directives he had helped draft. This young New Yorker of Russian-Jewish background proved a staunch if anxious friend of a union movement then in the midst of explosive growth. He regarded strong, independent unions as essential to a democratized Japan, but he was also deeply troubled by what he saw as labor's apparent vulnerability to the machinations of Japan's "revolutionary" Communist party. Cohen thus emerges as a "liberal" cold warrior, a proponent of "the power of democratic ideas to enlist the masses of the world in resistance to the spread of communism" (p. 406). Cold warriors of a more conservative stripe, indifferent if not hostile to democratization and fearful of the unruly masses, tagged Cohen a dangerous radical. Finally, in 1947 MacArthur kicked him upstairs to serve as an adviser on economic affairs. Although now less visible, he continued to function as an acute observer and an effective, if not always popular advocate of reform.

After his retirement from a post-occupation business career in Japan, Cohen set to work in the mid-1970s on telling his story, supplementing his own papers with impressive research in other sources. The author died in 1983 just as the original, two-volume Japanese version of his recollections appeared in print. It is that version that Cohen's friend, the distinguished Columbia sociologist and former occupationaire Herbert Passin, has edited into the volume under review here.

Scholars should revel in the marvelous perspective Cohen affords them from his pivotal position in Tokyo. Beyond a finely and carefully drawn picture of the occupation bureaucracy and its key figures, he offers a richly detailed description of the often delicate and always complex relationship between that bureaucracy and its counterparts in Washington and in the Japanese government. Out of this mine of information on the bureaucratic politics of the occupation emerge the tacit bargains, the informal meetings, and the recurrent turf battles that are only dimly if at all visible in the formal record.

Cohen's readers will have to wrestle with a number of provocative conclusions about the occupation. His carefully marshaled case for a "New Deal" success in Japan directly engages the concerns of Japan specialists concerned with continuity and change in modern state and society and with the persistence in the postwar period of elite power and cultural patterns in the face of the American reform program. His sympathetic, even admiring characterization of MacArthur and his insistence on the complex nature of the "reverse course" in occupation policy will interest historians of U.S. policy and will unsettle some. Regardless of where they

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come out on these central questions, students of the occupation owe Cohen and Passin thanks for this sterling contribution.

MICHAEL H. HUNT
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Spain's Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-making *by Andrea Bonime-Blanc. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1987. 182 pp. Paper, $21.00.*

Following events in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been renewed scholarly interest in transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and, more specifically, in patterns of constitution making and their differential outcomes. *Spain's Transition to Democracy* is an addition to the growing number of studies of this phenomenon.

The first two-thirds of the book is a detailed case study of constitution making and the transition to democracy in Spain, which took place in the late 1970s. Beginning with what the author calls an *auto-ruptura* (the break with the old regime carried out within the legal framework of the Franquist system), Bonime-Blanc describes the varying coalitional strategies that the major political parties adopted after the 1977 elections and the conflicts and compromises ultimately reached among them at different stages of the constituent process. She concludes that constitution making in Spain was consensual, insofar as it was characterized by the inclusion of all significant political forces (with the important exception of the Basque Nationalist Party) and by the willingness of political elites to reach compromises over fundamental and divisive issues, such as the type of regime to be established (monarchy versus republic), the role of the Church, the electoral system, and especially the territorial organization of the state. Bonime-Blanc next examines the most important features of the "political" and "socio-governmental" formula included in the constitution and concludes that consensual constitution making produced an undogmatic, often ambiguously-worded document. Insofar as both the consensual process of constitution making and the compromise outcome greatly enhanced the possibility that broad segments of Spanish society would view the new regime as legitimate, together they were critical to the successful transition and to subsequent democratic consolidation.

Despite Bonime-Blanc's claim that studies of transitions to democracy are scarce and analyses of constitution making even more rare, she traverses rather familiar ground to scholars of contemporary Spain. A number of excellent analyses of the constituent process in Spain and of the transition more generally have appeared in English. A plethora of works on this subject have been written by Spaniards. Bonime-Blanc's study seldom takes these into account. Instead, she relies primarily on newspaper coverage of events during this period and on published legislative debates on the constitution. Bonime-Blanc's examination of the Spanish case tends, therefore, to be rather superficial and more concerned with the purely formal or

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more visible aspects of constitution making rather than with the complex and often subterranean political dynamics of founding a new regime. Moreover, there are some notable errors in her account. The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), for example, did not favor a majority electoral system (p. 68). The Basque Nationalist Party was not excluded from the Cortes subcommittee responsible for writing the preliminary draft of the constitution because of its poor showing at the polls (p. 81), but rather because of the profound distrust of its aims and fear of its disruptive behavior. Notwithstanding these problems, Bonime-Blanc's discussion of the major features of the constitution is useful, and her overall conclusions concerning the nature of the constituent process and its impact on the transition are on the mark.

The last third of the book begins with a comparative overview of constitution making during democratic transitions in Spain in the 1930s and 1970s, postwar Germany and Italy, and contemporary Portugal. Bonime-Blanc compares these five cases at various stages of the constituent process and assesses the differences and similarities among their constitutions. This section is too brief (20 pages) to provide more than a superficial comparison, but it is suggestive of areas of analysis that ought to be explored in greater depth. The final section is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework for understanding democratic transitions, and it is based on Bonime-Blanc's main argument that both the nature of the constituent process (consensual versus dissensual) and the actual outcome of constitutional deliberations (dogmatic, ideological versus pragmatic, flexible) are crucial to the long-term success of such regime transformations. In this regard, once again, no account is taken of existing theoretical studies of democratic transitions, and thus it fails to build on and go beyond concepts and typologies already gaining wide currency. Her effort, therefore, resembles a mechanical exercise in typologizing. The elements of a theoretical framework are there, but they have not been joined together to provide a dynamic theory of regime transformation. Ultimately, one is not persuaded that Bonime-Blanc's concepts and typologies are more fruitful than those set forth by others.

GOLDIE SHABAD
The Ohio State University

The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 *by Gilbert Rozman. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 396 pp. $45.00.*

To leaders of China's post-Mao reform movement, who are trying to modernize their country within the framework of a socialist system, the developmental experience of the Soviet Union is of abiding interest. In this valuable monograph, a companion to his *A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China* (Princeton University Press, 1985), Gilbert Rozman sifts through vast quantities of Chinese literature on the Soviet Union to present us with valuable and revealing insights into both the course of Chinese reform and the state of Sino-Soviet relations. The

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revitalization of the field of Soviet and East European studies in China in the late 1970s enabled both scholars and policy makers alike, liberated to a considerable degree from the fetters of the earlier Maoist orthodoxies, to reexamine the Soviet experience. The result has been a more realistic assessment of the Soviet threat that has contributed to the normalization of Chinese-Soviet relations. Chinese interest in Soviet culture, history, politics, economics, and so forth is deeper and more systematic than many western scholars may have realized.

Rozman's introductory chapters present the rationale for his approach and provide a chronology of Chinese writings about the USSR against the evolving background of Sino-Soviet relations. He then explores in depth Chinese writings (many of them from limited circulation [*neibu*] sources) focusing on major social groups and their problems (peasants, workers, the intelligentsia, and officials). Within each of the functional chapters, he employs a chronological approach based on Soviet history. One of the major themes to emerge from this exercise is that most Chinese writings view the Soviet experience in much more positive terms than do most western writings on the USSR. The Soviet Union conveys the image of an advanced socialist country that has faced or is now facing most of the political, economic, and social problems that China itself confronts. As such, its experience may be far more relevant to China, in the eyes of all but the most radical reformers, than the experience of such western non-socialist states as the United States. Yet, as Rozman reminds us, there are major differences between reform-minded Chinese writers and the more orthodox in evaluating the Soviet experience, and these differences can provide valuable clues about the ongoing political debates in China concerning socialist reform.

Rozman certainly deserves credit for bringing to our attention a large corpus of material that would otherwise have remained largely inaccessible. At the same time, however, too much of this rather large book consists of lengthy summaries and paraphrases of academic articles that read more like the author's unrevised notes than they do a finished analysis. Some readers will find the detail fascinating; others may well find it tedious and repetitive. Second, Rozman fails to distinguish for us the relative authoritativeness of the various writings he discusses; nor do his literal readings of the texts allow for the possibility that sometimes there may be a gap between surface meanings and what the author really intends by his words. Third, it would have been interesting had Rozman looked at what the writers of China's aborted democratic movement (1978–1980) hd to say about the USSR in their unofficial journals.

The fundamental reexamination of the Soviet system, past and present, that has recently commenced in the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev's encouragement, may in turn stimulate a further, more critical rethinking of the Soviet experience by Chinese Sovietologists and political observers. Should such a reassessment occur, we could ask for no more experienced and able guide to this new literature than Gilbert Rozman.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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